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ABSTRACT
Purpose and the Construction of Experience: A Theory of
Volition and Its Implication for the Release of Human
Potential.
(July 1973)
Patrick William Conway, B.A.,
University of California, Santa Cruz, 1969.

Directed by:

Dr.

Daniel

C.

Jordan

This dissertation undertakes two main tasks.

The

first is to develop a conceptual framework sufficiently

adequate to integrate the diverse range of theoretical and

empirical perspectives on the nature of purpose and its role
in the release of human potentialities.

The basic theo-

retical principles are derived from the organismic process

philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.

These foundational

principles, in turn, provide the basis for

a

critical analy-

sis of literature pertinent to the problem of purposive

The results of this analysis are synthesized into

activity.
a

general theory of volition which holds major implications

for educational planning, particularly in early and middle

childhood.

Volition is defined as the process by which

conscious purpose emerges and determines the structural and

functional aspects of human experience.

The theory then

analyzes volition in terms of three component processes;

attention, goal - sett ing

,

and will--each of which constitutes

successively more specialized modes of purposive activity.
The second task is to extract educational objectives

from the developmental trends identified and suggest proto-

typical learning experiences to facilitate the growth of

volitional competence.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most distinguished living biologists, Julian

Huxley, makes the claim that "Evolution on this planet is a history of
the realization of new possibilities by the stuff of which earth (and

the rest of the universe) is made--life [Huxley, 1960, p, 13]."

In

the case of the human species, the process of evolution has reached an

intensity which far surpasses that of any other known form of life.
This is due, in large measure, to man’s volition; his capacity to en-

vision potentialities yet unrealized, to develop ideals, and then to
translate those ideals, those potentialities, into concrete expressions.
By so doing, he becomes the chief agent in his own evolution.
this power brings with it great responsibility.

However,

It can be a blessing

History provides numerous examples of the disasters that

and a curse.

result when the vision is misguided (genocide, war, racism) to mention
a few.

Yet, to retreat in the face of such hazards would be to forfeit

any investment in the future of evolution.

As Huxley puts it,

It is as if man had been suddenly appointed managing
director of the biggest business of all, the business

of evolution. Whether he wants to or not, whether he
point
is conscious of what he is doing or not he is in
evolution
of
direction
future
the
of fact detemining
the
on this earth. That is his inescapable destiny and
the
it
in
believing
starts
and
it
sooner he realizes
better for all concerned (Ibid.).
,

collective
What all this means is that our continued survival,

fullest realization of man's poas well as individual, depends on the

tentialities.

actualize
And since the capacity to envision and

of the release of human
unrealized possibilities is the dine qua non
of all those whose business
potential, it deserves the careful study

concerns human development

,

particularly in the fields of education and

mental health.

A cursory glance at the statistics of pathology; the incidence
and recidivism, of mental illness, alcoholism, drug addiction, and im-

prisonment reveals that vast resources of human potential are not being
realized.

Many of these truncated individuals find themselves unable to

change behavior patterns which are detrimental to the achievement of
their ultimate aims.

A similar problem exists for large numbers of the

so-called normal population though to a lesser degree.
(1968)

,

Winter, et al.,

offer evidence that many persons seem unable to conceptualize

goal possibilities which go much beyond their immediate situation.

These same individuals demonstrated a corresponding incapacity for self-

directed change.

Consequently, it would seem that an important function

of education and mental health would be to foster within each individual
the capacity to manage his own destiny.

Much of the research and theory in modem psychology has emphasized the role of environmental and somatic determinants in human
development with a relative neglect for the study of intrinsic psychogenic sources of motivation.

As a result, the concepts of volition and

will have fallen out of fashion within many circles of academic psychology.

It should be added, however, that this falling out was not com-

pletely arbitrary.

One of the outstanding contributions of Freud was

of
that he cut through the rather self-deceptive and naive notion
resoVictorian will-power, the omnipotent faculty by which men made

impeccably lational
lutions and purportedly directed their lives down the
path.

As Rollo May concludes,

xiii

The view that emerged was of man determined- -not driving
but driven.
'Man is lived by the unconscious' as Freud
put it.
'The deeply rooted belief in psychic freedom
and choice is unscientific and must give ground before
the claims of a determinism that governs mental life'
(1970).
Skinner, too, in his most recent book indicts the notion of

man as an autonomous free -agent whose behavior is determined by inner
processes that are purportedly independent of direct environmental influences.

Working from within his conceptual system of operant control,

his powerful argument leads him to assert,

An experimental analysis shifts the determination of
behavior from autonomous man to the environment- -an
environment responsible for both the evolution of the
species and the repertoire acquired by each member.
Environmental contingencies now take over the function
(Skinner, quoted
we once attributed to autonomous man
in Psychology Today
September 1971 )
,

Skinner's polished, well-reasoned argument masks a crucial

weakness in his position.

As can be seen, Skinner's system shifts the

source of control to environmental selection.

But nowhere does he

clearly delineate those conditions which constitute the environment.

If

environment is qualified in terms of those elements which evoke responses,
then clearly the environment includes the inner experience of one's
thoughts, feelings and fantasies.

Without a doubt, these have important

roots in exteroceptive stimulation, but ideas also involve the integration

of traces of past stimulation with the feelings and sensations in the

present into a unified experience.

Insofar as the process of integration

determines his enis enacted by the organism then the organism in part

vironment.

inAll this is merely a roundabout way of saying that the

shaping his actions.
dividual exercises a measure of self-detexmination in

xiv

Skinner's failure to make a qualitative
distinction between these levels
of experience which characterize the
organism's environment thus leads

him to make deceptive conclusions about the
nature of freedom and the
self -directed control of behavior.
Because ideas are important sources of data for human
behavior, the belief one holds about this issue of
self-determination

will greatly influence the way in which educators and
counsellors ap-

proach their tasks.

For this very reason, it is vitally important that

the conceptual scheme underlying empirical and speculative efforts
be

adequately formulated with respect to comprehensiveness (adequacy of
scope), logical consistency, and coherence.
Thus, a preliminary aim of this dissertation is to concep-

tualize the nature of those processes by which an individual self-

determines his experience; specifically, how one's ideal aims and purposes are expressed in one's activity.

It has been nearly half a cen-

tury since American psychology has attempted to formulate a comprehensive theory of volition and in the interim a wide range of relevant

empirical evidence has accrued.

Consequently, a renewed attack on the

problem and a new integrative effort, such as is attempted here, seems
appropriate.

Because the concept of volition relies so heavily on the acceptance of purposive causation and because there is sharp controversy
over the scientific status of teleological (purposive) explanations,

many experimental psychologists have been moved to discard volition altogether.

Chapter One thus seeks to clarify and resolve this contro-

versy on a very fundamental level of analysis.
xv

The organic philosophy

of Whitehead provides a basic interpretive framework
within which the
structural and functional role of purpose can be understood.

This

framework then serves both as the focal agent for the integration
of

various contributing data sources and the foundation on which the

theory is constructed.

Following this, each component process of the

theory is discussed in depth:

In Chapter Two, "Attention"; in Chapter

Three, "Goal -Setting”; and finally, in Chapter Four,

,T

Will."

A three-

digit reference system is used to identify each chapter, main section
and subsection.

The first digit designates the chapter number; the

second digit, the number of the main division within the chapter; and
the last digit signifies the particular section appearing under the main

division.

The intention is to provide a clearer notion of how each

section is structurally related to the rest of the document and also to
aid in reference.
The second aim is to begin bridging the gap between theory
and practice.

Specific implications are derived from the theoretical

model suggestive of ways in which an educator or counsellor can facilitate the development of each aspect of volitional competence.

These ap-

plications are advanced as seminal ideas which should be accommodated
and expanded according to the exigencies of the curriculum.

Many of

the techniques are not in themselves novel and although the scheme of

ideas may not at this point yield new techniques, the ideas nevertheless affect the perspective in which established techniques are applied.
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1.1 METAPHYSICAL BASIS
OF MODERN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

1.1.1

MATERIALISM AND THE PARTITIONING
OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
Among the many significant events in the history of western

thought , there is one which has particular importance for the purpose

of the present topic- -the divergence of philosophy and natural science
that began roughly around 1700 with the publication of Issac Newton’s

Prinoipia and Scholium.

The tremendous import of these documents,

Whitehead observed, is that they constitute the clearest, most definite,
and most influential statement among cosmological speculations of man-

kind up to that time (Whitehead, 1925).

At last, a scheme of prin-

ciples had been postulated against which all phenomena in the physical

universe could be analyzed, understood, and predicted.

There was

nothing within the range of the known universe which could not be explained, at least in principle if not in fact, by these "laws."

More-

over, the laws of force, gravitation, space, time, and velocity pre-

sented a vision of the universe which in no way required or admitted
the intervention of other kinds of explanatory principles.

As such,

science was presumed to have no need for metaphysics, and universities

divided their courses of study into natural science and moral science,
the former concerned with explaining the physcial universe while the

latter dealt with the realm of ideas.

Although such a separation may have been beneficial at
that time to the advancement of science, it has produced unfortunate

limitations of thought on both sides.

For science, the rejection of

2

metaphysical introspection has deprived it of a means for critically
examining the assumptions and axioms upon which its methodologies
are
based.

At the same time, philosophy has ceased to be concerned with

speculating on the general implications of scientific knowledge in a

given field for other areas of human inquiry.

Perhaps no science has

suffered more as a result of this partitioning than psychology.

The

metaphysical framework underlying most of twentieth century American
experimental psychology can be traced to the materialist philosophy
rooted in Newtonian mechanics.

But this has resulted in a curious

anachronism since the physical science model upon which this philosophy was founded no longer holds in the light of more recent advances
in physics and chemistry.

This state of affairs has led Sigmund Koch,

editor of the volumes entitled Psychology:

The Study of a Science , to

write the following about the status of modem psychology,
Whether as a ’’science" or any kind of coherent discipline
devoted to empirical study of man, psychology has been
misconceived.
.

.

Indeed, the pooled pseudo -knowledge that is much of
psychology can be seen as a congeries of alternate- -and
exceedingly simple- -images, around each of which one finds
a dense scholastic clutter of supportive research theorizing and methodological rhetoric (Koch, 1969).

Koch is only one among many thinkers who share this basic
perspective.

The mere fact that psychoanalysts, Gestalt ists and be-

haviorists, all of whose endeavers fall under the rubric of psychology,
seem to have little to say to one another, testifies to the fragmented

condition of psychological thought.

For this reason we have chosen to

delve heavily into philosophical discussion.

The only means by which

we can transcend the discordant polemics within the behavioral

3

sciences to seek a more general scheme of ideas that
will allow us
to unify the insights of various modes of psychological
inquiry and

achieve a more coherent perspective.

As Whitehead wrote,

We have to discriminate between weight to be given to
scientific opinion in the selection of its method and
its trustworthiness in formulating judgements of the
understanding. The slightest scrutiny of the history
of natural science shows that current scientific opinion is nearly infallible in the former case and is invariably wrong in the latter case (Whitehead, 1925).

Before proceeding further with this line of thought the

writer wishes to draw attention to the specific anomaly which prompts
this metaphysical introspection.

1.1.2

THE CRISES OF MENTALITY
AND PURPOSE

American experimental psychology found its scientific identity in the behaviorist movement almost 60 years ago.
B.

In 1924 John

Watson wrote,
All schools of psychology except that of behaviorism
claim consciousness is the subject matter of psychology.
Behaviorism, on the contrary, holds that the subject
matter of human psychology is the activities of the human
being.
Behaviorism claims that consciousness is neither
definable nor a usable concept; that it is merely another
word for the soul of more ancient times (Watson, 1924).
These well-known words heralded the systematic purging of

terms such as "mind," "thought," "idea," in fact, any reference to

mentality from the lexicon of experimental psychology.

Also dis-

carded were terms such as "will," "purpose," and "volition."

The ex-

tent of this purging can be seen when one searches through the

Psychological Abstracts

From the mid-thirties until the present,

there are only two or three entries under the headings of either
"will" or "volition."

It is true that mentality is gradually working

4

its way back into the concern of experimental psychology
and, in fact,

the issue of purpose never did escape completely from the arena.

This

was due largely to the efforts of Tolman and his theory of "purposive

behaviorism."
Tolman’ s system is known as "Purposive Behaviorism" because

he felt that some role for cognitive expectancy was required in a des-

cription of behavior.

His emphasis upon the cognitive aspects of be-

havioral situations provided a stark contrast to Clark Hull and his
followers.

But, when considered in a larger context, we see that even

the psychology of Tolman shared many of the same underlying assump-

tions as did the theories of Watson, Hull, Spence and Skinner.

Two of

these major assumptions that have persisted stubbornly in the minds of

psychologists are

(1)

the principle of reductionism (defined in Section

1.1.3), and (2) the principle of dualism (discussed in Section 1.1.7

and 1.1.8).

The argument developed in the following pages will demon-

strate how both of these epistemological schemes have in part allowed

psychologists to neglect the problem of will and volition and that
this neglect has proved suppressive to the growth of a meaningful and

adequate theory of human behavior.
The scope of scientific inquiry is largely determined by
the nature of one's basic assumptions about what reality is or ought
to be.

"If one is drawn by unassailable scientific argument to the

conclusion that man is a cockroach, rat or do," wrote Koch, "that

makes a difference."
It also makes a difference when one achieves ultimate
certitude that man is a telephone exchange, a servomechanism, a binary digital computer, a reward -seeking

5

vector, a hyphen written within an S-R process,
a stimulator maximizer, a food, sex, or libido
energy converter, a utilities-maximizing game
player, a status seeker, a mutual ego-titillator
a mutual emotional (or actual) masturbator (Koch,
1969 )

The point here is that the beliefs a man holds about him-

self and his fellows will indeed make a difference in the way he
interprets his experience.

Since scientists are also human beings, they

are no more immune to such influences than anyone else.

The difference

between laymen and scientists is that a scientist has formalized and
quantified a methodology by which to interpret his evidence, a tool
that works very efficiently within its chosen limits.

The methods of

analysis used in studying human brainwave patterns, for example, do

not allow a physiologist to infer the difference between logical versus
illogical thought processes.

This does not deny the possibility that

different brainwave characteristics may be correlative with either of
the two processes.

But it does assert that such a differentiation can

be sought and made only because one first acknowledges such a dis-

tinction as real within one's experience.

Such a differentiation, it

may be added, comes from outside the boundaries of physiological
method.

Likewise, reductionism and dualism, though enormously suc-

cessful for two centuries of technological and scientific advancement,
fail to illumine many important aspects of common experience which are

not easily contained within their limits.

Moreover, psychology has,

by and large, stubbornly refused to admit even the existence of these
aspects as potential realities for investigation.

No one has put it

6

more succinctly than Whitehead when he once remarked,
We have here a colossal example of anti-empirical
dogmatism arising from a successful methodology.
Evidence which lies outside the method simply does
not count (Whitehead, 1929a, p. 15).
The issue in question is whether the conspicuous exclusion of concepts

such as volition and will from the field of experimental psychology

can be justified.

For the moment, these concepts may be placed under

the category of explanation designated by Aristotle as types of "final

cause," causes attributable to the unrealized ends toward which the

event progresses.

Presumably, in "efficient causes" no such reference

to ends is needed to explain the occurrence of an event.

Final causes do not imply, as critics have sometimes ccm-

plained, that future events which have no existence in the present,

somehow mysteriously govern the present.

Clark Hull exemplified this

misconception when he said,
In its extreme form teleology is the name of the
belief that the terminal stage of certain environmental -organismic interaction cycles somehow is at
the same time one of the antecendent determining
conditions which bring the behavior cycle about
(Hull, 1943, p.

26).

Such an account is very strange in that action may be done for a

purpose and yet that purpose may never be achieved.
has happened on a number of occasions that

I

For example, it

have shouted at a stray

dog as he was scrounging in the garbage, with the purpose of frightening him away only to find that the dog pays no attention to my antics.

Yet, whether or not the goal was realized in no way invalidates the

explanation of my behavior in terms of the stated purpose.

The con-

fusion arises from failing to distinguish what is potential, the goal

7

in mind, from what is actual, the concrete
result of the ensuing ac-

tions.

Obviously, of the two, the former proposition is the
only

logical and coherent meaning of purpose.

1.1.3

REDUCTION ISM
Reduction in general denotes the explanation of one set of

statements, "A" by another set "B" with explanation here referring to
the logical derivation of all the statements in the set "A" from the
set "B."

This logical derivation may be effected in various ways,

thus yielding different types of reduction.

Here, two senses of re-

duction must be distinguished, strict -reduct ion and empirical re-

duction (Boden, 1972, p. 53).
In the case of strict reduction, the two sets of statements,

A and B are totally equivalent.

That is, A and B must be identical in

meaning, denote one and the same general domain and refer to the same
aspect of reality.

To show that psychology is strictly reducible to

physiology would be to show that the meaning of every purposive statement is contained within the meaning of a physiological statement.
Thus, when a behaviorist claims that purposive accounts are mere short-

hand for physiological ones, he implies that physiological accounts can

express everything that is expressed by purposive accounts.

As Boden

points out, "The result is that a strict reduction of Science A to
science B renders the vocabulary of A logically redundant or superfluM
ous [Ibid., p. 54].

Empirical reduction, on the other hand, relies upon factual

rather than logical isomorphism between the two sets of statements
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concerned.

This, in effect, means that the two sets of
statements, A

and B, refer to the same spatio-temporal event but
to different aspects
of that event so that the theoretical terms have
identifiably different

meanings.

Consequently, the vocabulary of "A" could not be dispensed

with once the reduction had been effected, without losing sight of
the
descriptive properties and explanatory relations expressed by it.

A case in point

is the explanation of a scientific theory or

a set of experimental principles (such as fluid mechanics) formulated

from some other more "basic’' domain.

Thus, the laws and principles of

thermodynamics can provide a full description of the sufficient and

necessary conditions for the phenomenon described by the laws of fluid
mechanics, and in terns of causal conditions required, they can be fully

accounted for within the more basic domain.

Put another way, all the

laws of the less basic science must be logically derivable from the

theoretical premises of the more basic science.

However, the value of

the less basic science presumably lies in its power to explain in

greater parsimony the relations existing among various conditions

caused by activity describable in terms of the more fundamental science.
There are few psychologists left who would admit to being
strict reductionists, but empirical reductionism is a very common

characteristic of contemporary psychological theory.

The critical

factor common to both versions of reductionism is their position on
the issue of causation:

The causal principles of the more basic sci-

ence should he necessary and sufficient conditions to explain the

causally efficacious events observed in the categories of the less
basic science.
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With this rather abstract definition of reductionism in
hand, we can now proceed to examine its particular
applications within the field of psychology, i.e., the widely accepted notion
that

psychological processes are in principle explainable in mechanistic
terms.

Nagel distinguishes the three general criteria for mechanical explanation as follows:
(a)
Its ultimate premises assert that the time rate
of change in the momentum of a physical system is a
function of the magnitude and direction of the forces
acting on it.
(b)
The direction of the change in
momentum of a body is along the direction of the impressed force; and the direction of such a change
associated with several forces is along the direction
of the vectorial sum of the component forces,
(c)
The forces are specified exclusively in terms of the
spatio-temporal magnitudes and relations of bodies, a
universal constant, and a number of constant coefficients (assumed to be listed exhaustively) whose
values depend on the individual properties of a given
system of bodies [Nagel, 1961, p. 170].

Obviously, the breadth of what may be included under

mechanistic explanations depends in part upon the kinds of forceconstants, and co-efficients allowed under the third condition.

Ex-

planations appealing to force components specifiable in terms of

Newtonian equations and of various other functions such as mass, electric charge, magnetic flux, viscosity, can be included in this category.

For present purposes, as far as psychological theory is concerned, we

may accept Boden's summary that "The mechanist viewpoint maintains
that other scientific explanations are reducible to explanations that
are admittedly physico-chemical in nature [Boden, 1972, p. 38]."

In

terms of the Aristotelian categories we might rephrase this statement
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by saying that the mechanistic view seeks to explain behavior
completely in terms of efficient causes and in fact regards any
reference to

final (teleological) causes as ipso faoto unscientific.

As we shall

see, this postion implicitly denies the possibility of causal influen-

ces attributable to subjective psychological categories such as "con-

sciousness," "foresight," "purpose," etc., while the logical extension

of this is an irreconcilable dualism between mind and body.
Two theories representing the major trends in

modem

psych-

ology, namely, psychoanalysis and behaviorism, are both subject to the

criticism of effecting an "unwarranted reductionism" in theorizing that
for scientific purposes, mental processes can be exhaustively explained
in terms of their correlative physio -chemical processes.

As Whitehead

muses on this incredible paradox,

Many a scientist has patiently designed experiments for
the purpose of substantiating his belief that animal
operations are motivated by no purposes. He has perhaps
spent his spare time in writing articles to prove that
human beings are as other animals, so that purpose is
a category irrelevant for the explanation of bodily
activities, his own activities included. Scientists
animated by the purpose of proving that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study
(Whitehead, 1929a, p. 16).

1.1.4

REDUCTIONISM IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
Psychoanalysis conceptualizes human behavior as primarily

motivated by unconscious drives, the specific modes of which are established physiologically (or physico- chemically) in early childhood and

which determine resulting behavior throughout the individual’s life.
Freud’s materialistic bias was never more clearly stated than in his
first major theoretical work, Project for a Scientific Psychology
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The intent of this project is to furnish us with
a psychology which shall be a natural science;
its
aim, that is, is to represent psychical processes
as quantitatively determined states of specifiable
material particles and so to make them plain and
void of contradiction
(Freud, quoted in Shepard,
v
1972 )
.

Freud went on to explain that psychical processes were to
be considered as a quanta of energy which were subject to the laws of

motion and that the material particles were the "neurons" in the brain.
These neurons, each one of which Freud believed to be a distinct cell

devoid of connections with other cells, were the building -block
functional units of the nervous system.

,

The inherent character of

these cells is that they had a tendency to discharge energy.

It was

from this basic character of neurons that Freud derived the notion of

primary and secondary processes.

The primary function or process of

the neuronic system was the discharge of neuronic energy which had been

generated by the internal needs of the body; hunger, etc.
there was

Conversely,

also the need to store enough of this energy to meet the de-

mands of life- -hence, secondary functions and processes.

These

secondary processes were seen as the prime mechanism of self preservation.

Although later he eventually abandoned this attempt to directly

reduce psychology to neurology, Freud still relied on the same theo-

retical framework in his explanations.

Lowry's review of some of

Freud's purely clinical speculations reveals that his analysis re-

mained physicalistic and retained a materialist metaphysical framework; "libido" and "eros" were substituted in the place of "neuronic

inertia" but they were assumed to perform basically the same physio-

chemical function as the latter
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Although psychoanalysis is attributed with the vice of overstatement, i.e.

,

extending a system of explanation beyond the relatively

narrow range of conditions over which its assumptions are met, Freud
himself tended to be quite modest in referring to the focus of his
theories, "I have always confined myself to the ground floor and base-

ment of the edifice called man [Frankl, 1969].”

And elsewhere, "Psycho-

analysis grew on a narrowly restricted base [Peters, 1958].”

In fact,

Peters (Ibid.) convincingly argues that Freud originally intended his

theory of the unconscious to be used only to explain instances of de-

viation from normal purposive actions.
1.1.5

REDUCTIONISM IN BEHAVIORISM
Behaviorism was predicated upon the assumption that behavior

of even the most complex order could be understood by reducing it to an

elaborate accumulation of reflex habits that have been stamped into the

central nervous system as a result of past instances in which such habits were strengthened or reinforced through practice and/or some reward.

For example, according to the behavioristic model, a person's

actions should be totally explainable in terms of reflexes and variants

of these reflexes and should be directly and precisely traceable to the

particular characteristics of the external stimuli conditions.

As

William James expressed it, the current of life which runs in our eyes
and our ears, is meant to run out at our hands, feet, and lips.

However, a problem begins to emerge when one tries to apply
this model to life as it is experienced.

It turns out that the sensor)

the
data coming into the nervous system cannot by themselves explain even
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simplest forms of emotional behavior (excluding of course the
very

limited number of highly specific reflexes displayed by nearly all

physiologically normal humans), yet, many psychologists still maintain
that objects and stimuli are the primitive arousers of action.

what are these "objects" and "stimuli?"

But

James points out that the ob-

ject is the total situation on which the reaction of the person is made.
Thus it is not the stimulus hut the situation as conceived , and mainly
those elements in the situation that strike one at the moment as being

vitally important.

As such, the total situation, far more than an ad-

ditive inventory of sense receptor impulses, is a product of one’s
goals and intentions as they relate to the immediate circumstances.

James furnishes the example of the bear advancing toward us.

"The same

bear may excite us to either fight or flight," he says, "according to

whether our intention or idea is of his killing us or of us killing
him [James, 1920, p. 350]."

The situation, then, is a function of

one's plans, desires, and purposes, elements irreducible to a col-

ligation of receptor-effector arcs.
1.1.6

MATERIALISM, AND THE FALLACY
OF MISPLACED CONCRETENESS

Returning to the original theme, both behaviorism and psychoanalysis in their deeply ingrained reductionistic methods assume the

doctrine which Whitehead termed "scientific materialism,"

A doctrine which presupposes the ultimate fact of

an
throughout
irreducible brute matter or material spread
In itself, such a
space in a flux of configurations.
material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It does
what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed by
external relations which do not spring from the nature
of its being (Whitehead, 1929a, p. 8).
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Such an assumption, Whitehead maintains, is an example of
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness whereby deceptively abstract con-

cepts (such as inert universal matter made of solid, impervious atoms)
are erroneously regarded as concrete matters of fact.

The result is

that the full richness of concrete reality as it is disclosed in direct experience is largely overlooked, thus prompting us down the path

of ultimate contradiction for our reasonings lack concordance with
the structure of reality.

A critical examination of the basis of

entific materialism from the perspective of the

modem physical

sci-

sciences

will be reserved for a later point in the present discussion.
The issue at present is the exclusion of the notion of final

cause by the materialist reductionist.

Does this exclusion create an

impasse in the quest for adequacy of scientific understanding?
swer can be posed quite simply in the form of a question:

The an-

Why has the

trend of evolution been upward?
1.1.7

FINAL CAUSE AND MENTALITY
IN BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
"The universe as construed solely in terms of the efficient

causation of purely physical interconnections presents a sheer, insoluble contradiction [Whitehead, 1925a, p. 25]

."

This is because the

laws and principles of physics and chemistry are bounded by the second

law of thermodynamics.

The second law of thermodynamics state that the

universal tendency of energy systems is to progress from higher,
complex energy states to lower, simpler energy states, a tendency

exemplified in the slow decay of physical nature.

Commonly referred

itself absolutely into as the "law of entropy," the principle is by
of the
capable of accounting for the appearance and evolution
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phenomenon of life, which by its very nature is a
counter-trend to the
persistent entropy exhibited by non-living entities.

Yet the orthodox

doctrines of physiology stipulate that the operation of living
bodies
be explained solely in terms of the physical system of physical
categories.

Physiology has failed to explain within its own domain the

most fundamental properties of its subject matter:

Life.

Here, then, is a crucial challenge to the logical, as well
as empirical adequacy of reductionism within biology, a science pre-

sumably much more successful than psychology in elucidating the physicochemical underpinnings of life-processes.

An increasing number of bi-

ologists, among them Waddington (1962), and Wright (1967), recognize
the untenability of maintaining a reductionist approach, the principles

of which are based exclusively upon a physical system which is itself

internally inconsistent.
This is not to say that life disobeys the laws of in-

organic chemistry.

No reactions between the material components of a

living body yet observed, infringe upon or contravene the physical
laws governing the processes of inorganic material.

Rather, the dis-

pute is that such principles alone cannot account for the emergence of

highly complex organic systems exhibiting a tendency towards greater
complexity, contrast, improbability and, it should be added, greater

control over their environment.

Whitehead concludes,

The moral to be drawn from the general survey of the
physical universe with its operations viewed in terms
of purely physical laws, and neglected so far as they
are inexpressible in such terms, is that we have omitted some general counter -agency (Ibid.).

16

On this very same point, Whitehead takes issue with 20^^

Century Darwinism which seeks to explain evolution of life in terms
of
two principles --summarized as follows,

What do we mean by twentieth- century Darwinism and
what do we mean by the synthetic theory of evolution?
I think its essence can be characterized by two
postulates:
That all events that lead to the pro1)
duction of new genotypes, such as mutations, recombination and fertilization are essentially random
and not in any way whatsoever finalistic, and 2) that
the order in the organic world, manifested in the
numerous adaptations of organisms to the physical
and biotic environment, is due to the ordering effect
of natural selection (Ernst Mayr, quoted in Waddington,
1962, p. 85).

The essential meaning of this theory is encapsulated in the

phrase, "survival of the fittest.”

There is no quarrel with the ob-

servation that in the struggle for existence the fittest eliminate the
less fit; the problem is whether fitness for survival is identical with

what Whitehead calls "the best exemplification of the Art of Life" (or
the historical tendency of evolution to result in higher forms of life)

Whitehead points out that, in fact, life itself, especially the higher
forms, are increasingly fragile and comparatively deficient in survival

value.

Inorganic matter endures for millions of years and the lowest

forms of life, micro-organisms such as virus, amoeba, and simple multi-

cellular organisms like hydra, moss and lichen exhibit far greater
abilities in adapting to adverse circumstances than do most higher organisms.

Obviously, the struggle for existence and survival ability

has had something to say in determining which species manage to persist
and which finally perish.

But this struggle in itself does not explain

power in
the emergence of such complex organisims with fragile survival
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the first place.

Put another way, survival of the fittest may be

necessary but it is not a sufficent condition to have
occasioned the
evolution of life.

Whitehead cites another characteristic of life unaccounted
for by Darwinian theory.

The upward trend of evolution has been ac-

companied not by an increase in the organism'

s

passive adaptation to

the environment but by a growth of the converse relation.

The higher

forms of life demonstrate an increasing tendency to adapt the environ-

ment to themselves for their own purposes.

Hence the appearance of

nest building in insects, birds and vertebrates, and the hunting behavior of higher animals.

Rather than waiting for nutrients to enter

their vicinity, animals actively search out, chase, catch, and masticate their food.

This tendency to modify the environment has reached

its most pronounced expression in mankind and exhibits an extraordinary

degree of variety and novelty.

Whitehead's thesis is that the explanation of life's up-

ward trend and the associated increase in the capacity to modify the
environment is a three- fold tendency inhering in the impulse of life,
(i)

to live,

(ii) to live well,

(iii) to live better

.

In fact the art of life is first to be alive, secondly ,
to be alive in a satisfactory way, and thirdly to acquire
an increase in satisfaction (Whitehead, 1929a, p. 8).

The first condition accounts for the Darwinian platform as

described earlier, but the second and third conditions hold particular
significance for the present effort to ascertain the role of teleology
or final causation in the function of life.

What these added con-

ditions imply, especially the third, is that life is self -creative,
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i.c.

,

its activities tend toward the production of novelty
and that

this novelty is not random or anarchic but emerges within the
order of

fom;

''form," Whitehead says, "realized in potential but not in
fact."

The urge towards such forms and the refinement of activity

with respect to them is expressed in the various sorts of appetitions
(goal -directed tendencies) common to living organisms: such appetitions

exemplify final causation towards ideal ends which lie outside the mere

physical tendency.

Whitehead provides the illustration, "In the burning

desert there is appetition towards water, whereas the physical tendency
is towards the increased dryness of the animal body [Ibid.]."

Here,

then, is a most primitive manifestation of mentality- -the ingression of

an ideal yet unattained into the concrete functioning of a system.

Un-

less one is willing to assert that the operations of a living body are

vacuous and indistinguishable from the processes of inorganic matter,
i.e., that there is no intrinsic difference between 150 pounds of car-

bon, oxygen, hydrogen, plus a few trace minerals, and a human being,

then each organism must be conceived as attaining an end for itself.
This mentality does not presuppose consciousness but it does

assert that each entity subjectively experiences and determines its com-

ponent processes of becoming in terms of some form which is its "subjective aim" or purpose.

An example of this appetition in the activi-

ties of the living plant is the elaborate mechanisms underlying the

tropistic responses of root and leaf systems.

If a plant seedling is

turned horizontally, one may observe within a few hours that the growing
vertically
zone of the root bends until the root tip becomes directed
upward.
downward, and the growing zone of the stem bends vertically

19

Other orientation responses are the curvatures of stems and other
organs of climbing plants in response to contact, and the growth of
roots toward moisture.

Furthermore, when a plant is grown in the

dark, chlorophyll does not foim and the plant remains pale yellowish

white; the leaves remain small and rudimentary.

But instead of

growth activity slowing down in this nutritionally deprived state, the
growth of inter -modal cells in the stem accelerates to a rate many
times more than normal so that the plant soon becomes very tall and
spindly.

This process is called ’'etiolation” and is a response, the

function or purpose of which is to restore the normal pattern of de-

velopment (Ray, 1963).

It enables a buried or heavily shaded shoot

to elongate rapidly unencumbered with bulky, and under the circum-

stances, useless leaves until it emerges and reaches the light.

How

can this phenomena be understood without reference to the realization
of potential (ideal) ends towards which these processes are directed?
Yet, there are two basic arguments put forth by physio-

logists for their refusal to consider final cause as a legitimate

category of explanation (Boden, 1972; Whitehead, 1929a).

The first

is that the question of teleology lies outside the scope of the sci-

entific method which involves tracing the persistence of physical and

chemical principles throughout the physiological operations.

But as

Whitehead points out, it is absurd to limit a problem by reason of a

method of attack.
living organism.

The object is to understand the operations of a

Harry Harlow and Wolfgang Kohler, among others, have

the animal
shown there is clear evidence that certain activities of

disposition
organism depend upon the foresight of ends and the conative
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to attain them.

The emminent geneticist and anthropologist Theodosius

Dobzhansky simply concludes that the adaptive value of foresight or
forethought is too evident to need demonstration (Dobzhansky, 1962).
The second reason for this aversion towards final cause is
that teleological explanations can, if caution is not exercised, lead
to facile explanations in which a problem is improperly dismissed by

merely assigning it a final cause.

The fact that such hazards are a

real possibility, however, is insufficient reason for ignoring the

problem.

"Even if heads be

1.1.8

METAPHYSICS OF SUBSTANCE: THE
BIFURCATION OF MATTER AND MIND

weak;,

the problem remains."

A satisfactory system of explanation must elucidate the interweaving of final and efficient causation, for these two tendencies exist
together in the world.

The arbitrary bifurcation of final and efficient

cause into two distinct, independent categories lies at the root of a

misconceived mind-body dualism.

On the other hand, if one can success-

fully explain how the two modes of causation inter- link with one another
in the natural world, then perhaps a clearer perspective of the relation-

ship between mind and body can be achieved.

Descartes conceived the duality between mind and body in
terms of substances \ bodily substance and mental substance.

These two

inkinds of substances were presumed to be independent of one another

determined
sofar as the operations of bodily substance were completely

behaved acby mechanical laws and contingencies while mental substance
mechanics.
cording to a parallel set of laws governing mental

This

of bodily subabsolute separation leads inevitably to a conception

qualities above and beyond
stances which possess no intrinsic value or
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the inorganic material of which they are composed.

Theoretically,

within such a system, there is no way to distinguish between nature

dead or nature alive, a distinction persistently at the forefront of
immediate experience.

The logical extension of this substance -based

metaphysics ultimately leads to incoherence.

Whitehead's observation

that incoherence arises from a contradiction in first principles would

suggest a critical analysis of the validity of substance as the ultimate irreducible reality of either the physical or mental universe.
The lineage of the substance notion is directly traceable to the ma-

terialist doctrine mentioned earlier, the severe limitations of which

Whitehead sharply criticized.

Yet this doctrine of "continuous stuff

with permanent attributes, enduring without differentiation and retaining its self-identity through any stretch of time however small or

large" has been fundamentally persistent in western metaphysics even
to the present, despite the fact that several major advances in

physics have decisively refuted its foundations.

modem

Referring to this

persistence, Whitehead summarizes.
The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining
persistent qualities, either essentially or accidently,
expresses an abstraction useful for many purposes of life.
But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement
It arose
of the nature of things, it proves mistaken.
of
its
any
in
succeeded
from a mistake and has never
enit
has
success,
applications. But it has had one
and
logic,
Aristotelian
trenched itself in language, in
in metaphysics (Whitehead, 1938, p. 146).
As was mentioned earlier, this root doctrine of materialin
ism, that substance is the ultimate actural reality, was justified

terms of classical Eighteenth Century physics.

However, new evidence

once and
has accrued during the last 60 to 70 years which shattered
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for all the classical notion of stable, immutable matter.

1.1.9

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATION OF 20 th CENTURY PHYSICS:
SUBSTANCE REVISITED
The first direct challenge came from the work of De Broglie

and Bohr in their development of the quantum mechanical model of the
atom.

In the late 19

th

Century, with the aid of the diffraction

grating, a device allowing spectral analysis of light, serious defic-

iencies were exposed in the classical planetary model of the atom.
The anomaly first appeared when the observed spectral characteristics

of hydrogen gas were unaccountable, in terms of the classical model.

The classical model predicts that

(1)

the hydrogen atoms are unstable

_o

(with half life of 10

ated spectrums.

sec.), and (2) that they emit continuous radi-

However, the diffraction grating showed that hydro-

gen atoms are stable and that they radiate only at discrete frequencies or wavelengths (Capek, 1961).

Bohr's model, put forth in 1913,

did not include the wave nature of particles which was recognized in
1924 by De Broglie.

It was De Broglie's stroke of genius to realize

that the electron moves around the nucleus in an integral number of

wavelengths.

This insight, along with the "Heisenberg Uncertainty

Principle," (which states that the location of extremely samll particles
at high
in time- space, such as neutrons, electrons, and protons moving
revelocities, can never be precisely determined- -only approximated),

or viquire a major redefinition of matter as a series of occasions,

pattern.
brations, in which the unit of identity is the enduring

These

successive activity
patterns are resolvable into subordinate chains of
instead of solid inert
in which waves or periods of energetic activity,

matter, become the fundamental units.
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The metaphysical extension of these paradigmatic revisions
in the foundations of

modem physical

science is that the final reality

of things is their existence as a process:

Specifically, process ex-

pressing foim--form as the structure or pattern which the process creates and recreates.

For the modem view process, activity and change are
the matter of fact. At an instant there is nothing.
Each instant is only a way of grouping matters of
fact.
Thus since there are no instants conceived as
simple primary entities, there is no nature at an instant.
Thus all interrelations of matter of fact
involve transition in their essence. All realization
involves implication in the creative advance
(Whitehead, 1938, p. 146).
The redefinition of reality as process introduces the

factor of potentiality as an indispensible ingredient to the existence
of an actual entity.

stant becoming:

This is because process implies transition, con-

An actual entity is always in the process of becoming

something and that something is itself as potential yet unrealized.
Admittedly, the self-expression of a hydrogen atom is rather limited
and in large part merely involves a reiteration of the same form in a

new time- space context.

But this picture of matter is a long way from

the old conception of inert corpuscular substance.

Further insights into the organismic properties of atomic
function and structure is afforded by the Pauli exclusion principle,
Broglie's disthe implications of which are as far-reaching as De
coveries.

This law describes the total atom in a way that cannot

electrons and
conceivably be derived from laws concerning individual

exactly the same
asserts that no two electrons in an atom can have
the electron
quantum states; quantum states take into account

s

energy.
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angular momentum, orientation and spin (Barbour, 1966).

Thus, when a

new electron enters a molecule, its functional character is influenced
by the presence of those electrons already within the system so that
the state of each one will be unique.

explicit the requirement of

This discovery makes even more

modem physical

system of things as a whole.

theory to analyze the

Margenau's assessment cuts to the core

of the issue.
The essence of mechanistic reasoning is seen to cluster
around two beliefs; first, that entities are divisable
into parts, and second that these parts are localizable
in space and time.
Prior to [the exclusion principle]
all theories had affected the individual nature of the socalled ’'parts”; the new principle regulated their social
behavior. With respect to the single particle it had
It is as though here, for the first time,
nothing to say.
physics had discovered within its own precincts, a purely
social law, a law that is simple in its basic formulation
and yet immense in its collective effects. Mechanistic
reasoning, already far behind, has gone out of sight as
a result of this latest advance. ... In the Pauli principle is a way of understanding why entities show in their
togetherness laws of behavior different from the laws
which govern them in their isolation. The emergence of
new properties on composition is a rather general phenomenon in modem physics and owes its occurrence to the
exclusion principle (Margenan, 1950, p. 442).
.

.

.

.

.

.

What are the metaphysical implications of these transformed
fundamentals in

modem physical

thought?

Obviously, caution must be ex-

ercised in attempting to generalize patterns and relations from one
level of analysis to another.

Failure to do so is sure to result in

scientific thought
the same kinds of erroneous overstatements that locked
in the stifling grip of meterialism.

For example, some psychologists,

implications
among them McDougall, have seized upon the indeterministic

human action
of quantum mechanics to bolster their claim that

indeterminant by the laws of physics.

is

Along the same line, recent
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neuro-physiological research suggests that the response in individual
nerve cells to stimulation is stochastic, or indeterminate, in that it
requires statistical analysis in terms of probability of firing (Altman,
1965)

.

Any meaningful statement of the relation between an individual

neural response and a particular stimulus is thus impossible.

The

indeterminacy rests on spontaneous random activity of the synapses.
But this argument, that indeterminacy at the quantum

physical level directly implies or is responsible for indeterminacy at
the psychological level, is patently untenable.

For one thing, the

factor of quantal indeterminacy becomes insignificant when one is con-

sidering large populations of anything, whether it be atoms, or nerve
cells.

Secondly, the argument is covertly reduct ioni Stic in asserting

that psychology individuality can be accounted for and reduced to
The fallacy

indeterminacy at the level of physico-chemical processes.

in this line of reasoning has led more perceptive writers such as

Boden to conclude, "The issue of indeterminism in physics is therefore
totally irrelevant to the psychology of action, unless there are reasons
for believing that physical indeterminacy may result in the upsetting

of specifically purposive behavior [Boden, 1972, p. 334]."

Unfortunately, Boden closes the books too early and it

took not a psychologist but a physicist like Barbour to see the more
substantive meaning:

Atomic indeterminacy and human freedom are not
directly related to each other, and occur on very
different levels. They are both examples of "weak
causality" in which a set of potentialities is
determined .... Individual events display some
.

.

.
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unpredictability whereas exact laws are the result
of large numbers.
Insofar as man is a collection of
particles, atomic indeterminacy is lost in statistical regularities.
But insofar as human experience
is an integrated event, it displays a new type of
unpredictability- -not derivative from atomic indeterminacy, but from its organization at a higher
level.
Perhaps coordinated individual events, at
various levels, have multiple potentialities though
only at higher levels is there freedom (Barbour,
1966, p. 314).

In summary, there are perhaps three main implications for

metaphysics and psychology to be drawn from the study of modem
physics,

1)

activity and process are the salient characteristics of the

world described by quantum physics,

2)

this process exhibits definite

structure and tends toward the continual realization of forms or po-

tentialities, and 3) the nature of a system of process or entities is

such that the system as a whole constitutes an identity which governs
the participation of component elements or processes of the system in a

manner unique to the system and unpredicted by these components as individual events.

Thus, the relationship between a whole and its parts

obliterates any meaning that might be attached to the possibility of

explaining an organismic whole in terms of its parts, a possibility

upon which the reductionist ultimately must base the validity of his
approach.

1.2

1.2.1

ORGANIC METAPHYSICS AND PURPOSE

ONTOLOGICAL STRATIFICATION:
A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF CAUSALITY
into selected
The intent of this somewhat involved excursion

issues in

modem physics

re
and biology was to see whether a set of basic

suggest a general pattern
lationships observed within these fields might
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of analysis applicable to other fields of inquiry particularly the

problem of purpose in psychology.

Although three such general prin-

ciples were offered in the preceding paragraph, the next important

task is to determine if these general observations can be formalized
into an abstract morphology that will provide some insight into the

counter- tendency which converts the downward decay of mere physical

tendencies into the upsurge of living nature; a counter -tendency

culminating in the purposive fabric of human life.
The work of Michael Polanyi, a physicist who came to

psychology with a deep interest in the pervasive issues and problems
that surround the personal activities of human understanding, is an
In terms of the present discussion,

impressive response to this need.

there is one Polanyian notion that has particular relevance to the subject of final cause and purpose:

The concept of boundary conditions

in the operation of hierarchical structures.

Probably the easiest way

to grasp the idea is to provide an illustration of its application, in

this case the example of a machine:

My watch tells me the time. It is kept going by its
mainspring, uncoiling under the control of the hair
spring and balance wheel; this turns the hands which
Such are the operational principles
tell the time.
define its construction and workwhich
watch,
of a
cannot be defined by the laws
principles
The
ing.
of a watch are formed by the
parts
of nature. No
natural equilibration of matter. They are artificially shaped and sagaciously connected to perform their function in telling the time. This is
their meaning: to understand a watch is to understand what it is for and how it works. The laws
as inanimate nature are indifferent to this purThey cannot determine the working of a watch
pose.
any more than the chemistry or physics of printers
ink can determine the contents of a book (Polanyi,
quoted in Greene, 1969, p. 153).
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Viewed as separate entities, the parts of the watch contain no reference to the mechanical engineering principles coordinating
the interrelation of these parts as a device which records and cali-

brates the passage of time.

Furthermore, these engineering principles

are not specified by the laws of physics, i.e.

rived from mere physical laws.

,

they cannot be de-

However, at the same time, these prin-

ciples depend upon the physical laws for their operation.

As Polanyi

explains it, "The particulars viewed in themselves are controlled by
the laws of inanimate nature; while viewed jointly, they are controlled

by the operational principles of the machine [Ibid., p. 154]."

It is

important to emphasize that these sets of principles are quite distinct

from each other, yet they operate together in determining the operation of the watch.

It is the nature of the interaction of these two

sets of principles which the concept of boundary control seeks to illumine.

The laws of physics expressly leave open certain variabil-

ities of the system.

The range of these variabilities (or potential-

ities) constitutes the boundary conditions of physics.

operational principles of the machine control

Now, the

the conditions left

undetermined by the boundaries and so do not violtate the laws of
physics and chemistry which operate within these boundaries.
Polanyi cites the structure of speech as another instance,
quite different from the machine example, of the same idea at work.
The first and lowest level consists of phonemes, letters and sounds;
struc
the second, the combination of phonemes into words; the third,

of
turing of words into sentences; the fourth involves the working

composition
sentences into a style; and finally, the fifth level, the
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of the text.

Here again, the boundaries left open by each lower level

are determined by and operate under the control of the next higher
level, etc.

For instance, the phonemes one utters are shaped by a vo-

cabulary; the vocabulary is formed into sentences according to the
rules of grammar; the sentences are in turn subjected to the dictates

of style.

And style is subservient to the intensional meaning of the

ideas composing the text.
In this example, there are multiple (as opposed to just
two) levels of control determining the content under consideration

(speech).

And again, the operations of the higher levels cannot be

accounted for by the laws governing the subsidiary levels.

As Polanyi

indicates

You cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics; you
cannot derive grammar from a vocabulary; a correct
use of grammar does not account for good style; and
a good style does not provide the content for a good
piece of prose (Ibid, p. 155).
This principle of stratified levels of boundary control is

easily transposed to the analysis of living beings.

Every living or-

ganism relies, before all else, upon the laws of physics and chemistry
for its operation.

But each successive advance upwards on the evolu-

tionary ladder introduces a new set of conditions which transform these
fundamental inorganic events into an increasingly complex, integrated,
and novel expression of the rising tide of life.
The vegetative function harnesses the entropy inherent in
duplicating
inorganic chemical process to the end of constructing and

extremely large organic molecules.

This function requires the accumu-

energy within
lation and utilization of vast quantities of potential
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the system.

As was mentioned earlier, such a process cannot be

accounted for exclusively in terms of the principles of inorganic
chemistry.

The highly complex, intricate and controlled series of

chemical reactions involved in respiration and photosynthesis ex-

plicitly demonstrate the control exerted by a higher set of principles.
In this case, there is the ingression of vegetable forms or potential-

ities over the unrealized possibilities left undetermined by inorganic

mineral processes.
Animal life adds on an additional set of boundaries or

dimensions to those possibilities left open by the boundaries of vegatative survival.

The specialized forms of composition characterizing

animal life exhibit greater variability of functioning afforded by the

capacities of sense perception and muscular action.

The principles

governing muscular action leave open their integration into innate

patterns of behavior

which provide a corresponding increase in the

ability to manipulate and exploit the surrounding environment.

In the

case of higher animals and particularly man, these innate patterns are

open to being shaped by intelligence and finally, the boundaries of
intelligent actions are molded by the conscious purposes and aesthetic

decisions of the individual.
The stratified levels referred to above are crude and in-

complete --there are many other possible modes of ontological straticoordinafication, even within each level described; for example, the

adjustment, and
tion of neuro -muscular activities, eyeball motion, lens

control of the iris when tracking a moving object.

But such examples

emphasize that such
are not central to the point, which is merely to
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relations as are described by the principle of boundary control and

ontological stratification

do exist and that "The higher principles

which characterize a comprehensive entity cannot be defined in terms
of the laws that apply to the parts themselves [Polanyi, 1964]."
The laws of physics and chemistry do not ascribe the genetic code con-

tained in the sequence of base pairing in the DNA molecule.

In fact,

DNA can function as a code only if its order is not due to the forces
of physico-chemical potential energy.
Likewise, the genetic code fails to account for the trans-

mission of faculties such as consciousness, purpose and aesthetic intuitions.

As Polanyi puts it, "It is as if the faculty of vision were

to be made more intelligible to a person

sense physiology [Ibid.]

."

bom

blind, by a chapter on

From this, he asserts that DNA evokes and

provides the foundation for higher

,

subtler levels of existence rather

than determining these levels:
principles.
Mind itself includes an ascending sequence of
transcended
Its appetitive and intellectual workings are
growth of man
by principles of responsibility. Thus the
place along a seto the highest levels is seen to take
evolutionquence of rising principles. And we see this
boundaries, each
ary hierarchy built as a sequence of
the strata
harnessing
by
achievements
aiming at higher
reducible.
not
are
themselves
below them, to which they
relations
of
series
rising
These boundaries control a
aware of their
which we can understand only by being
upon the upper
bearing
as
constituent parts subsidiarily,
238]
p.
1969,
level which they serve (Polanyi,

position to consider a
At this juncture, we are in a
and
and the relation between mind
resolution of the problem of purpose

operating within stratified
body in terms of boundary conditions

structures
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1 . 2.2

MIND AND BODY IN
ORGANIC PROCESSES
Whitehead also makes the observation that organismic processes

seem to possess a dual nature, but he approaches the problem from a much

larger frame of reference and thereby suggests a further clue.

For

Whitehead, every occasion of experience is dipolar; it contains a mental
aspect or pole and a physical pole.

He defines mentality as "The ex-

perience of forms of definiteness in their disconnection from any physical experience, but with an abstract evaluation of what they can con-

tribute to such experience [Whitehead, 1929a, p. 32]."

Such forms

Whitehead likens to the Platonic ideals and the Medieval universals.
They can be expressed in more modem terms as the potentialities of
expression open to an organism.
In the real world, these potentialities or forms continually

ingress upon and determine the course of the process as constituted by

whatever physical data are involved.

These forms provide continuity in

occasions
that the identity of the immediate occasion is linked with

that are part of the organism's past and unrealized future.

From the

found_in
standpoint of the various levels of ontological stratification

each new level adds its
the evolutionary hierarchy considered earlier,
lower level as a new
potential forms for realization to those of the
set of boundary conditions.

Thus, the boundary conditions are equiva-

system.
lent to the ideal potentialities of the

By the time we reach

of expression are incredibly
the human organism the potential fornis

the predominant activity.
vast so that novelty of expression becomes

unrealized possibility emerges
Thus , the conceptual entertainment of
as a major factor in human mentality.

For the lower forms of existence
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the realm of potential is more restricted and consequently mental ex-

perience is much less intense, becoming negligible among inorganic entities.

But this does not mean that the higher levels of life are

altogether absent in the earlier stages of evolution.

They may be

present in traces well before they emerge as prominent characteristics.

Along the same lines as Whitehead, Polanyi asserts that, "Evolution may
be seen then as a progressive intensification of the higher principles
of life.

This is what we witness in the development of the embryo and

of the growing child, processes akin to evolution [Whitehead, 1925, pp.

148-149]."
Thus the notions of mind and body (efficient and final
cause) are no longer forever irresolvable, dismembered aspects of an

entity, but can now be seen as interwoven principles which operate

jointly in the advancing process of life.

Mind and body are a way of

describing the characteristic relation between these two sets of
principles.

Whitehead seems to suggest this pattern in terms re

markably similar to Polanyi when he writes,
into
The effect of physiology was to put mind back
of
effect
the
first
The neurologist traces
nature.
at
integration
then
stimuli along the bodily nerves,
projective
a
of
nerve centers, and finally the rise
.In biochemistry, the
reference beyond the body.
of
delicate adjustment of the chemical composition
organism
whole
the parts to the preservation of the
is seen as
experience
mental
the
Thus
is detected.
reporting
the reflective experience of a totality,
unit of
for itself what it is in itself as one
of the sum
integration
the
is
occurrence. This unit
not their
of its partial happenings, but it is
unity as an event.
own
its
It has
numerical aggregate.
for its own
entity
an
This total unity considered as
patteme
the
of
unity
sake, is the prehension into
.

.
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aspects of the universe of events (Ibid., p. 147).
This relation of part to whole does not start with the

special case of higher organisms.

The selected examples considered

earlier, of atomic structure and plant physiology demonstrate that

this relation reigns throughout nature.

Mentality is the experience

of organic form determining the confluence of many component sub-

processes as a single actual expression of that potential form.

It

is a relation which contrasts the principles governing a society of

events as separate occurrences against the additional principles

characterizing those events as they occur subsidiarily in the creation of a complex unity.
This interpretation completely transcends the division of

mind and body into two different kinds of entities, each functioning
in accord with its own set of laws with neither having any bearing

upon the other.

The arbitrary division of mind and body was neatly

consistent with a materialistic science within which every object was
of
seen to involve no more or no less than the mechanics (Newtonian)

of ininert matter, a science unable to recognize the gradations

trinsic value within the living universe.
unThe organismic position also avoids the empirically

tenable claim of

modem

reduct ionism, that mind is merely the osten-

governing chemical
sible reflection of strictly physical principles

processes in the body.

ends
Most important, as Whitehead affirms, "It

of our aesthetic and
the divorce of science from the affirmations

ethical experiences.”
not just a legitimate
By recognizing mental activity as
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but a necessary ingredient in the creation and continuation of life we

have now an internally consistent view of reality which embraces pur-

pose as a coherent element in the construction of experience.

1.3

1.3.1

SUMMARY OF FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND PROSPECTUS

OVERVIEW
In the preceding sections, several issues connected

with the problem of purpose have been deliberately framed in broad
general terms.

The reason for this manner of approach stems from our

conviction that an adequate understanding of a scientific problem is
first of all a contextual concern; that is, it depends vitally upon

how the wider metaphysical assumptions (whether implicit or explicit)

define the problem.

With respect to the present topic, psycholo-

gists are certainly talking about purposes and the fact that it is a
topic of debate testifies to its status as a real issue.

But a more

thorough grasp of its significance has been hindered because it is
fundamentally alien to reductionist mechanistic systems of explanation.
Teleological causes always had to be imported from outside the system
on an ad hoc basis in order to rescue scientific psychology from

making absurdly narrow statements about human behavior.

Because final

cause and purpose are not coherent categories within the established

scientific framework, they are lame notions reflective of the sharp

discontinuity between experimental-physiological psychology on the
one hand, and humanistic psychology on the other.

This discontinuity

for coand incoherence, which has severely limited the opportunities

operative enlightenment, stems from inadequate and conflicting
principles.

1

some
The present chapter attempts a redefinition of

irst
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crucial first principles in terns of organismic philosophy, assisted

by the epistemological insights of Polanyi.

Unfortunately, these

principles are often interwoven with specific arguments and issues
from which the principles themselves were developed, thus making it

difficult to abstract the theoretical scheme.

The following section

attempts just such a consolidation, an explicit condensed statement

of the formative elements underlying an organismic psychology of
volition.
PURPOSE, POTENTIALITY AND CONCRESCENCE:
THE HIERARCHY OF BOUNDARIES IN PROCESS

1.3.2

1.

The final reality of any organism cannot be understood

apart from its form in the process of evolution.
2.

This process, which Whitehead calls concrescence, in-

volves the coming together, the unification of subsidiary elements in
the creation of a single novel whole.
3.

The creation of this novel entity transmutes the

character of the component elements.

In the philosophy of organism,

transmutation is the operation whereby an aggregate of many elements is
constituted not as an aggregate or many, but as a unity (Whitehead,
1929b)

.

In transmutation the component elements acquire and express

new attributes or potentialities unrealizable outside the integrated
form in which they participate.

This novel expression can be seen as

boundary
the influence of a new set of principles restructuring the
components as
conditions left open by the functional principles of the
a democratic aggregate.
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4.

The nature of this higher grade, unifying control is de-

fined by the forms or potentialities analagous to the constellated

physical occasion.

The subjectively felt contrast between these

forms as pure potentials and the actual occasion as given in the im-

mediate present, generates the experience of appetition in which the
forms become the final cause or subjective aim of the concrescence.

Whitehead’s explanation is straight to the point,
The physical inheritance [of every organism] is
essentially accompanied by a conceptual reaction
partly conformed to, and partly introductory of, a
relevant novel contrast, but always introducing
emphasis, valuation and purpose. The integration
of the physical and mental side into a unity of
experience is a self- formation which is a process of
concrescence (Ibid., p. 165).

Suggesting here a relation between efficient and final
cause, Whitehead poses a contrast to the effect that something is

"alive when in some measure its reactions are inexplicable by any

tradition of pure physical inheritance [ibid., p. 159]."

(For

Whitehead, explanation "by tradition" is merely another phraseology
for efficient cause.)

Thus a single occasion is alive when the subjective
aim which determines its process of concrescence
has introduced a novelty of definiteness not to be
found in the inherited data of its primary phase [of
the concrescence] (ibid., p. 158).

Thus the connection between efficient and final cause is

found in the nature of concrescence.

This central principle of organ

reality as a
ismic philosophy expresses the fundamental character of

process.

Whitehead
In the opening chapter of Process and Reality ,

many enter into a
asserts, "It lies in the nature of things that the
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complex unity [Ibid., p. 32]."
from disjunction to conjunction.

Concrescence describes this advance
Casting the theme in somewhat more

vivid language he writes,
Nature is never complete, it is always passing
beyond itself. Thus is the creative advance of
nature. The ’creative advance’’ [concrescence] is
the application of this ultimate principle of
creativity to each novel situation which it originates.
.The creative process is rhythmic:
It
swings from the publicity of many things to the
individual privacy; and it swings back from the
private ideal to the publicity of the objectified
individual. The former swing is dominated by the
efficient cause which is actual. The oneness of
the universe, and the oneness of each element in
the universe repeat themselves to the crack of
doom in the creative advance from creature to
creature (ibid., p. 347).
.

.

Whitehead differentiates concrescence into five phases.
The first, most primitive

is the phase of conformal feelings; second,

is the phase of conceptual feelings; third, simple comparative feelings;

fourth, complex comparative feelings; and finally, the "satisfaction."

For the purpose of the present discussion it is unnecessary to con-

sider these phases in detail, but it is important to grasp the general

characteristics differentiating the later phases from the earlier ones.
Occasionally, Whitehead himself dispenses with the origi-

nal five phases and simply distinguishes between two stages, the responsive stage, and the supplemental stage.

The responsive stage in

vo Ives the mere reception of data (physical feelings)

.

These data are

the entity."
"nothing else than the actual world itself presented to

experiences of form or
The supplementary phases introduce a) the mental
contrast (repotentiality (mental feelings), and b) the subsequent
feelings.
ferred to above) of physical feelings with mental

The final
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aspects of the supplementary stage involve

even more complex integra-

tions of both mental and physical feelings and
each higher level of in-

tegration adds its elements of novelty and the role of
mentality, the
inner teleological cause becomes more prominent.
Since subjective aim inheres in the mental feeling of
forms experienced as pure potential, it emerges in the more
advanced
stages of concrescence.

Although this process is common to all organ-

isms, the effects of the advanced supplemental stages are negligible

for micro-cosmic processes such as electrons, atoms and even the lowest

forms of biological process.
This last observation recalls Polanyi's contention (See

Section 1.2.2) that the higher levels of life are not altogether absent
in the earlier stages of evolution, that these levels may be present in

traces long before they become prominent.

His assertion that evolution

may be seen as the progressive intensification of the higher principles
of life is corroborated by Whitehead.

Hence it becomes feasible to

account for the lowest levels in terms of efficient external causes.

Not until the higher grades of life do the advanced supple-

mental stages become significant in determining the organism's functions.
In the case of man, the conceptual entertainment of unrealized pos-

sibilities- -vision and purpose giving rise to activity- -become the

central feature in experience.

Indeed, for Whitehead, "The life of

a human being receives its worth, its importance, from the way in which

unrealized ideals shape its purposes and tinge its actions [Whitehead,
1938, p. 27]."

40

1.3.3

PURPOSE: AN

ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
In much the same vein as Whitehead, Dobzhansky also has

observed,
[Man] is able to form mental images of things and
situations which do not yet exist but which may be
found, brought about or constructed by his efforts.
Man can create in his imagination worlds different
from the actual one and can visualize himself in
these imaginary worlds (Dobzhansky, 1962, p. 338).

But beyond this, Dobzhansky cites the extraordinarily creative thrust

characterizing the appetitions of mankind,
The human nervous system possesses ’curious* and
profound hungers for many objects which are neither
meat nor drink, nor satisfiers of oxygen nor of sex
need, nor of maternal need, nor of any other more
obvious visceral demand (Ibid., p. 214).

He sees these hungers as "curious" because they are unpre-

dicted by a strictly utilitarian view of evolution.

In other words,

they transcend the boundary conditions specified by principles of mere

biological survival.

The human condition introduces a higher level of

mental experience wherein the subjective aim is dominated by the concrescence or integration of aesthetic contrasts.

Hence, one finds in man

a sensitivity to beauty, and making or doing things that seem "beautiful"

for no other apparent purpose.

Although the evidences of aesthetic appetition and the impulse to create and apprehend beauty are most noticeable in man,

Dobzhansky cites several instances in which animals seem to display
some degree of aesthetic sensitivity.

He refers to a series of studies

by Reusch (1957) which convincingly suggests the presence of "protoaesthetic" phenomena in some mammals and birds.

The animals were
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offered for play, without reward, a choice of six
pieces of white card-

board with one of several different patterns printed
on each:
metrical versus assymmetrical

,

sym-

with or without rhythmic repetition of

constituent elements, and steady versus faltering lines.

The animals

consistently preferred symmetrical and rhythmical patterns, and
chose
figures with steady rather than faltering lines.

As an anthropologist searching for the evolutionary context of aesthetic purpose, Dobzhansky detects both a phylogenetic and

ontogenetic relation between aesthetics and the emergence of play activities.

Among higher animals and especially man, play is so vital

that when it is restrained, development is markedly impaired.

Play is

difficult to define precisely because its very nature is the production of variety and the experience of novelty.

activity is intrinsically rewarding.

Like aesthetics, its

With reference to the universal

prominence of play in the human species, Thorpe writes,
There is indeed good reason for thinking that the
prolonged childhood of the human species
[has]
been of prime importance in the process of freeing
appetitive behavior from the primary needs. This
and man’s growing mastery of his environment have
been the essential steps, not only for play, but for
all those activities which transcend mere maintainance and which underly the mental and spiritual
development of man; activities which though originating in play, have produced real advances in
knowledge and comprehension of the scheme of things,
and which may for all we know offer vistas of advance in the millenia to come compared to which our
present understanding will seem puny and infantile
in the extreme (Thorpe 1956)
.

.

.

,

In case it appears that the discussion has strayed some-

what from the original issue, i.e., the causal role of purpose in

human action, let it be emphasized that the anthropological observation
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on play and aesthetics illustrates a profoundly
significant point

about the transcendant nature of human appetition.

It is empirical

testimony of the human spirit's tendency to reach
beyond the world as
given to transform the world as given.

Such purposes cannot be speci-

fied by the boundary conditions of biological survival
and they cannot
be reduced to a complex extension of neurophysiological
tensions.

Rather they arise from the concrescent interfusion and contrast of the
actual real world, including the immanence of past experience, as well
as the environment as immediately felt, with the apprehension of

purely potential forms.
1.3.4

PURPOSE AND INTRINSIC
MOTIVATION: A CRITIQUE

Certainly the operation of such purposes has by no means gone
unrecognized.

J. McV. Hunt

(1965) refers to them as intrinsic motivation

for information processing because the tendencies cannot be traced to ex-

trinsic physiological tissue needs.

Robert White defines the phenomena

as effectance motivation (White, 1959).

The defining attributes are the

same- -"a feeling of efficacy- -in transactions in which behavior has an

exploratory, varying, experimental character" and produces novelty and
change in the environment.
Once again we find root for this observation in Whitehead's

explanation of the upward trend of evolution.
acterization of life's threefold urge,
alive in a satisfactory way; and

(3)

(1)

Referring to his char-

to be alive;

to live better,

(2)

to be

the prominent

dimension of intrinsic motivation centers on this third purpose or aim.
Yet, neither Hunt nor White suggests that the source of
this intrinsic motivation derives from the inherently purposive na-

ture of human experience, and probably neither would concede to the ul-
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tunate reality of teleological causes.

In fact, both Hunt and White

infer purpose to be a derivative effect of
intrinsic motivation rather

than its cause.

The implication here is that purposes, although
con-

ceded to be "real" are, after all, determined by more
primitive non-

purposive tendencies.

In principle, these tendencies are assumed to

be reducible to principles of neurological function even
though at

present such principles are acknowledged to be unspecified.

Viewed from the organismic perspective argued throughout
this chapter, such a position is not only reductionistic but represents an inversion of the facts.

Intrinsic motivation has no meaning

apart from organismic purpose; the former is an expression of the sub-

jective entertainment of ideal ends, and not vice versa.
1.3.5

THE THEORY INTRODUCED
The theory of volition stated briefly here, and to be de-

veloped and expanded in the following pages, follows closely a previous

conception of volition put forth by William James (1890)
(1908).

,

and McDougall

However, these two writers viewed volition as a rather special

form of conation in which a "loftier" but weaker impulse is made to prevail over a "baser" but stronger tendency, or when one is acting against
the inertia of habit.

James calls this phenomenon "will with effort"

and characterizes it as a "counter- agency to the line of least resis-

tance."

The relevance of both James' and McDougall 's interpretations

will be discussed more fully in Chapter Four.
The meaning of volition advanced here is somewhat expanded

over these earlier conceptions.

It is conceived to be the emerging

factor of self-causation uniting the modes of efficient and final cause
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which underly the psychological concrescence
of the human organism.
It is the purposive construction of
experience, the bringing to bear of

one's

sense of purpose upon the immediate reaction
to the world.

In

its most developed and refined form, volition
becomes the capacity to

integrate one's various subjective tendencies into
a coherent sense of

purpose that transmutes the ongoing flow of experience in
terms of
operational plans and intentions which, ultimately, effect action.

In

this sense, action is not restricted to overt muscular behavior
but

includes cognition, perception, and other forms of psychological process.

Much of the preceding discussion suggests a metaphysical
pattern which can accommodate this definition.

The next task is to

move from the level of generality and explore the application of this
scheme to the specifically intentional aspects of the human organism.
The model developed here conceptually differentiates vo-

lition into three processes; "attention," "goal-setting," and "will,"

each of which may be briefly defined as follows.

Attention is the process by which the organism purposively
selects (differentiates) and structures (integrates) the actual sensorial and emotional data immanent within the situation and the con-

ceptual data of the immediate present into a unity of conscious
experience.
Goal- setting refers to the conception of unrealized pos-

sibility as a consequent expression of one's purpose.

More specifical-

ly, it is the process by which an individual anticipates and organizes

his future by making a conscious decision about future events or
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conditions towards which ho will strive.
wil1 is the Process of transforming an intention
as po-

tentiality into actuality; the realization of intention
in action.
The component subphases of will are
(1) self- initiation,
severance, and

(3)

(2)

per-

effectance of closure.

The three main processes may be seen as successive degrees
in the expression of organismic purpose; that is, "will"
presupposes

"intention,” while "intention" presupposes "attention."

The character

of this relation can best be visualized under the image of a set of

three Chinese boxes, each box contained within a larger box.

The

outermost box is analagous to the process of attention, the most fundamental expression of puspose.

Within this box a more specialized

form of the process of attention is distinguishable; intention or
goal -setting.

Within the domain of goal -setting, the even more spe-

cific expression of "will" is generated.

The later, more specialized

process does not repudiate the more fundamental context within which it
occurs; as was seen earlier, the later process presupposes the more

general process and yet contributes to it an additional dimension of

definiteness and value.
attention
goal -setting

will

One prediction of the present model is that, when an in-

dividual is engaged in a more advanced process such as goal -setting,
this process influences reciprocally the subsequent operation of the
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more fundamental process, i.e., attention.

This prediction is corrobo-

rated by an extensive body of research literature on intentional learning, which demonstrates clearly that an individual's intentions
with re-

spect to a situation largely (though not wholly) determine the focus of
attention, what data are selected, and how they are organized.
Similarly, when an individual is in the midst of actualizing
an intention, the development of subsequent plans and goals tends to

conform with the tradition of realized intentions in one's past and
present.

This cumulative tradition of actualized occasions constitutes

the immanent basis of personal identity and explains the means by which
the past participates in the creation of the present and transmits it-

self into the future.
As can be seen, this theory identifies attention as the

primary process in volition and the prerequisite to all other volitional operations.

This insight was expressed over 70 years ago by William

James when he wrote, "Attention is the first and fundamental thing in

volition."

Although the science of psychology has changed immensely

since the era of James, his brilliant insights and seminal ideas have
lost none of their originality.

In fact, not until recently, with

accumulation of new evidence, could the full import of some of
James' remarks be fully comprehended.

Many of James' ideas on the

subjects developed herein have provided a rich groundwork for the

speculations advanced here.
To facilitate comprehension, the format used in each of the

succeeding chapters is as follows;
1)

brief definition of the process,
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2)

elaborate description including a review and syn-

thesis of empirical and conceptual literature pertinent
to the

process,
3)

theoretical justification of the process, its sig-

nificance for intellectual, affective and social development,
4)

developmental pattern of the process,

5)

the process stated as an educational objective,

6)

educational implications of two, three, and four, with

selected examples of prototypical learning experiences designed to
foster development of the process, and
7)

suggestions of measures and methods for evaluating

effects of learning experiences (where available and feasible)

CHAPTER TWO
ATTENTION

Attention is the process by which one purposively selects (differentiates) and organizes (integrates) feelings sensory
,
information 3 memories 3 ideas , and bodily movements 3 into a single
focus of conscious experience.
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2.0

2.1

ELABORATE DESCRIPTION

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

When we pause to consider the dominant features characterizing conscious experience, one of the most salient traits to emerge is
its selective nature.

Oar awareness consists of a relationship be-

tween ourselves and our extensive environment in which our arena of im-

mediate concern is sharply limited.

We forego entertaining a multitude

of possible situations in the interest of maintaining a coherent unity
of experience with one.

Another irreducible element of consciousness is its unending flow and transition.

The relation between the organism and the

environment cannot be described in static terms but is highly mobile
and our awareness of this relation is the registration of the continual flux of this interaction.

The third fundamental characteristic of conscious ex-

perience is its purposive nature.

The selectivity and mobility of

consciousness function largely in service to our aims and intentions
in a given situation.

We differentiate that which is important to us

and ignore, by and large, that which is insignificant or meaningless.
The notions of meaning and importance are ultimately sensib

only

when placed within the framework of some intention or purpose.

The

meaning and importance of a situation or object is a determinate
some
function of how it relates to the organism in the fulfillment of
aim.

selectivity,
These three parameters of conscious awareness’,
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transition, purpose, deeply and indelibly present in our immediate
ex-

perience, are wedded in the concept of attention.

Indeed, we are

proposing that these elements are the interfused facets of a single
process which characterizes the purposive construction of experience.

Attention has been characterized as a persistent problem
in the annals of psychological inquiry- -persistent in that attempts to

ignore its presence by resorting to mechanistic paradigms of behaviorism which systematically exclude purpose as a property of existence

have been unsucessful.

Attempts to circumvent the construct of at-

tention have resulted in either

(1)

the necessity of substituting other

terms with basically the same meaning, or

(2)

an impoverished theoreti-

cal framework inadequate to account for substantial areas of human

experience.

The first case is an example of circular methodology

while the second is an example of a dead-end.

Faced with this reali-

zation, psychology is beginning to reconsider the matter of attention

with renewed vigor and the past fifteen years have witnessed a steady
increase in the number of studies concerned with attention.

As might

be expected, however, there is little agreement as to what attention

really is, what underlies its operation, how it is controlled, and what
its effects are upon behavior.

Because there is no generally agreed

upon theoretical base broad enough to accommodate the various perspectives, the research presents a fragmentary and often incoherent

assemblage of data.

Thus, there are self-contained dynasties of re

of
search, each approaching attention from a particular point

vie\v,

each assuming
conducting studies based upon their conceptualization and

particular
to have contained the entire phenomenon within that

52

tradition.

Most of these dynasties have tackled a legitimate
problem

and made a contribution towards further knowledge.

But there has been

remarkably little effort directed toward understanding how these
various perspectives might relate to one another as aspects of a larger
single reality.

At this juncture such an effort would seem both ap-

propriate and necessary.

Amassing more data will yield dimimishing

returns unless and until there is a unifying principle which can integrate the array of evidence into a coherent explanation of our
experience.

Generating such a synthesis is a large order and the detailed

documentation which should accompany this kind of task falls beyond
the purpose of this document.

Following is an attempt to sketch the

outline of a tentative unified definition of the process of attention.
Because the research data represent the end product of a
great deal of abstraction and theorization, often reflecting a situa-

tion which is highly contrived and remote from the realities of every-

day life, the process of reconstruction must begin with a description
of attention that has its roots in the fundamental fact of our im-

mediate experience.

Thus, our first step is to assemble the phenomeno-

logical data of attention as

everyday existence.

they appear before us in our personal

Once this process of assemblage is completed, we

then have the basis upon which to interpret the meaning of the specialized theories of attention and their associated empirical data.

53
2. 2

PHI LOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We begin with two accounts of attention on the experiential
level; that of Edward Titchener and that of William James.

Attention

occupied a central position in the psychology of both of these men,
although, as we shall see, their approaches to the subject are in

sharp contrast.

2.2.1

Titchener.

Titchener' s approach is representative of the

Structure School of psychology in which the strategy of investigation

consisted of the analysis of the contents of consciousness into its
elements.

The method of analysis was introspection.

The results of

his observation led Titchener to write, "It seems to me beyond ques-

tion that the problem of attention centres in the fact of sensible
clearness."

Titchener concluded that the clearness of a sensation in

consciousness was influenced by a number of dimensions which he delineated (Titchener, 1908, pp. 174-206).

Briefly stated, the conditions are:

(1)

The intensity of

stimulus and its sensory equivalents- -an intense stimulus such as a

sudden loud sound or a bright light, jumps into clear awareness more

readily than weaker stimuli.

[Titchener qualifies the criteria of in-

tensity as relative to current levels of activity or adaptation, noting
that high levels of stimulation over extended periods result in de-

creased sensitivity and fatigue and hence recede from clear figure.]
(2)

The form or quality of stimulus- -distinct, irregular stimuli are

generally more compelling than regular non-discrete ones.

(3)

The
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temporal relation of the stimuli- -repetition, to some degree,
and
suddenness are especially influential.

(4)

this aspect tends to impair clearness.

(5)

Movement of a stimulusThe novelty, rarity, or

strangeness of an occasion- -such qualities contribute to the emergence of a stimulus into clear figure.

(6)

Similarity of the stimulus

to ideas, sensations, or images already present in the mind- -this

factor seems to correspond to the

modem notion of

’’set."

If a sub-

ject has established a perceptual -cognitive set or predisposition to-

ward a certain class of stimuli, he is more likely to notice a member
of that class of objects than a subject who has no such set.

Titchener

points to the examples of the collector, the inventor, or the expert

whose keen attention is aroused by stimuli which the rest of the world
pass without notice.

(7)

The accommodation of the sense organs--al-

though Titchener is cautious to acknowledge that the orientation of
the sense organs is not a sufficient condition for clearness.

Ob-

viously, our eyes may accidentally converge upon some object in the
field of vision while we are mentally occupied with other things and
still not bring that object into the focus of consciousness.

(8)

The

rate of change, including its absence or cessation- -referring to the
first condition, how adaptation to an intense stimulus led to its re-

cession from awareness; if such a stimulus were to suddenly cease, we

would immediately take notice of it.

Titchener points out that his

list of conditions progresses from the attributes of the stimulus to
the psychological disposition of the organism, which is an indication

between
that he viewed attention as a function involving a relation

55

the organism and its environment.

2.2.2

James.

A radically different treatment of the concept of

attention is offered by William James, an approach representative of
the "Functionalist” tradition.

Whereas Titchener identified attention

with the clearness of conscious contents, James conceived of attention
as an active process whose function was selection.

experience is what

I

agree to attend to."

For James,

,r

My

His definition of attention

remains probably the most eloquent and concise encapsulation yet
rendered.
It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and
vivid form of one out of what seem several simultaneously
possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization,
concentration of consciousness are of its essence. It
implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal
effectively with others and is a condition which has
a real opposite in the confused scatterbrained state
which in French is called distraction
(James,
.

1890,

I, p.

.

.

403).

He goes on to explain that the "abolition" of this confused, ambient

state of mind is the awakening of attention.

One principle object comes then into the focus of consciousness. Others are temporarily suppressed. The
awakening may come about either by reason of a stimulus
from without, or in consequence of some unknown inner
alteration [James did not elaborate as to the nature of
this inner alteration although there are indications
elsewhere that he is referring to the causal effects
of purpose and intent ionality upon the awareness.] and
the changes it brings with it mounts to a concentration upon a single object with exclusion of aught besides, or to a condition anywhere between this and the
completely dispersed state (Ibid., p. 404).

James points out that the effects of attention are to make
one perceive, conceive, distinguish and remember things better.

It is
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here that the theories of Titchener and James find a common touching
point.

But James carried the issue forward by asking whether the

prominence of things attended to is due to this increased clarity of
the sensation or to an increase of intensity.

Conceding that the

matter is not clear-cut, James nevertheless asserts that to some
extent the relative intensity of two sensations is changed when one

of them is attended to and the other is not.

He admits, however,

that it is also undeniable that attention augments the clarity of

experience.

Clarity as James intended it means distinction from

other things and internal analysis or subdivision- -differentiation.
His interest in the selective aspect of attention led quite

naturally to the problem of how many things or ideas a person could
attend to at once.

The question is quite important because it seems

to involve the nature of the processes which are responsible for the

limitation of attention.

Is the conscious activity a serial process

which can do but one thing at a time or is it a parallel process which
can accomplish the total number of operations at the same time?

If

the former hypothesis is correct, then there must be some method of

rapid switching among the tasks a subject is trying to do or else
there will be considerable loss of information obtained from any given
task.

James’ answer was that the number of things to which one can

attend is altogether indefinite depending upon
powers, (2)

(1)

one's intellectual

what sort of operation one is performing on the data, and
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(3)

what the "things" are.

He goes on to point out that when appre-

hended conceptually as a connected integrated system the number of
things may be quite large.
But where the object before us breaks into parts disconnected with each other, and forming each as it were,
a separate object or system not concivable in union
with the rest, it becomes harder to apprehend all these
parts at once and the mind tends to let go of one whilst
it attends to the other.
He thus concludes:
If then by the original question, how many ideas or things
can we attend to at once, be meant how many entirely disconnected systems or processes of conception can go on
simultaneously, the answer is not easily more than one,
unless the processes are very habitual; but then two, or

even three without very much oscillation of the attention
(James, 1890, p. 409).
2.

2.3

Attention and the Structure of Consciousness.

Implied but

not explicit in this description is a third possible explanation of
the manner in which attention selects and structures consciousness.

Instead of regarding attention as a discrete binary function which is

either on or off (assumptions which underlie the concepts of serial
and parallel processing) it is conceivable that there are various
levels of attention or conscious activity, hierarchically organized
or stratified.

At the top level of this structure is the apex of

consciousness, the center of focal awareness wherein we experience
the singular nature of intellectual processes; the seemingly one

channel capacity of conscious activity illustrated in the fact that
inwe can listen to and interpret only one conversation at any given

stant or solve only one arithmetic problem at a time.

This focal

number of
awareness is the product of an integration sustained by a
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contemporary lower-order subsidiary processes.

Examples of these

lower order processes are the habitual operations which underlie

routine activities like walking or word recognition when listening to
or reading sentences.

In either of these cases, a large amount of

information is being handled and processed by the nervous system in
any given moment.

Walking involves the flexible coordination of

thousands of neuromuscular operations at once, and reading 300 words
a minute involves accounting for and interpreting an array of 30 to

40 letters per second, but neither walking nor comprehending language

are especially difficult activities for a human being to carry on.

The key to this capacity, as James indirectly hints, lies in the fact

that the large quantities of data which we assimilate are perceived as

highly interrelated and forming a coherent unified whole on the level
of focal awareness and that these component data which constitute the

whole conform to a set of conditions or rules which the organism has
previously differentiated and integrated and retrieves from memory to
apply to the present occasion.

To put it another way, the organism

through previous experience and learning develops a structure

or

schema

which is stored in the memory and can be subsequently matched to interpret and integrate incoming sensations.

It is also worth mentioning

that such schema or programs are developed and mobilized for routine

motor activities like walking, knitting, driving, etc.
to these stored schema as "sets."

One might refer

Thus the individual can successfully

the
deal with novel and complex situations only because underlying

past
novelty there are massive similarities between the present and
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situations which enable the organism to apply the appropriate sets to
these similar aspects.

Consequently, it may be said that a great many

"habitual" operations underlie every creative act.
These subsidiary structures are not subconscious.
aware of the movement of one’s legs in walking.

One is

Similarly, any lit-

erate person cannot deny consciousness of the letters on the page he is
reading.

However, as Polanyi points out, the manner in which one is

conscious of these elements is in the form of clues which point to a
joint significance lying beyond their reality as separate entities in
and of themselves.

Polanyi applies the term "tacit knowing" or "tacit

integration" to describe the hierarchical structure of consciousness
and he goes on to extend this notion into a theory of perception,

knowledge, and scientific inquiry.

Polanyi maintains that tacit know-

ing involves two different kinds of attention or awareness towards a
set of particulars; subsidiary or proximal awareness and focal or

distal awareness.
speech.

Take, for example, the situation of listening to

Normally, one focuses his attention upon the semantic content

or meaning of the sounds which he hears and this act of comprehension

entails rapid integration of pitch, duration, consonant characters

which convey sym(all of which are attended to proximally) into units
bolic meaning.

However, if instead, one concentrates upon these sub-

speaker's lips as
units of speech, noting in detail the movement of the

prosody and intonation of
he articulates various morphemes, noting the
these elements of speech
his voice, one would now be focally aware of

of their higher order joint
as terminal objects and hence lose grasp

meaning as integral parts of a symbolic message.
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feel that Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge lends vivid

illustration and support for the notion that attention consists of a

stratification of awareness characterized by increasingly complex
levels of data integration, culminating in the apex of focal consciousness.

Focal consciousness is the highest order integration of the

experiencing subject and is immediately and primarily felt as the

unitary nature of attention.

Thus, a complex of data may be entertained

or held in the arena of focal awareness insofar as the constituents may
be apprehended or integrated as a single unified whole.

When the array

of data cannot be integrated into a meaningful unity (as in the case
of being presented with two simultaneously spoken messages) the organism cannot focally attend to the two unrelated groups of data at the
same time and one group must be rejected.

The factors 3 then 3 which

limit integration of data are the same which limit the capacity of

focal attention and account for its selective properties.
These factors may be studied as a function of two inter-

related variables:

(1)

the organism's capacity to differentiate and

integrate the diverse particulars within its phenomenal field, and
(2)

the incompatibility among the data which are being considered.

The former depends upon learning competence, while the latter simply
epoch
means that certain things do not go together at least in this

the universe.

ot

For example, two like-charged ions do not coalesce- -they

configurations of
repel one another, and human beings cannot see both
of one by its very
figure-ground reversal simultaneously- -the presence

nature excludes the other.

Naturally these parameters are not totally

a
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independent of each other, inasmuch as the incompatability of
elements

and/or processes is a function of the context or system in which
they
participate.
Thus we have returned to the selective nature of attention.
But now, it is clear that selectivity is a consequent expression of
the structural unity of conscious processes.
2.2.4

Attention as Prehension.

This interpretation of attention

is consistent with the organic process philosophy of Whitehead and

finds broad philosophical justification in his theory of prehensions.

Recall that, according to Whitehead, the nature of actual entities,
the final real things of which the world is made up, is characterized

by a process of concrescence in which "The universe of many things
acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item
of the many to its subordination in the constitution of the novel one
[Whitehead, 1929b, p. 321] ."

Although the formal development of these

principles in Process and Reality is highly technical and detailed, a
non- technical paragraph in Modes of Thought provides a most effective

illustration of these notions as they apply to the analysis of human
experience.

1

find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, fear, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions- -all of them subjective reactions
.The
to the environment as active in my nature.
I

.

1

.

Incidentally, though Whitehead's philosophy may seem highly
abstract and difficult to understand, the reader should be aware that
Whitehead himself said that the aim of his philosophy is to elucidate
of
the nature of experience, to make explicit the implicit knowledge
philosophia
which
our being. He also felt that the foundation upon
excal system must ultimately rest is a direct appeal to immediate

perience

.
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individual enjoyment is what I am in my role of a
natural activity. As I shape the activities of the
environment into a new creation, which is myself at
this moment; and yet as being myself it is a continuation of the antecedent world. If we stress the
role of the environment, this process is causation.
If we stress the role of my immediate pattern of
active enjoyment, this process is self -creation.
If
we stress the role of the conceptual anticipation of
the future whose existence is a necessity in the nature
of the present, this process is the teleological aim
at some ideal in the future (Whitehead, 1938, p. 228).

Two themes which clearly emerge in the preceding quotation
are that the organism becomes what it is as a consequence of its sub-

jective interaction with the data provided by its environment and that
this interaction is governed by the subject in an active process of

selection in accordance with a conceived ideal or purpose.
The process by which a subject reacts to its environment in
the act of self-creation is called prehension.

More specifically, pre-

hension refers to the process of appropriating into a unity of existence
the many data presented as relevant by the processes of nature.

prehension consists of three elements,

(1)

"Every

the concrescing subject or

actual entity, (2) the datum which is prehended, and

(3)

the subjec-

tive form or manner in which the data are prehended [Ibid., p. 88]

."

A prehension may be either positive or negative, depending upon
whether the reaction is incorporative or aversive, and it may be either
"physical" or "conceptual" depending upon the nature of the data prehended.

A positive prehension involves the assimilation or integra-

tion of data into the organism.

It is the process by which data are

genuinely included in the real internal constitution of a new actual
life
entity; the derived data are literally absorbed into the complex
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of the new entity.

They are essential components.

They are no longer

external facts to which the subject responds but are part of
his ul-

timate privacy (Ibid., pp. 130-131).
Whitehead, however, is careful to point out that the data
of positive prehension are the result of a selection which must involve
the elimination of certain data by what he refers to as negative pre-

hension.

A negative prehension

sidered but then are rejected.

is thus one in which the data are con-

In Whitehead's words, "A negative pre-

hension adds to the emotional complex though not to the objective data."
The necessity of negative prehension is rooted in the maintenance of

diversity in the universe.

If, as Whitehead maintains, an organism is

a product of the vast multitude of its prehensions, which have been and

are being integrated into a unity of existence, then the uniqueness or

individuality of an actual entity, which is a function of its differences with respect to other actual entities, must necessarily be due
to the fact that its component prehens ions- -past

are different.

,

present and future,

Obviously, there are also a great many similarities

shared to a greater or lesser degree among entities, indicating that

many prehensions are commonly, even universally, felt.

Nevertheless,

if all entities prehended all the available data in any given occasion,
all diversity would perish and there would be no basis for individuality.

Yet the undeniable fact of existence is its diversity within

its unity.

As Whitehead puts it, the aim of the universe is beauty;

the form is meaningful contrasts.

Thus, each subject in the process

of self-creation selectively prehends according to its ideal reality
as embodied in its subjedtive aim.
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But there is another angle,
the unity of the becoming process.

certain contexts.

Individuality also rests upon

Some things do not go together in

Some clash rather than contrast.

Certain things

experience destruction as a result of their relations to other things.
Thus negative prehension, the process by which an organism can dismiss,
ignore, or repress certain elements which would destroy or impair its

development is one means of rescuing complexity from the danger of incompatibility.

There are two types of negative prehension.

One involves a

definite decision or act of exclusion, the typical case of which is
the organism excluding a possibility of development on the grounds of

organic incompatibility.

Such negative prehension may be regarded as

aesthetic judgment in the concrescence of the organism.

An example

at the lowest level, suggested by Eisendrath (1970) might be the de-

cision of an atom to emit or exclude a proton rather than to disintegrate.

At the organic (living) level it may be represented in

the tendency of living tissue to reject foreign

matter rather than

die, while on the psychological level it may mean that a gun sales-

man who recognizes the incompatibility between his selling guns and
his valuing non-violence decides to give up his gun-selling career.

The second type of negative prehension is a conception of an

object or ideal not realized in the datum.

This latter variety which

figures prominently in the choices of the human organism might be

thought of as a form of transcendence since it is the means by which
an individual can move forward in his development by reacting not to
the immediate situation as given, but rather to some unrealized
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potentiality which lies beyond the present data.

This form of nega-

tive prehension introduces novelty into experience through
the effects

of consciously held aspirations and purpose.

It is the supreme oc-

casion of pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps.

Thus, a child

who aspires to become a statesman is rising above his datum as a
child and is entertaining an idea which to an extent negates his im-

mediate actuality.

In a sense he has turned his attention towards an

ideal, altering his awareness of the present data.

Generally speaking, then, negative prehension is the inter-

vention or contravention of the organism's subjective aim in the determination of its concrescence.

It is the anticipation of future

possibilities and the urge toward their realization which preserves
the integrity of the organism in its advance toward novelty.

It

necessarily implies choice, elimination, and selection of the data

which become the subject's experience.

We would propose that attention

is the exemplification of the prehension process on the level of con-

scious thought and perception.

tion in terms of this paradigm?

What is gained by interpreting attenOf foremost significance we have ac-

quired a sense of how attention functions in the ongoing process of
creative becoming, and how the individual constructs his experience.
In addition, the construct of "prehension" emphasizes a necessary and

vital connection between what the individual consciously experiences,
i.e., what he knows, and what his aims and aspirations are.

Attention

peras a mode of prehension represents the interfusion of cognition,

ception, and conation.

Conation refers to more than a mere design or

emotional
intention about something- -it includes the deeply rooted
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complex and pathos (loving) underlying such designs,
the feelings,
implicit and explicit, which form the basis of our
aspirations.

Thus,

the interrelation between knowledge and aim in the
operation of atten-

tion also involves an interrelation between knowledge and
feeling
(loving).

The conceptual recognition of this interconnectedness has

a long history emerging in the vocabulary of 19 th Century
phenomen-

ology as intent ionality.
2.2.5

Intentionality and Interest:

The Affective Base of Attention.

Bretano, who introduced the concept of intentionality, be-

lieved that consciousness is defined by the fact that it intends something, points towards something outside itself- -specifically that it

intends the object.

Edmund Husserl, Bretano'

s

disciple, pointed out

that consciousness never exists in a subjective vacuum but is always

consciousness of something, or more accurately, consciousness toward
something.

"Thus meaning is an intention of the mind."

Heidegger extended Husserl's notion to include the total
feeling, valuing and acting of the human being.

troducing the concept of "care."

He did this by in-

Care is constructive of our world,

in a sense analogous to the molding of understanding by purpose.

Actually, one could just as easily substitute love in the place of
care, inasmuch as the descriptive and functional qualities which

Heidegger ascribes to care correspond to love in contemporary language.
There is an undeniably close relationship between caring or loving
and intentionality already suggested by the fact that the root word

"tend," to take care of- -is the center of the term intentionality.
This indication that affective tonality is heavily impli-
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cated in the molding of conscious experience recalls a
statement made
by James concerning the close inner relation between attention
and
interest.

He says that what we attend to and what interests us are

synonomous terms.

For James, the interest is the basis upon which the

subjective field is organized.

He writes:

Millions of items of the outward order are present to
my senses which never properly enter into my experience.
Why? Because they have no interest for me. My experience
is what I agree to attend to.
Only those items which I
notice shape my mind- -without selective interest experience is an utter chaos.
Interest alone gives accent
and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground
--intelligible perspective in a word (James, 1890,
p. 409).

By placing interest at the core of attention, James has

touched upon a key issue in the dynamics of attention.

Interest is

the vital link between ideals and aims, conscious or subconscious and

the immediacy of the present.

portance of our experience.

Its effect is felt in the relative im-

"To feel interested in something is to

feel attracted to it, to feel inclined to give attention to it [Ibid.,
p.

430] ."

Here again, we encounter the element of feeling.

It

seems to this writer that feeling is a crucial factor in the operation

of interest.

As such, interest might be regarded as the feeling or

loving component which underlies attention.

Because it is essentially

a quality of feeling, interest is not subject to the direct control of

the will.

Interest must be aroused- -must be achieved indirectly.

This does not mean that an individual cannot make conscious efforts to

become interested in something.

A person can voluntarily attend

to

something for which he holds no interest, but only to a very limiLed
extent unless there is something in the situation which strikes him
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as novel, relevant and meaningful to the realization
of his individual-

ity (concrescence).

When this happens, the subject develops a positive

attraction or interest toward the object and positive prehension
occurs.
If the object or situation is perceived as irrelevant or
destructive,

negative prehension follows

.

2

Thus, although attention and interest are not to be equated

with each other (since one may be interested in many things but only
attend to one at any given moment), one’s interest (or feeling) in a

situation or object will determine his capacity to attend to it.

In-

terest is the vague fashioner of one's attention; what one has attended
to in turn figures heavily in what one knows.

What one knows is part

of what one feels and who one is (an organism is the multitude of its
prehensions), what one feels is in turn the basis of one's interest.
This cycle is grossly over-simplified and there are many important

variables which are unaccounted for (which consequently gives it the
appearance of a vicious inescapable circle- -this inadequacy is acknowledged)

,

but its purpose is merely to show that interest (and attention)

is not without genesis and not without some means of self-determination.

2

The fact that people sometimes are interested in morbid
things is not a contradiction of this principle. An interest or
preoccupation with the morbid is an instance in the pathology of attention and can arise as a consequence of two conditions. The first
case is when the subject's history has involved the systematic suppression of his self-expression through constructive channels. Repeatedly and hopelessly frustrated, he is driven to self -destructive
expression as the only remaining form of self -becoming (albeit disFor such a person, destruction is indeed
torted) left open to him.
perceived as relevant and meaningful to his self actualization.
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The first section of this paper has been an attempt to
as-

semble a phenomenological account of the various aspects underlying
the process of attention and construct a coherent philosophical

framework which will serve two pruposes.

(1)

To provide a con-

textual basis for understanding attention as a process interrelated

with other aspects of personality in the evolving consitution of
the total human being, and (2) to serve as a basis for interpreting
the theoretical and empirical data on attention generated by the

various schools of experimental psychology.

Hence there will fre-

quently be references to notions, ideas and sources developed in this
section of the dissertation.

2.1.3

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS

A survey of contemporary psychological literature reveals
that attention is treated as one of three quite distinct phenomena,

each of which we will consider separately.

First, there is a body of

literature which equates attention with arousal.

This interpreta.

tion is often used in experiments on preparedness and vigilance.

A typical vigilance task

3

is to present the subject with a clock-face

^The basic purpose of vigilance experiments is to assess or
measure a subject’s ability to detect a weak signal or stimulus the
exact moment of occurrence of which the subject has no foreknowledge.
Generally, the subject is aware of the kind of event he is supposed
to detect beforehand and because it is of relatively low intensity
his
he must maintain his attention and alertness upon the region of
per
to
is
if
he
occur
to
is
environment where the anticipated signal
the
in
decrement
the
ceive it. The procedure is then to determine
of sucsubject’s vigilance (operationally defined by the percentage
involved
is
he
cessful detections) with respect to the length of time
onset ot
the
to
Decrements in performance are attributed
in the task.
activation
of
fatigue, boredom, and a general decrease in the level
and arousal.
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having a single hand which moves a certain distance in
discrete jumps
at regular or irregular intervals.

Occasionally, the hand makes a

double jump and the subject is to press a key when the double jump
occurs.

The task can be complicated further by requiring the subject

to monitor several clocks simultaneously, by presenting other extran-

eous signals, and so on.

When a subject is required to keep on with

this task for a considerable period of time, say two or three hours,

his vigilance usually declines as time goes on- -his accuracy falls

off more or less rapidly.
There is an expansive volume of experimental literature and

theoretical discussion concerned with the reasons for this decline in

vigilance and factors which can maintain accuracy without loss over a
period of time.^

We will not attempt to cover all the explanations,

but will instead consider those accounts which connect performance

with arousal.
The concept of expectancy has been used to explain the lack
In the case of

of decrement when the signals are irregularly spaced.

irregular signals, however, expectancy does not account for the re-

duction in accuracy over time unless one assumes that the particular
character of the irregularity of a given series has some effect of
changing expectation over time.

A number of investigators seem con-

vinced that the gradual loss is more akin to some kind of fatigue or

Tor a more detailed and in-depth summary of the vigilance
"A Two Factor
phenomenon the reader is referred to McCormack, P. D.
In
A. F.
Studies.”
Recent
of
Light
Theory of Vigilance in the
Holland
North
Amsterdam:
Saunders (Ed.) Attention and Performance
Attention.
and
Vigilance
Publishing Co., 1967 and Mackworth, J.
Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969.
,

.

,
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boredom which accumulates during the task period
and lowers the readiness to respond.

This phenomena of decrement in vigilance
naturally

suggests that arousal is somehow reduced through the
infrequent stimulation.

One must tread cautiously on this speculation, however,

since the predictions from arousal theory can be quite
complex and at
odds, depending upon the specific circumstances.

For instance,

Broadbent (1963) points out that poor performance can be produced by
either very high or very low arousal.

For example, it is now known

that knowledge of results is one factor which helps maintain vigil-

ance

.

Presumably the usual decrement without knowledge of results is

due to loss of interest in the task and a consequent low-level of
arousal.

Providing feedback to the subject makes the job more in-

teresting, raises the level of arousal, and prevents performance loss.

However, it is conceivable that the subject might get so bored that

activation would increase (with the onset of restlessness) rather
than decrease and then one would have to argue that the loss of performance is due to too high a level of arousal.

Another complication arises with the explanation that a
decrement of attention is caused by a decrease in interest and thus

presumably arousal.

If this were the case, one might expect regular

signals to make the task more boring and thus increase the decline of

performance.

Yet regular signals seem to maintain performance at a

more or less constant level.

This contradiction dissolves when we

consider that because of the predictability of the signals, the subject can relax between them and prepare himself temporarily for each
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signal as he anticipates it.

Nevertheless, the arousal or activation approach
to attention suffers on several counts.

First, the several attempts made to

directly relate vigilance performance to physiological
indices of
arousal have yielded unclear and often conflicting
results.

This is

partially because there is a lack of clearly valid and generally
accepted indicators of arousal.

For example, Eason, Beardshall and

Jaffe (1965) experimented with four indices of arousal--skin conductance, heart rate, muscle potential in the neck and potentials
in the eye region.

On two of the measures, no change was observed

while the two other indices showed changes in opposite directions.
Such results suggest arousal is multi-dimensional and that different indicators reflect different aspects.

A second problem

is that there has not yet been a satis-

factory separation of general alertness and arousal from the more
specific pattern of attention to particular stimuli.

As Ryan (1970)

points out, an individual might be very alert to his daydreaming or
to worrying about some personal problem outside the experiment but

not alert to the task in the laboratory.
Finally, there is somewhat of a logical problem in equating

attention with arousal.

Arousal is basically purported to be a non-

specific, vague and diffuse pattern of activation while attention is

essentially conceived

of as a highly selective, versatile and speci-

fic orientation of the organism towards a particular aspect or seg-

ment of a situation.

There is reason to believe, for instance, that

intentional learning is generally superior to unintentional learning
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because the intention to learn directs the subject’s attention
to-

wards the relevant attributes of the task.

If the effects of atten-

tion were solely derivative of the influence exercised by arousal
there would theoretically be no basis for the fact that a person
in
a high state of arousal still performs better upon material
which is

intentionally as opposed to incidentally learned.

In other words, it

would seem theoretically insufficient to suppose that a process which
is characterized by diffuseness can somehow fully account for a pro-

cess which is characterized by specificity.

Neisser (1967) feels that any conception of attention as

psychic energy is not a useful heuristic in understanding the various
processes comprising attention.

He suggests that a more constructive

view is to regard attention as an allotment of analyzing or organizing
mechanisms to a limited region of the perceptual field.

We would say,

however, that arousal and activation are probably significantly in-

volved in the process of attention but that they do not explain the
whole story.

2.3.1

Attention as Organization.

The first and most persistent

efforts to conceptualize attention in terms of the principles of or-

ganization were made by the Gestalt psychologists.

Attention was seen

to involve the phenomenon of reorganizing materials into figure

ground relations.

Since reorganization and figure-ground relation-

ships were the general principles of perception, the gestaltists did

not view attention as much different from any other aspect of perception.

The notion of the individual actively reorganizing the data

that is
attended to seems potentially to be a powerful concept and one
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basically congruent with the philosophical
framework proposed earlier
in this paper.

However, it is precisely this kind of
active organ-

ization on which Gestalt theory is weakest.

Their principles of

organization are, for the most part, extvinsically
based , that is,

they deal almost exclusively with the variables
inherent in the
stimulus arrangement such as "isolation,”
"grouping," "fitting," etc
Consequently, there is a neglect of the active

'intr'Cns'ic

structuring

of experiential data which originates from within
the organism.

Again

two experiments on intentional versus incidental
learning provide a

test case for the theory.

Kaswan (1957) had subjects learn to associate pairs of
figures.

In some cases, the figures were "fitting" in that the two

formed continuations of each other and could be seen as part of a

single gestalt.

In other instances, the figures were more disparate.

The experiment showed that the "fitting figures" (good gestalts) were

learned better than the disparate ones; this held true for both incidental and intentional learning.

Another study, testing the

isolation effect (another gestalt principle) yielded essentially the
same results.

Thus, the evidence suggests that these principles of

perceptual organization may play a part in learning but they do no
of themselves explain the differences between what we attend to and

what we do not attend to; why intentional learning is superior to incidental learning.
There are other inadequacies in trying to subsume the process of attention under the Gestalt model.

These perceptual
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principles refer to a limited set of phenomena
that might be called

pre-cognitive (pre- cognitive not in a developmental
sense but rather
in the sense that they are primitive
structures which operate below

the level of cognitive activity).

As such, the Gestalt principles are

subject to the following limitations:

(1)

they are heavily dependent

upon and therefore restricted by the arrangement of
sensory data,
(2)

the permutation of structured wholes are of a
limited and pre-

determined number, and

(3)

once a good gestalt is attained, the struc-

ture becomes inert, reaches its ceiling, so to speak.

Beyond this,

the Gestalt principles do not account for the effect that logical
or

personal meaning exercise on attention.

We may attend to and struc-

ture a situation along lines that have nothing to do with gestalt
forms.

Finally, because they are supposedly invariant, we are left

with the problem of structures without genesis, form without process,
and structure without construction.

The double-binded insufficiency

of static structures is that in being devoid of ontology, they are
also incapable of explaining creative and novel organizations of
experience.

2.3.2

Attention as Selectivity.

Most of the contemporary research

approaches attention as the problem of perceptual-cognitive selectivity.

For these investigators, the core phenomenon of the attention

process is that we select what is relevant and reject the rest.

The

research has been directed toward elucidating what enables a person
to select and separate one group of data from its embedded context

and from it construct a coherent, meaningful pattern.
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One finding that has so far emerged from the
experiments is
that humans will use all the information that is
available to them in

performing this task of selection or differentiation.

Some of the

most interesting and illuminating results of this
problem come from
the studies concerned with selective listening.

In typical designs,

the subject is presented with the task of separating out two
simul-

taneously spoken messages so that one is followed and understood while
the other is ignored.

Norman (1969) lists the major cues which sub-

jects seem to utilize in performing such an operation.
A)

The voices come from different directions,

B)

Lip reading, gestures, etc.,

C)

The fact that messages are uttered by different speaking
voices and are thus distinguished by variances in mean
pitches, mean speeds, male versus female, etc.,

D)

Differing accents

When these cues, which are based on the purely physical
characteristics of the two messages fail or are not present, the subject can resort to psychological continuity or semantic structure as
a means of disentangling or differentiating the data, utilizing such

parameters as the transition probabilities between words.

In this

case, subject matter, syntactic structure, and voice dynamics become

differentiating cues.

With respect to the rejected message, the indications are
that it has certain statistical properties which the subject recognizes.

For example, the listener may notice the rejected signal as

speech, notice a change in voice timbre and pitch or become aware

that speech has been replaced by some other sound.

It is almost as if
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there is a system that monitors the gross characteristics of the un-

attended aspects of the environment while the organism is attending
to a situation.

Efforts aimed at uncovering the nature of this system have
led some psychologists to posit that we possess a very short term

storage or temporary memory for items to which we are not attending.
The existence of such a system would suggest that the limitation of
the perception of many features in a complex field is imposed less

by the original intake of information than by the necessity of storing
it in memory for more than a very short time.

Lawrence and Laberge

(1956) found that when observers were shown various numbers of dif-

ferent shapes in various colors and given instructions to attend pri-

marily to number or shape or color, the subjects were able to report
some information about the features to which they had not been direc-

ted to attend (or even told specifically not to attend)

that this was done instantly following the trial.

,

provided

Lawrence and Laberge

maintained that their results indicated no evidence of immediate perceptual selectivity and that it made no difference whether the subjects

were given task instructions before or immediately after exposure.

A

recent review of these results in a study by Egreth (1967) revealed

upon
several methodological problems and therefore casts some doubt
the above conclusion.

Meanwhile, further investigation has fairly

place in the prewell established that some of the selection takes
takes place in
liminary perceptual act itself and further selection
for report.
the process of recalling the information

Moreover, the

selection at both of these
evidence indicates that intention affects
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stages
2.3.3

The Filter Model.

modem effort

The first

towards a foimal

theory of attention was advanced by Donald
Broadbent (1958).

Actually,

Broadbent 's theory aimed to deal comprehensively
with the entire

omenon of human information processing.

phen-

His thesis was that the

nervous system acts to some extent as a "single" communication
channel,
so that it is useful to regard it as having a "limited capacity."

The

selective mechanism, supposedly situated in the brain, selects from
all sensory events those data which have some features in common.

The

criterial basis for auditory selection include physical features of
the signal, intensity, pitch, and the spatial localization.

The filter

then can be tuned to accept the desired message and reject all others.
The locus of selectivity, the filter stage which yields the single

channel capacity follows two prior stages of processing; primary sense

data pathways and a short-term buffer storage, both of which have a
multi-channel capability and are presumably non- selective.

Broadbent

holds that the maximum time incoming information may be held in buffer
storage is in the order of seconds.

He further points out that the

selection of data is not completely random and that the probability

of a particular class of events being selected for processing is increased by certain properties of the events and by certain conditions

of the organism.

Such properties include parameters of

(a)

physical

intensity, (b) time elapsed since the last information from the par-

ticular class of events, of which the present instance is a member,
entered the organism's attention, and
as opposed to low frequency.

(c)

whether the sound is of high
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Support for the notion of a single channel
hypothesis has

accrued from a number of studies which, oddly enough,
have dealt with
the phenomenon of directing attention toward two
objects simultaneously.

Mowbray (1954) reported that some individuals seemed to
be capable of
perceiving two messages presented at the same time in a single sensory mode provided that the two remained separable in terms of their
physical identity.

However, the messages were not long, continuously

spoken sentences but rather short phrases presented simultaneously.
Thus, some theorists have claimed that what actually occurs is that

the subject's attention alternates rapidly between the two series of

events

Yet another explanation which appears even more likely but

which has not yet been suggested is that both phrases are sufficiently
brief, so that by the time the first phrase has been completely processed, the second one, initially unattended to, has not decayed and

hence is still available for retrieval from short-term memory.

In

order for this to occur at all, however, the two contemporary data

must be adequately separated physically in order that the nervous
system can differentiate the input into two discrete sensory events.
Otherwise, the objects or sounds may not be perceived at all, or there

may be some modification of the percept of one by the percept of the
other

(Vernon, 1962).

Therefore, if two figures are presented tach-

istoscopically in rapid succession of one another they will be perceived as a single figure, combining the attributes of both originals.
Despite the supporting evidence, there are nevertheless some
serious difficulties with the single -channel theory.

To begin with,
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Broadbent claims the strength of his model
rests in its superior precision; it is a "more exact version" than
the accounts offered by the

introspectionists

.

Yet the notion of what constitutes a
single chan-

nel, the central construct of the theory,
is left vague and undefined.
If by single-channel we mean that the
organism can carry on only one

activity at a time, our definition is circular and
we have explained
nothing.

We are still left with the problem of establishing
a set

of general parameters that accurately differentiate
what constitutes
a single activity from two activities.

For example,

I

might com-

fortably say that sight-playing more than a single melodic tune would
for me exceed the boundary of a single activity.

But for a concert

artist, sight -playing a Bach three-part invention or even a fugue
(four independent melodic lines) might easily qualify as a single

activity.

If the single channel concept is to have any scientific

merit, the criteria which define it must be different from those con-

ditions which are explained by it.

Another problem is that the theory provides no means for the
selection of data on the basis of meaning.

If an individual were

able only to notice the gross physical characteristics of the rejected message he would theoretically be unable to switch his attention
to a more relevant or meaningful message newly introduced into the

situation, since he would have no way of ascertaining the meaning or

content of the new data until after he stopped the first task altogether.

The fact of the matter is, that people are able to perform

such shifts of attention.

For a long time, experimenters argued that

they could not demonstrate this fact, citing documentation from
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selective listening studies which indicated that
subjects were unable
to remember any of the content of the rejected
message.

Norman (1969)

has pointed out that in these instances the
investigator waited a

while before questioning the subjects on how much of
the non-attended

message they remembered.

Speculating that the material which re-

ceives no attention is noticed only briefly, Noiman himself
conducted
an experiment in which he asked subjects at various points during
the

trial to recount what they were able to remember of the rejected

message they had just heard.

The results yielded evidence that the

subjects did have a short-term memory for items to which they were

not attending but no long-term memory.
The inevitable question that this discussion leads to is,
at what stage in the sequence of information processing does this

selection by meaning occur.

Conceivably the locus of selectivity could

fall among one or several of the following five stages.
1)

Primary selection on the basis of meaning prior to
’’buffer"

(short-term) storage,

2)

Selection from aspects of the buffer material for
further processing,

3)

Selective retention over a period of time,

4)

Factors in the environment at the time of recall
which select from what the subject has retained.

Norman's study already confirms that there is some selection at and perhaps beyond stage 3.

More research is needed to con-

firm the extent to which an analysis of meaning takes place during

prior stages of processing.
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A more recent series of studies on this problem

(Anne Treise-

man, 1965) were aimed at determining upon what
level and upon what

criteria the selection of relevant from irrelevant
material is made.
Treiseman’s experiments relied upon the technique known
as "shadowing"

which requires the subject to attend to one of two
simultaneously
spoken messages and to repeat the relevant message as soon as he
hears
it.

Treiseman varied certain features of the irrelevant message, such

as voice type (male versus female)

,

the language of the irrelevant

message, and she even inserted reversed speech in order to vary the

number and type of cues available to the listener as a means of differentiating the two signals.

She was especially curious as to

whether or not both messages are fully analyzed with respect to meaning before one is selected and, if not, at what stage in the analysis

the unwanted message is discarded.

Moreover, she was interested in

what determines the selection and switching between messages.
Her findings suggest that both messages are not fully an-

alyzed before one is rejected but that a preliminary analysis takes
place at various levels in the perceptual system, depending upon the
type of characteristics which differentiate the two signals.

proposed that the features

She

of incoming messages are analyzed succes-

sively by the nervous system, starting with general physical attributes
and proceeding on to the identification of words and their meaning.

Signals are separated from one another by their physical attributes

when it is possible and by their grammatical and semantic features

when it becomes necessary.
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In regard to these conditions, Treiseman
found a graded

effect on the ability of her subjects to reject
an irrelevant message.

When there was a distinct physical difference between
the relevant
and irrelevant channels subjects experienced no
difficulty in shadowing
one and ignoring the other.

When the messages had similar physical

characteristics but belonged to different languages they were much
less successful.

The better they knew the language, the more diffi-

cult it was to prevent intrusions from the unwanted message.

The

most difficult task was to maintain shadowing when both messages were
read in the same language and spoken with the same voice.

Treiseman’

explanation of the selective process does not glaringly conflict with
the experiential account of attention presented in the first section
and is far more successful than Broadbent’s theory in accounting for
the experimental results.

quacies

However, there are still certain inade-

.

The main criticism against Treiseman’ s theory is its com-

plexity.

If each incoming message is analyzed and judged, the sel-

ection process has not simplified or reduced the amount of infor-

mation the organism must deal with- -the original basis for assuming
that a selective mechanism exists in the first place.

The second objection is that Treiseman' s theory is basically
a modification of Broadbent’s single channel filter model and hence

suffers from vagueness and some of the logical circularity which

flicted the original theory.

af-

For example, though it is acknowledged

that meaning is functional in the selective process, there is still

no explanation as to how meaning is understood or noticed and thus
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how it influences selection.

These questions are crucial because

meaning is the primary factor in determining the structural
interrelationship of the many data present to the organism in a given
situation.

And it is this structural interrelationship which in turn

constitutes the phenomenal units of our experience --the units around

which the singular capacity of focal attention may conform.
These problems are so fundamental that they extend to the
core of the perceptual process.

Therefore, a satisfactory resolution

of these can be arrived at only through a re-examination and reformu-

lation of the basic principles which underlie the perception itself.

2.3.4

Issues in Perceptual Theory.

There is yet no comprehensive

theory of attention because we lack a generally agreed upon theory of
perception.

However, man’s attempts to construct theories of per-

ception date back to ancient times and constitute his earliest efforts
to deal with "psychological issues."

concerned with perception.

Both Aristotle and Plato were

The classical models of perception which

guided research, theory and speculation of modem psychology derive
from seventeenth century philosophy and particularly the mechanistic
doctrines of Descartes.

Cartesian philosophy is a descendant in the

rationalist tradition of Aristotle and much of Descartes' thought represents an extension of the former’s doctrine.

We will not re-attempt

a critical discussion of these foundations now except to say that the

legacy bequeathed by this tradition upon

modem psychology was

less

than liberating.
The model of perception we inherited was essentially one in
of the
which the organism passively registered impressions and images
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world.

The mind was "the passive clay on which sensations
write,

something which merely absorbs and classifies facts."
sumption behind this conception is

that

One key as-

the perceptual system,

the senses and the mind consisted of facsimile images
that mirrored
the arrangement of elements and physical forces in the
external world.

Learning causes individual differences only in terms of the detail
and completeness of this mental image, i.e., how closely it matches

external reality.

Despite the fact that philosophy itself disinherited such a

notion in the nineteenth century;

notwithstanding the advances of

twentieth century nuclear physics and the theory of relativity which

proved the arbitrary and inadequate bases of these assumptions, and
the recent trends in

modem biology

considered earlier)

much of experimental psychology remains entrenched

,

in these archaic notions.

(the implications of which we

Feeling less and less comfortable with

this anomalous situation, psychologists have made sporadic efforts to

expand their vocabulary and generalize their conceptual framework.
But underneath, the materialistic biases persist and continue to

govern methodological sanctions, the priority of issues and the
legitimacy of evidence.

Few within the field have seriously ques-

tioned the basic paradigm.

Only within the past few years has perceptual theory begun
to break away from the stultifying notions of material objectivism.

A widening circle of psychologists has become strongly critical of
the objectivist inversion which assumes that sense perception is

totally subservient to external reality with the mere task of
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transducing sense stimuli into their respective mental
images.

There

is an increasing rejection of the primacy of
naive realism and a grow-

ing recognition of the immediate and personal nature
of awareness.

Emerging from this is the realization that perception is primarily
a process of construction, transition and interpretation
and that
it is ultimately subjective.

Such a model of perception suggests,

in the words of Platt,

That each of us stands at the creative choosing
focus of a moving web of past antecedents and future
consequences that branch out from our present choices
and actions propagating and amplifying themselves indefinitely (Platt, 1970, p. 23).
2.3.5

Perception as Organismic Process.

In accordance with the

principles of organismic process outlined in Section

1,

we advance the

following principles as a rudimentary foundation upon which may be

built a coherent and adequate theory of perception.

We propose that

the mind's grasp and enjoyment of the world, of which perception is

an integral facet rests on two basic psychological and neurological
principles.

The first is the principle of response to novelty or

change while the second is the principle of response to repetition or

permanence in the form of pattern.

Both of these notions (which are

reflections of the processes of differentiation and integration) are
the indispensable ingredients in sustaining the process.

If one is

absent, the grasp of consciousness rapidly decays.

These principles imply a radical departure from the histori-

cally dominant views of perception.

The essential nature of percep-

tion now becomes a problem of process, rather than substances

transition as opposed to stasis.

of
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To clarify what this means, let us draw
upon some specific

illustrations afforded by the research literature
in perception.
These studies might best be characterized
as efforts to determine
the boundary conditions of human perception-that is, investigation

into those factors or influences under which
perception breaks down
or is radically altered.

Studying these sorts of limits can provide

us with a knowledge of those fundamental conditions
upon which per-

ceptual operations are based.
One such area of inquiry has been concerned with the spon-

taneous and irrepressible fluctuations of attention which occur in
an unchanging situation.

The evidence accrued from experiments on

vigilance and sensory deprivation is fairly conclusive in demonstrating that it is impossible for a person to focus his perception
for an indefinite period of time upon a single aspect of a stabilized

unchanging situation.

This holds for all sensory modes, including

vision, although it is generally easier to preserve the focus of

visual perception than auditory or tactile perception because of the

person’s capacity to control the orientation of the sense organs
themselves.

Broadbent (1963) has attempted to account for the results
of Mackworth's clock-test vigilance task in terms of this factor.
He argues that the decline in vigilance is due to "the inability to

maintain any concentration of awareness on a relatively unimpressive
and unchanging situation.”

Sooner or later there occur blockages

in perception and a wandering of attention to other features of the

environment or to the observer's own thoughts.

Hence, an event
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occurring during this period goes
unnoticed- though this is less likely to happen if the event is
expected.
This inability to maintain
attention on monotonous tasks is a
well-known phenomenon to radar
observers, pilots and industrial
inspectors.
In reviewing the findings, Broadbent
found that a short in-

terval between periods of testing or
a novel stimulus (e.g., a tele-

phone message) temporarily restored the
full efficiency of a subject's
performance.

He also discovered that when every signal
was followed

by an auditory message informing the subject
of his performance, deterioration was retarded and in some cases performance
improved.
There are several explanations for this effect of
feedback (knowledge
of results) upon performance but we will reserve
discussion on these

speculations for a later time.

The immediate point is to recognize

that such feedback at least serves to introduce some variation (novelty)

into an otherwise monotonous situation and in so doing creates a

climate in which perceptual processing can occur.

After conducting a similar series of experiments, using
dial-watching tasks, Broadbent observed that the signal itself introduces novelty into the situation and that the occurrence of each
signal restores performance partially to that level appearing at the

beginning of the watch.

He also noted that when signals come from

several possible sources, some of these sources are naturally more

likely to receive a response than others but when the time of monotonous watching is extended, these priorities are reversed and attention

fluctuates so that those initially neglected sources become favored.

An interesting mode of perceptual fluctuation can be
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observed in the spontaneous reversals of figure -ground relations that

occur when looking at ambiguous representations of familiar objects.
Such reversals seem to happen when the sensory data provides the observer with input for which there are two or more possible representations that are quite different and about equally plausible or

familiar by whatever criteria the perceptual system employs.

Another

version of this multi- stability of patterns is connected with the
depth- reversal that often occurs when focusing upon ambiguous two-

dimensional schemata which suggest three-dimensional forms; for example,
the rhomboid cubicle,

Such reversals of perceptual configuration are largely
spontaneous and are only partially under voluntary control, i.e., the

viewer cannot completely inhibit these tendencies.

Voluntary direc-

tion of attention towards one configuration may increase its dominance
but it seldom produces complete suppression of the other.

As we shall

demonstrate later, the reason for this probably lies in the physical
organization of the perceptual system.

An even more dramatic instance of the breakdown of perception
under invariant stimulation is the phenomenon of perceptual fading.
retina
This is elicited when a stationary image is projected on the

for a prolonged period of time.

Under such conditions the observer

completely and then
finds that the image begins to fade or disappear
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spontaneously reappear over regular intervals.

It is interesting to

note that the speed and amount of fading as well as rates and
fre-

quency of regeneration varied according to the nature of the figure.
The amount of fading correlated negatively with the degree of meaning
and complexity associated with the particular figure, again suggesting

that novelty and variation are requisite ingredients of perception.
But there are even further confirmations in the results of recent in-

quests into the neurological processes underlying vision.
The findings indicate that the function of vision is de-

pendent upon continual change or fluctuation of stimulation upon the
retina.

For example, Ditchbum and Riggs have found that constant

motion of the eyeballs is necessary for visual perception.

These

motions are too tiny and too rapid to be seen by the unaided eye.
Their amplitudes are less than one minute of an arc and their frequencies are in the range from 50 to 150 cycles persecond.

Never-

theless, if this movement is compensated for by optical or electronic

feedback devices so that the image is exactly stabilized on the retina,

vision disappears within a fraction of a second.
We might extrapolate with respect to these findings that
(1)

our perceptual system is not equipped to deal with steady inputs;

the subjective experience of vision cannot be reduced to states of

matter or energy, to substance devoid of process.

Rather, it is

fundamentally based upon the experience of transition, the motion of
process within a situation.

(2)

The organism is actively involved in

therefore engenerating this condition of flux and transition and is

gaged in the construction of reality.

(3)

Complementing the requisite
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element of change and novelty is the
reciprocal need for sameness or
pattern within the process. This is necessary
because without order
and structure (integration), experience
is unintelligible.

Pattern

perception, the experience of identity or
sameness amid change is the
result of an array of stimuli upon the
retina which is congruent with
an immediately previous array upon a
different set of cells.

The

brain can perceive something only if it can
detect the sameness of an
array before and after displacement.

Thus, neither a steady state

nor an unpatterned random flux can be assimilated by
the experiencing
organism.

The emerging theme is elegantly Whiteheadian

emerging within order and order emerging from novelty.

;

of novelty
In the words

of William James, it is the "felt transition from one passing thought

or drop of experience to the next."

The data provide fresh insight

into James’ testimony of the immanence of the past in the present-

that the immediate present is the felt transition from the immediate
past.

Thus, for James, the clap of thunder is the feeling of the

silence persisting from a moment ago.

"The parts of experience hold

together from next to next by the relations that are themselves parts
of experience."

2.3.6

The Dynamics of Perception.

To recapitulate a basic premise

articulated at the beginning of this paper, the relation between or-

ganism and environment must be described not in static terms but in
terms of its ongoing transactions.

If we put the emphasis on opera-

tions, there is no clear distinction between self and world and body

and mind- -indeed, the two become functionally inseparable.

This may

be a clue that efforts at such abstraction would be missing the mark.
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Operationally, the more important entities to be
considered are perhaps not the system and environment so much as the
flow-processes
that connect them- -their mode of interrelation.

We now see that the classical model of perception, which
assigns the sense organs to the mere role of transducers, changing

physical energy to some physiological analog which subsequently gets
selected for further processing by the central nervous system, is a

vast and somewhat misleading oversimplification of the perceptual
process.

The transformation, and alterations that the nervous sys-

tem performs upon the original physical stimulus received by the
sense organs are profound and impressive.
Similarly, there is no longer any empirical basis for as-

suming that perception involves a template -matching process wherein
the brain matches incoming sensory data to a duplicate schema which
is stored somewhere in the cortex.

the only way in which

I

According to such an explanation,

am able to see a chair or to perceive it in

any meaningful sense is to fish through my perceptual memory until

I

can match the present array on the retina with its exact mental analog.

If nothing else, there is a basic logical problem behind the

template theory in that the number of possible patterns or combinations of patterns as well as the new viewing angles or transpositions

under which these original patterns may be perceived is practically
infinite.

If we needed a template for each figure or schema we see

or know in its many variations and distortions, the number of neural

networks and the size of the brain required to process our daily intake of data would rapidly approach infinity

.

Yet , the fact remains
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that human beings are faced daily with the task of recognizing

familiar patterns in previously unexperienced perspectives and
contexts.

Moreover, there is no indication that there are any limits to

one s capacity to do this despite the fact that the number of physical

networks in the brain is finite.
But there is another difficulty.

If we accept the template

theory, we are left with the serious problem of explaining how these

templates are acquired or developed.

The theory cannot account for the

ontological genesis of these neural structures.

Hebb proposes that the

neural structures are honed out in a cumulative fashion as certain
groups of neurons are repeatedly stimulated in a particular pattern
or sequence.

But this does not hold.

If to properly recognize a

situation from a particular perspective it is necessary to match the
specific array with its corresponding analog, how is it possible for
a child to recognize something from a perspective he has never before

witnessed?

The only alternative is to say that the structures are

pre-existent, i.e., without genesis.

Such a position would be un-

tenable in the face of empirical evidence and antithetical to a

development ally based process psychology.
Our position is that an adequate account of perception must
be firmly built upon the notions of structure , process and subjective
aim.

Stepping in the direction of such a reformulation is Hale's

principle of "analysis by synthesis."

As opposed to passive template

of acplate -matching, Hale stresses that perception is an operation

intenelations.
tively comparing incoming data with previously learned
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Presumably, there is a set of rather
general purpose operations which
examine the features of data input
extracted by basic physiological
analyses.

These features are differentiated
according to the struc-

tures yielded by previous learning
and experience and are subsequently integrated into a novel structure
as a function of (1) those already

existent integrations and

(2)

the subjective aim (conscious or sub-

conscious) by which the novelty is introduced
into the occasion.

Thus

the assimilation and accommodation of
perceptual data is characterized

and sustained by an ongoing process of creative
synthesis.

Perception conceived in terms of analysis (differentiation)

by synthesis (integration)

,

explains the extremely important role that

context plays in the recognition of patterns, a role which
could not
be accounted for by the template -matching model.

For example, we

often recognize persons who have been considerably changed by the

passage of years.

On the other hand, we may fail to recognize an

unchanged face in a novel or unexpected context.

This apparent

anomaly can be resolved when we consider the operation from the stand-

point of process.

In these terms, pattern recognition occurs to the

extent that the present act of visual synthesis approximates an

earlier one.

Thus it is not a matter of absolute similarity among

the items (determined by some fixed abstract criteria) which is critical or pertinent, but their similarity along dimensions used by the

subject in the two acts of synthesis or construction involved.
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2.4

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF ATTENTION
Building upon this interpretation, we propose that attention

be defined as the momentary focus and configuration of
perceptual oper-

ations within the total (inner and outer) environment.

This configura-

tion possesses a unitary character, i.e., no more than one focus can

predominate during any given occasion or the structure of consciousness disintegrates.

The focus need not be confined to concrete data--

it may just as well be an abstraction or an unrealized ideal.

As was

explained earlier, consequent to its unitary nature, it follows that

attention implies a selective interaction with the multitude of data
received by the organism.
2.4.1

Attention and the Morphology of Abstraction.

As Whitehead

points out, the power of conceptual abstraction is its ability to unify

data which on a concrete level are inconsistent or unrelated among themselves.

A necessary consequence of such abstraction, however,

is that

the rich diversity and subtle uniqueness of experience must to some de-

gree be sacrificed.

Consequently, it is not only impossible but im-

practical for us to view the world exclusively in terms of towering
abstraction.

Conscious understanding, knowledge, indeed survival, de-

pend upon continual interchange between the general and specific,

between the abstract and the concrete.

As such, the bulk of our ex-

perience is built upon various degrees of abstraction.

As we move away

from the abstract toward consideration of the concrete pole of actual
data, the subtleties and differences among things emerge into awareness

and accordingly we encounter aspects of this inconsistency.

For example,
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we may see an array of objects; some are cone-shaped,
others cube-shaped.
Insofar as our attention is directed towards coneness
or cubeness, we

may not be immediately aware as to whether the objects
are blue, red,
or yellow.

Color may be irrelevant in determining the focus of
attention.

Thus, on the basis of shape (a unifying principle), we are
able to at-

tend to an entire set of diverse objects as comprising one
object of
attention.

The singular focus of attention in this case is the abstract

entity shape and under this single theme we are able to integrate an
entire set of concretely different objects into one object of attention.
If we descend the ladder another step so that we take the color of the

objects into our immediate awareness, i.e., we "prehend" the data of
color, we suddenly introduce disjunctive elements into the perceptual

occasion.

The formerly single "object of attention" perishes and be-

comes segmented, creating several new and independent potential foci.
In this condition, each focus constitutes a potential object of atten-

tion and a new criteria or ceiling for the inclusion and exclusion of
data.

To entertain one focus requires the momentary suppression or

exclusion of other possible foci.

For example, to perceive an object as

a red cone demands reciprocally that one perceive it as not blue or not

yellow.

To see an object as both red and blue simultaneously is con-

tradictory in terms of the conditions.

The exclusion of data incompat-

ible with unity of the perceptual event by negative prehension is the

boundary principle underlying the selective nature of attention.
The conception of attention as a constructive act of synthesis
years
is remarkably consistent with the theory James advanced over 75

ago in his Principles of Psychology 3

(Vol.

I).

James proposed that
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attention involved two processes:

(1)

the accommodation of the sense

organs, and (2) preparation from within of the
ideational centers con-

cerned with the object to which the attention is paid.
this anticipatory pre -perception.

James calls

The former concerns the physical

orientation of the sense receptor itself, e.g., direction of the eyeball, focusing of the image upon the retina, while the latter refers
to a matrix or schema retrieved from primary memory which the individual

conjoins with the present stimulus.

He writes, "The image in the mind

is the attention; the preperception is half of the perception of the

looked-for thing."

James avoids the pitfalls of an exact copy or tem-

plate model by explaining that the pre -perceptual image is a matrix of
references which are brought to bear upon the immediate array of afferent stimulation; references of past association, references to

native and acquired interests, references to aims and aspirations.
These references are what suffuse with the factual data in creating the

percipient occasion.

For James, "The only things which we commonly see

are those which we preperceive."

This notion also accounts for the fact that what is synthe-

sized is not always so clear and distinct as Tichener and his intro-

spectionists claim.

Recall that for Tichener, the effect of attention

was to enhance the accuracy or resolution of the perception.

However,

the object of attention may be amorphous and ill-defined but still very

much at the center of focal awareness.

This is because the construc-

tion and synthesis will contain only those dimensions which the subject
has given it.

Thus, the young child’s perception of an automobile

though intensive, will tend to be relatively undifferentiated.

If
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asked to draw what he sees, he is likely to omit
the door handles,

chrome trimming, window vents and other details, whereas
a designer is
apt to "see" much more of the subtleties and detail
since he brings to
the situation a highly differentiated and integrated set of
references

and operations which allow him to attend to and perceive the
car in
far greater complexity and refinement.
2.

4.2

The Purposive Base of Attention.

One advantage in regarding

attention as an act of constructive synthesis is the parsimonious way
in which it can account for the effects of intention.

In passive

models of attention, intention has been a troublesome problem.

Since

by definition intention is an active construct, it introduces a fundamental inconsistency into a basically passive system of explanation.
As an ad hoc element which had to be brought in from outside the ex-

planatory framework, intention has been an inert concept unrelated in
a vital sense to the rest of the theory.

Although many theorists in-

tuitively recognize its indispensability within the formal theories, intention as a construct was never articulated in a way that had coherence or explanatory value.

This anomalous inconsistency has in the

past led many of the more rigorous experimentalists to discard the concept altogether.

Though such disillusionment may well have been

justified, the strategy of pushing the issue under the rug does not
solve the problem.

Fortunately, the present model is not only logic-

ally compatible with, but even requires intention as a component of
the system.

To restate the problem, how is it possible for a person to
select in a situation where there are two or more stimuli of equal inthe
tensity in relatively equal proximity, one such object and reject
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other, to hear one voice and ignore the others, to ’’see" one image or

configuration and "not see" the others?

Presumably the unattended data

are impinging on the sense receptors just as strongly as the one to

which the subject is attending yet he is in most instances successful in
selectively perceiving only those data which he intends to entertain.
If the answer is to claim that intention determines which template is

activated to accommodate the present stimuli, all we’ve said is that
intention is a factor- -we still have not explained in any significant
sense how it operates, how in causal terms the process of selection is

accomplished.

However, when attention is conceptualized as an act of

synthesis the role of intention can be better understood.

If the in-

dividual perceives reality by constructing it 3 then selection becomes
an integral function of the creative operation underlying the perceptual event.

Let us bracket this statement for a moment and recall an

earlier discussion dealing with the concept of intent ionality, in which

we explored the link between what one knows and what one intends.

It

was Bretano who said that consciousness is defined by the fact that it
intends something, points towards something outside itself- -specifically

that it intends an object.

The ancestral roots of this notion can be

[what is
traced back to Aristotle who wrote, "What is given to the eyes

perceived or apprehended] is the intention of the soul."

The inter-

intention.
connection is succinctly illustrated in the etymology of

The

derivatives stem is
Latin root from which "intend" and its associated
get "tension."
"tendere" meaning "to stretch," from which we

This im-

of the mind, a tending
mediately suggests that intention is a stretching
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or pulling toward another entity.

Intentional ity is vital inasmuch as

it determines the degrees of importance and dimensions
of meaning we as-

sign to a situation and thereby introduces perspective and structure
into
our experience.

Our aims and purposes in a sense provide the all im-

portant context into which the fragments of data (differentiated experience) are integrated to form the meaningful realities of our exis-

tence

.

Returning to the original question, intention operates as one

parameter influencing the direction or form of process taken in the act
of perception.

We are assuming that the essence of an individual's being

consists of a continual transition from potentiality to actuality.

Thus,

at any given moment in one's life, one has to determine which one among

the myriad number of possibilities before him he will actually become
in the next moment.

(This means that some possibilities have to be

selected while others must, therefore, be excluded.)

Whitehead explains

that this self-determination in the act of creation is conditioned by
the "subjective aim" of the organism.

Subjective aim or purpose is what

preserves the continuity and identity of the evolving entity.

To some

degree, what the organism becomes is automatically decided by historical
and biological factors.

Yet for Whitehead even the genetic code which

governs the form and patterns of our bodily processes without our conscious decision is an aspect or level upon which subjective aim exerts
its influence.

Conscious intention and purpose are the highly developed

experience.
and complex genre of subjective aim associated with human

exemplificaBut it serves the same type of function as its lower-order

concrescence.
tions, shaping the pattern and continuity of one's

101

Briefly, intention is a foimative element in the process
of becoming,
or self-creating, and since attention or selective perception
is in

every way a manifestation of this process, it also is subject to the
causal ingression of purpose.
Again, this supposition is consistent with experimental evi-

dence as well as informal observation.

For example, it is commonly

known that a person's expectations about a situation heavily influence
his actual perception of that situation.

If an observer is led to ex-

pect that he will see a particular shape or object, he often sees what
he expected to appear rather than what was actually presented.

Such

tendencies may be introduced by instruction or by the more frequent
cases in which an observer's general familiarity with a situation

causes him to perceive what he expects.

A well-known illustration of

this phenomenon is the proof-reader's illusion, the case in which a

reader does not detect misspelled versions of familiar words.

He, in

effect, "fills in" the missing letter, or "corrects" the wrong word

himself, without any conscious effort of doing so.

Of course, the in-

dividual may be trained or given special practice in detecting such
discrepancies, but this involves establishing a "set" which sensitizes

him to certain incongruities of configurations in his sensory experience.
In the case of the proof-reader, he is able to be receptive to discrep-

ancies only by ignoring to a considerable extent the meaning of the

material he is reading.
2.

4.3

The Physiology of Attention.

A newly opened vista of inquiry,

fascinating
the physiological study of attention, holds promise and is a

field of investigation.
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Recent studies by Magoun (1958) and Hernandez -Peon (1964)
suggest that the physiological processes underlying attention at least

partially involve the reticular formation, a structure located in the
thalamic region of the brain- stem.
One of the functions of the reticular formation seems to be
the regulation of the sleeping and waking patterns of the organism; the

initiation of arousal and quiescent states.

But the reticular formation

is also functional in the perceptual processes of waking life and it

appears that the locus of these operations is centered in a section of
the structure other than that concerned with sleep-waking cycles.

Evidently the ascending afferent neural fibers are structurally

divided into two pathways.

The main pathway, sometimes referred to as

the lemniscal system, rapidly conducts incoming sensory impulses from
the lower ganglia directly to the cerebral cortex.

In addition to this

system there is both physiological and anatomical evidence indicating
the presence of a high- threshold, slow conducting extra -lemniscal system, the locus of which is presumably the reticular formation.

This dif-

fuse system apparently receives input from all sensory systems by means

of collateral fibers which connect the reticular formation to the main

pathways leading to the cortex from the lower brain.

At one time, it

was thought that the reticular formation was fed by collateral fibers

branching off from the direct tract leading to the cortex in the region
of the midbrain, but later research confirms that the extra -lemniscal

system is fed by a separate and independent neural tract.

The primary

transmission of senfunction of this system does not appear to be the
in the functions of
sory messages, but it does seem to play a major role
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arousal and vigilance.
Operationally, the extra- lemniscal system serves to
enhance
the sensitivity of the receptor areas in the cortex
and to facilitate

their nervous discharges particularly with respect
to input which is

novel or interesting.

At the same time, it acts to inhibit cortical

responses to repeated or uninteresting stimulation (Hernandez -Peon,
1967).

Granit (1955) and Dodt (1956) observed that stimulation of the

reticular formation could either inhibit or facilitate the unit discharge of retinal ganglion cells.

relation to the auditory system.

Similar effects were demonstrated in
Because the reticular formation seems

to mediate this function in a number of sensory modes, Hernandez -Peon has

characterized it as a poly- sensory system.

Although the rostral brain- stem is undoubtedly involved in
the control and maintenance of attention, there is still a missing link.

How does this diffuse sub -cortical system

’’know"

which impulses are to

be excluded or attenuated and which are to be amplified?

This question

is particularly important with regard to the sophisticated varieties of

attentional control found in man and the higher animals.

In what opera-

tional mode, for example, is meaning introduced as a determining factor
in attention?

Recalling an earlier discussion, it was suggested that

the nature of meaning is ultimately sensible only when placed within
the framework of some goal or purpose.

This may be an oversimplifica-

tion but it certainly is clear that meaning is a highly complex phenome-

non which in many instances implicitly involves teleological criteria.
As such, we might expect the higher forebrain structures to play an
afferent
active role in the selective inhibition and facilitation of the
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sensory tracts through the reticular formation.

Also, it would be in-

teresting to see if the conceptual interconnection between
meaning and

volition is supported by a physiological correlate.

More specifically,

if it can be established that the frontal -lobe structures
associated

with the capacity to form and carry out intentions are also involved in
the selective functions of the reticular formulation, we may at last

have uncovered physiological justification for the psychological sup-

position that purpose is an irreducible causal factor in our perceptual
and cognitive enjoyment of the world.

As it turns out, a number of recent investigations have phys-

iologically and anatomically traced descending corticofugal axon fibers

extending from localized cortical areas into the vigilance system of the

reticular formation.

Of all the corticofugal projections, those arising

from the frontal lobes appear to be most importantly related to the

maintenance of attention since ablations of the frontal cortex in monkeys and frontal lobotomies in humans interfere with the performance
of tasks that require sustained attention.
At present, it is impossible to say what ultimate value or

significance inquiry into the physiological aspects of attention will
hold.

At the moment, so little exists that current studies provide al-

most nothing in the way of new perspectives on the problem.

At best,

where its findings are conclusive, physiological research can serve as
their cona testing ground for the validity of current theories and

structs.
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2.4.4

Operational Phases.

By now, it should be clear that attention

is a term applied to a very complex aggregate of
operations, highly in-

terrelated and reciprocal to one another.

For the sake of conceptual

analysis, we propose following Neisser (1967), that the phenomenon of

attention can be broken down into two distinct
attentive structuring, and

(2)

phases:

focal attention.

(1)

pre-

These two aspects

might be better described as sequential stages in the attention process.
Objects or patterns in our environment are identified only
after they have been segmented (differentiated) one from another.

Since

the processes of focal attention are by nature structuring and selec-

tive and are unable to operate on all perceptual data simultaneously,

they are effective only after preliminary operations have already seg-

regated or formed the figural or auditory units upon which attention

may be focused.

These preliminary operations, though very elusive and

somewhat inaccessible to current experimental methods, are nevertheless
a subject of great interest and importance to attention theorists.

Neisser calls these operations, pre-attentive processes, to emphasize
that they bring forth the units which subsequent processes elaborate
and interpret.

As such, pre-attentive operations are relatively global

or holistic, serving to separate figure from ground, and to establish a

tacit framework for more explicit analysis.

In terms of our process

model of attention, preattention creates and maintains the frame of
reference and boundary conditions within which the constructive synthesis aspect of attention takes place.

The versatility and capability

of this process is dependent upon previous experiences of differentiating and integrating similar types of situations.

For example, Neisser
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points out that, on request, a literate person can
focus his attention
onto a single letter of the page (for instance the "g M
appearing earlier
in this sentence).

Having found it, he can note whether it is well-

formed or how it differes from such letters as "p M or "b. M

The pre-

attentive processes keep the "g" a separate and integral unit while all
this happens.

This is an acquired or learned capacity, very difficult

for young children and illiterates.

They must deal with much cruder ob-

jects of attention, such as the entire block of print on the page or the

whole word in which the "g" is embedded.
Thus, it would be a serious mis judgment to conclude that because

preattention is such a fleeting and implicit part of our experience, it
should be taken for granted.

It is precisely because it is so implicit

that it must be taken seriously, and its subtleties and complexities

elucidated.

The functional significance is encapsulated in the old Gestalt

maxim that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

This means

that the appearance of a part depends upon the whole in which it is embedded, that the manner in which a piece of data is interpreted, its sig-

nificance and identity, is a determinant function of the nature of its
inter-relations with other pieces of data in the constitution of a

higher-order entity.

(Recall Polanyi’s reformulation of this phenomenon

in terms of "tacit inference.")

The next logical question:

Does an observer first see the

parts as separate elements in and of themselves and then infer the pata pretern or whole they constitute, or is the whole seen first, without

liminary analysis of the parts?

In some respects, this question is
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inappropriate, because it is based upon some unchecked
presuppositions;

specifically, to presume that one either sees the whole or the
parts as
if the two were mutually exclusive of each other.

However, the per-

ception of the whole requires perception of its component parts or else
there would be no whole to perceive.

As Polanyi emphasizes, it is the

way in which the parts are perceived which makes the difference.

Re-

call the contrast between focal awareness of the elements as self-

sufficient particulars and subsidiary awareness of these parts as clues

which contribute toward a subsuming higher-order reality.
Rephrasing the question then, do we prehend the data of a

situation first focally and then subsidiarily or vice versa, i.e., do

we first examine the elements of a situation as separate particulars
and then infer their existence as a constellated whole, or is it the

other way around?

There is strong indication from both subjective and

physiological evidence that situations are immediately experienced in
terms of structured wholes and then secondarily

isolated from context as abstracted entities.

core

the various parts

The rapidity and ef-

ficiency with which we recognize complex patterns would preclude any

possibility of a perceptual system which relied upon inductive inference.
Such a mode of processing would be so inefficient and so cumbersome as
to require physical and neurological resources hundreds of times larger

than those which the human brain possesses.
For example, reading 300 words per minute (an average speed)

breaks down to an average of

5

words per second.

Let us assume for a

moment that each word contains an average of 6-7 letters.

If before the

identified
word could be recognized, each letter had to be separately
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and combined with the ones preceding it, and then after every possible

combination is considered and the most likely inference is selected,
the operation would require hundreds of sequential decisions per second

merely to recognize the words themselves.

This of course does not in-

clude an account of the more complex syntactic and semantic decisions

which still must be made.

We would concur with George Miller that to

say that people can make '’decisions" at such rates is to extend the

concept well beyond its useful range.

He suggests that phenomeno-

logical data show that the larger, more meaningful decisions are made
first and that the details are pursued only so far as they are necessary
to serve one's immediate purposes.

Thus, preattention provides a skeletal synthesis for a broad

range of incoming data.

It is primitive (though learned) and holistic.

A more elaborate synthesis

is then constructed around some focal unit

which has been derived by the preattentive processes.

The operations of

focal attention articulate and abstract the subtle variations, the re-

fined structure of forms in our environment.

It consists of differen-

tiating the various modes of extensive interconnection between the subject and the object in clear and distinct terms.

Whereas preattention

yields a comparatively vague and global awareness of life's flow and

transition in focal attention, the perception acquires a selective emphasis whereby the finite occasions of experience receive clear definition.

the
The price of such articulation and refinement is, however,

exclusion of other possible perspectives.
awesome.

As Whitehead puts it:

Nevertheless, its power is
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This clarity of human vision both enhances
the
uniqueness of each individual occasion and at the
same
time discloses its essential relationships to
occasions
other than itself.
It emphasizes both finite individuality and its relationship to other individualities.
Further, it discloses some analysis of the matterof-fact in immediate realization. And yet, by this
disclosure it brings into prominence the potentialities
for alternative realizations, in the past, in the
future, in the present.
It tells what may be and what
might have been.
It lays bare diversities and analogies.
Mankind enoys a vision of the function of form within
fact, and of the issue of value from this interplay
(Whitehead, 1938, p. 77).
2.4.5

Conclusion.

In the preceding pages, an attempt has been made

to develop a coherent definition of attention based upon the process

metaphysics of Whitehead and the psychological philosophy of James.

Working from this frame of reference we have sought to interpret and
integrate the rather specialized findings and concerns of experimental psychology.

Because current theory and research pertinent to attention
ranges over a broad spectrum of conceptual issues and diverse method-

ological approaches (e.g., introspective, phenomenological, experimental, physiological) a comprehensive definition of attention must be

sufficiently general to accommodate and integrate the various avenues
of inquiry.

However, in order to render such generalization meaning-

ful, it is necessary to explore its applications to specific problem

areas.

Hence, the extensive treatment given to articulating and ex-

plicating the interface of attention with its related notions and constructs: interest, intention, set, arousal, perceptual selectivity

and structuring, and consciousness.
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In brief, the purpose of this entire chapter is to lay the

foundation for, and develop the meaning of, a definition of attention
as the process by which the organism purposively selects
(differentiates)

and structures (integrates) feelings, sensory information, memories, and
ideas in the immediate present into a unity of conscious experience.

This focal unity depends upon the continual penetration and transforma-

tion of the subject's environment (including memories, ideals, possibilities as well as extereoceptive sensation)

,

the perpetual perishing of

the present and the progressive unfolding of potentiality toward a novel

synthesis of consciousness.

It is our thesis that purpose provides the

coherence, continuity and direction of this creative advance.

111

2.5

2.5.1

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION

LEARNING COMPETENCE AND ATTENTION:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
If there is one point over which educators find no dispute,

it would be that attention is a fundamental prerequisite
to effective

learning.

Indeed, the statement appears to be so self evident that it

hardly bears mentioning.

Yet, why and how attention so influences learn-

ing is somewhat less obvious and on this score psychologists are in far

less agreement.

Many of these differences can be understood in terms of

the various conceptions of attention that have grown out of contemporary

research, conceptions which we reviewed in the previous chapter (i.e.,

attention as arousal, organization, selectivity).

Nevertheless, it is

helpful to make a more detailed analysis of the manner in which at-

tention is related to learning competence in order to establish more

precisely its crucial role.
Recall that our fundamental assumption about the nature of

human life is that its intensity is affected by the degree to which an
individual is engaged in creative evolution or concrescence.

This pro-

cess is mediated by the reciprocal capacities of differentiation and
integration.

Differentiation involves a definition and particulari-

zation of substance and experience which results in the establishment
of diversity whereas integration concerns the structuring of these di-

verse elements into a new unity- -the creation of order or pattern.

The

identity of each element then emerges as the totality of its interrelations whith other elements in the constitution of the actualizing

whole organism.

The psychological and spiritual aspects of concrescence

are what we define as learning.

Learning competence is, then, the ability
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to differentiate and integrate any aspect of experience in such
a way
as to put the individual in greater touch with the reality of the
or-

ganic interrelatedness characterizing his physical, human, and spirit-

ual environments.

Inasmuch as we have defined attention in terms of

selection (differentiation) and construction (integration) of ex-

periential data, one might naturally expect that attention is at the

very core of the learning process itself.
ing it as a distinctive process?

How then do we justify treat-

In fact, we cannot.

It may be more

correct to regard attention as a mode of interaction that underlies and

constitutes a phase of learning.
As James has written, the effect of attention is to make us
perceive, conceive, distinguish and remember things better.

Recall his

point that an object attended to will remain in the memory and his con-

clusion that because attention is one of the tasks of the self, the latter helps deteimine which things get in the primary (long-term) memory.

McDougall maintained that the effect of attention is not only to select
and stabilize a particular form of thought but to allow for a more de-

tailed analysis and therefore a more subtle control of actions with

respect to that focus.
These statements indicate three ways in which attention serves
as a means of differentiating experience.

First, it enhances the subtle-

ties and detail of our immediate perception of things.

Secondly, it

mediates the storage and retrieval access of experience and thirdly,
variations
because attention allows us to discriminate or distinguish
we are capable
among data on a high level of resolution and refinement,

within our environment.
of responding more effectively to the diversity
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In other words, unless we are able to differentiate between

two situations, we have no basis upon which to develop different kinds

of actions towards them.

These propositions receive a good deal of empirical documen-

tation from the research concerned with intentional versus incidental
learning.

In the laboratory studies of human learning, it has been

demonstrated again and again that the presence of an intention or "task"
to learn can have a very powerful effect upon the rate and accuracy of

learning.

Although there are differing points of view as to how the

intention to learn exerts its effect upon learning, suffice it to say
that the explanation which most adequately and coherently accounts for
the experimental data and which is most congruent with the evidence of

subjective experience, centrally involves the direction and redirection
of attention.

Presumably, the attention is intensified or redirected

by the task and as a result, the material is more organized or perceived differently.

Earlier in this paper we attempted to explain how

of attention.
intention and purpose were formative elements in the process

function of the organism
It was emphasized that perception is a creative
the individual.
and is thus subject to the aims and purposes of

White

necessarily involves
head, concurring that this organic construction
aim, writes.
the realization of ideal ends or subjective

contemplation
The conception of knowledge as passive
is ever
Nature
facts.
the
is too inadequate to meet
of action
sense
the
and
originating its own development
as
event
percipient
is the direct knowledge of the
natural
of
formation
having its very being in the
For this reason Perception
relations
Th® forwar
at the utmost point of creation
of experience,
moving time exhibits this characteristic

....

.

•

•

:

that it is essentially action. This passage.
in other words, its creative advance, is its fundamental characteristic
(In Eisendrath, 1970, p. 106).
.

.

With regard to the role of attention in the integration of
experience , a great deal has already been said in the previous chapter

A considerable portion of the discussion was devoted to describing how
the selective nature of attention could be ultimately understood as a

natural and necessary means by which the imperative coherence and unity
of consciousness is maintained.

Introducing the Whiteheadian construct

of negative prehension provides a broad and basic philosophical justi-

fication for this function.

Negative prehension on a psychological

level refers to the process by which the organism can dismiss, ignore,
or repress certain data which are incompatible with, and destructive to,
the unitary synthesis of the conscious field.

Another form of negative prehension which we said figured

prominently in the human experience is a conception of an ideal or unrealized potentiality not actual in the immediate data.

Focussing upon

this novel data necessitates to some extent a dismissal of certain as-

pects of the current situation.

A person who interprets and responds to

a situation in terms of some ideal or goal has integrated the data of

his momentary situation in such a way as to exclude perspectives which

contradict the presently determining ideal.

In this condition the con-

ceptual data (the ideal) negates the present data by replacing it.

As

supremely human act
such, this mode of negative prehension underlies the
and means of human
of transcendence, one of the most powerful sources

growth.

implications for moral
As we shall see later, this capacity has

and spiritual development.
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So far, we have treated the relation between attention
and

learning competence in very general terms.

The remainder of this sec-

tion will concentrate on the importance of attention to several specific
aspects of learning competence.
2.5.2

ATTENTION AND VOLITION

William James defines the essence of "healthy will” as action
following vision.

problem of will.

In so doing, he identifies attention as the central

He writes, "Attention is the first and fundamental

thing in volition.

The essential achievement of the will, in short,

when it is most voluntary, is to attend to a difficult object and hold
it fast before the mind [James, 1890, Vol. II, P. 528]."

We might feel

apt to dismiss James’ account as naive and uninformative and excuse it
as an artifact of the primitive state of psychological thought during

However, over 70 years later, Rollo May was to concede,

this time.

When we analyze will with all the tools modem psychoanalysis brings us we shall find ourselves pushed back
to the level of attention- intention as the seat of the
will. The effort which goes into the exercise of the
will is really effort of attention; the strain in willing
is the effort to keep the consciousness clear, i.e.,
the strain of keeping the attention focussed (May, 1970,
p.

220).

We are inclined to agree with May's analysis.

No matter which

way we approach the problem, attention is an indispensable prerequisite
in any volitional process.

In fact, it would appear that attention in

its rudimentary form is the genesis from which these other processes

evolve.

Take, for example, the process of goal-setting or formulating

intentions.

Implicit within any such consciously held goal or intention

which the
is some measure of attention toward the object or situation
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goal reflects.

It is worth re-emphasizing that the relation
between

intention and attention is not of one state or faculty
preceding the

other sequentially.

Rather it is one of reciprocal interdependence- -one

is a precondition for the other.

The ability to turn one’s attention towards some yet un-

realized possibility in the future is essential if one is to have a
degree of control and self-determination over his destiny.
The differentiation of complex goals and intentions into com-

ponent sub-plans and intermediary steps also requires the capacity to
focally attend and analyze the conditions and contingencies with which
one is faced in constructing a coherent plan of action.

This includes

the ability to project and imagine the consequences of a given alter-

native.

Obviously, other operations are involved in the process but

without the ability to isolate and focus upon a particular possibility
and follow-through

the steps of projection and decision-making to con-

clusion, the individual's efforts would become fragmented, sporadic,

and ineffectual.

Although attention is most crucial in the formative phases of
goal-setting, it serves an important function in the translation of intentions into actuality (the process of willing; See Chapter Four).

With respect to self- initiation, the first subprocess, it is
James who again provides us with a description, this time through one of
his charming anecdotes.

We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing
morning in a room without a fire, and how the very
vital principle within us protests against the ordeal
[remember James lived in New England before the advent
Probably most persons have lain
of central heating]
.
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on certain mornings for an hour at a time unable
to
brace themselves to the resolve. We think how late
we shall be how the duties of the day will suffer;
we
say, 'I must get up, this is ignominious,' and so’
on.
But still the warm couch feels too delicious and the
cold outside too cruel, and resolution faints away
and postpones itself again and again just as it seemed
on the verge of the decisive act. Now how do we ever
get up under such circumstances? If I may generalize
from my own experience we more often then not get up
without any struggle or decision at all. We suddenly
find that we have got up. A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs, we forget both the warmth and the
cold; we fall into some reverie connected with the
day's life, in the course of which the idea flashes
across us, 'Hollo!
I must lie here no longer' --an
idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contradicting
or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently produces
immediately its appropriate motor effects.
(James,
1890, Vol. II, p. 527)

And then he adds,
It was our acute consciousness of both the warmth and
the cold during the period of struggle which paralyzed
our activity.
(Ibid.)

As Rollo May has pointed out, there are important links missing from this description.

For example, at the crucial turning point

of the episode, the moment in which the intention is actualized, James
skips over the issue by saying that there is merely a fortunate lapse

of consciousness in which the paralyzing ambivalence is forgotten and

suddenly we get up.

The implication is that the arousal to action

occurs almost by accident.

If this were the whole truth there would be

no basis for arguing that will or attention has anything to do with
the purposive self-determining construction of personality.
In all fairness to James,

he really meant this.

I

think it is highly unlikely that

Gleaning from his writing elsewhere on the sub-

of
ject, he hints that there is more going on than just a lapse
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consciousness is a direct result of the purposive dimension
underlying
our perceptual cognitive processes.

To explain this, let us momentarily

retrace our steps to the previous discussion of the relation
between
interest and attention.
We suggested that interest be regarded as the feeling (loving)

component of attention and that one's interest in a situation or object
will determine his capacity to attend to it.

It was also argued that

whether or not one would be interested in something would depend upon

how the particular thing in question is subjectively perceived to relate
to one's deep-seated aims and ideals.

It would seem that the missing

element in James' account is the causal role of interest (loving) or in-

tentionality in creating the fantasy connedted with the day's events.
The rest falls into place when we realize that fantasy is a mode of

attention in which the object is some unrealized occasion or form of
concrescence, i.e.

,

the object is potential as opposed to actual.

As a variety of attention, fantasy is also by nature selective, in which case the actual data of the immediate present, in this

instance the warmth of the bed and the cold outside, are dismissed from

consciousness along with conflicting tendencies they evoked.

As the

fantasized possibilities assume prominence in the phenomenal field, they

accordingly evoke their respective ideomotor tendencies.

In other words

if a compelling idea or intention is brought into the focus of attention

unobstructed, an action will automatically follow.

"unobstructed attention."

bodily expression.

The keynote here is

The felt tendency merges into and becomes the
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James' application of the ideomotor theory to the
problem of

will is one of his greatest insights because it so beautifully
avoids
the perilous bifurcation of mind and body which so easily
creeps into

explanations of will.

Mind and body, or as Whitehead says, the mental

and physical poles of an actual entity, interfuse with each other in
the process of becoming (concrescence).

Thus, the nature of our in-

dividual experience, our role as causal agents in our own advance is a

unity of body and mind.

Though in an abstract sense, we may see them

as distinctly different natures in the ongoing process of life, the two

intermingle and merge in every occasion to create a single actual being.

Returning to self-arousal, it follows as an expression of un-

encumbered intention or attention toward unrealized possibility.

Until

the conscious field is momentarily released of competing intentions so
that a unitary idea or fantasy is held in unobstructed prominence, the

initiation of action will be fragmented, weak, ineffectual, and perhaps immobilized.

Much the same relation applies to perseverance which is the
process of maintaining effort toward the actualization of some intention
or purpose when faced with difficulties.

If the child is able to fan-

tasize (i.e., direct his attention toward) the desired goal state, he

can often infuse his immediate activity with new energy and determination,

especially when the goal is remote.

Fantasy can also provide the criti-

cal impetus needed to consummate goal -directed activity and achieve

closure
2

.

2.3

ATTENTION AND COGNITION
For Piaget, the process of centering attention upon data in
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the environment is a fundamental prerequisite for all stages
of opera-

tional thought.

In fact, Piaget regards the concentration of attention

on one idea as precisely nothing else but the centering of thought
(Piaget, 1966).

He points out how in pre- operational intuitive thought

the child is able to focus his attention on one dimension of comparison

between two different sized and shaped objects.

For example, take the

case of the child who estimates that there are more beads in jar "B" than
in jar "A" because the level has been raised.

He centers his attention

on the relation between the heights of B and A and ignores the widths.
But if we transfer the beads from B into another glass, C, which is even

thinner and taller, the child is apt to reply that there are fewer beads

because C is too narrow.

height to width.

This represents a shift of attention from

On the other hand, the child who judges the quantity

in B to be less than that in

A on account of thinness

is likely to favor

the increased length of C in favor of height and ignore the decrease of

width.

Piaget remarks:

Now the transition from a single centring to two
successive centrings heralds the beginnings of the
operation; once he reasons with respect to both
relations at the same time the child will in fact
deduce conservation (Ibid, p. 131).
Thus the operational stages of thought are characterized by an

increasing ability to coordinate and focus one' attention upon the

various aspects of incoming sensory data so as to yield a more complex
and versatile integration of the referrent experience.
The simultaneous coordination of many variables in the stage of
toconcrete operations does not mean that attention is focally divided

wards each variable or dimension independently.

Such a hypothesis
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would be in contradiction to our knowledge of attention
as primarily a

unitary phenomenon.

But this apparent contradiction is resolved when

we recall that the unit object of attention may be a higher order
concept, an abstraction which structures the plurality of variables into

a number of subsidiary functions which converge into a joint focal

meaning; e.g., height and width and depth are three separate variables

which can be coordinated into a single abstract unity identified by the
concept of volume.
In the more advanced formal operations stage which involves

logical transformation of operational data, the child must develop the

capacity to disregard the immediate intuitive appearance of an object
in favor of interacting with it on the basis of these complex ab-

stractions.

As Piaget points out, with the advent of formal operations,

there is more than mere representation of things as they are "Since the

world of the possible becomes available for construction and since
thought [attention] becomes free from the ’real’ world [Ibid., 151]."

One final note- -Piaget'

tering of thought is a point

I

s

equation of attention with the cen-

think worth re-emphasizing.

For Piaget,

thought is an internalized scheme of operations by which the individual

transforms the perceptual data and constructs his view of reality.

This

is entirely congruent with the conception of attention as the process by

which the subject actively selects and synthesizes the sensory and conceptual data of the immediate present into an experience of consciousness.

Turning to the field of research, many studies underscore the

key role of attention in the formation and utilization of concepts.
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Effective conceptual thinking depends upon the ability to respond to a

situation very selectively in terms of one or several of its attributes.
If a child is unable to focus his attention upon the relevant attributes

of an embedded instance while ignoring the irrelevant qualities, his

capacity to order and classify experience and thus manage its otherwise

overwhelming complexity, will be severely handicapped.
To cite just two studies, one by Hendrickson and Muehl (1962)

involved training children to attend to the relevant attributes of a

discrimination task.

The trained group markedly outperformed a control

group that lacked such training.

Another study by Klausmeir and Meinke

(1968) was conducted to ascertain the effect of various kinds of in-

struction upon a concept -learning task.

When subjects were taught both

the plan and principle (purpose) for the focusing of attention on the

problem, the efficiency of their efforts was superior to any of the

other groups.
2.5.3

THE ROLE OF ATTENTION IN THE EXERCISE OF VALUES:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT

Inasmuch as the application of moral and spiritual principles
to one’s daily life involves the translation of ideality or aims into

actuality, volitional competence is centrally implicated in the moral

and spiritual aspects of human growth.

Since we have discussed in de-

we can
tail the relation of attention to volitional competence already,

infer a great deal about the role of attention in value effectance.
consider a speciBut to make this interrelation more explicit, let us

fic illustration.

Assume that individual "A" holds as his highest

human race.
value, working toward the organic oneness of the

Let us
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also assume that A sees the primary means of realizing this ideal in
his personal life as the establishment of harmony in his interpersonal

relationships.

Now, one of A's frequent contacts is "B" a cantankerous

ill -wishing individual, seemingly devoid of a real interest in the feel-

ings of others. Thus, whenever

A meets

B, A's capacity to respond to B

in a manner congruent with his values is often overtaxed.

However, A

discovers that he is much more successful in actualizing this value if
he actively focuses his attention upon the positive qualities which B

displays (however sporadically) and ignores the irritable aspects of
the latter's character.

The effect of this strategy then begins to

exert a transforming effect upon B's actions as both informal experience and the research on behavior modification would predict.

Raising this to a more general level, one of the goals of

value competence is the expression of one's ultimate concerns and values
in the immediate structuring of potentialities as they become powers in

the actuality of everyday life, a supremely human form of transcendence.

One means of achieving transcendence is to focus consciousness- -attention- -upon a potential object (ideal, value) which lies beyond the

actual data and to introduce it as a novel element into the immediate
occasion.
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6

DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

In a review of the literature pertaining to the
genesis and

development of attention in early childhood, Blum and Adcock
(1968)
suggest that certain long-held notions about the ontogeny of
attention

need to be critically re-examined.

For example, a supposition quite

popular in recent years is that the infant’s world is largely undifferentiated.

However, this notion has been seriously challenged by

a number of studies during the past five years.

Investigations by Fantz

(1961, 1964, 1965), Stechler and Latz (1966) indicate that the child

selectively attends, i.e., fixates his gaze upon (though not on a wholly

voluntary basis) prominent visual patterns in his environment within the
first week after birth.

Carpenter and Stechler (1967) observed that infants displayed
an increase in attentiveness (fixation) from the first through the second

week with a drop between the second and the third.

From the third week

on, however, there was a steady increase in the period of fixation along

with the emergence of definite approach- avoidance reactions toward
various objects.

Hunt (1965) also points to a number of studies which indicate
that infants possess the capacity for crude pattern recognition shortly

after birth.

Specifically, neonates appear to prefer (i.e., they fixate

longer upon) patterned surfaces to homogeneous surfaces and they also tend
to prefer complex patterns to simple ones.

Moreover, this appetite for

complexity increases both with age and experience,

A series of studies conducted by Gilmer and Moyer
yielded some surprising results.

(1954, 1955)

Their findings suggest that the child's
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ability to concentrate or attend to something for an
extended period of
time remains relatively constant over the span from 18 months
to seven

years of age.

Apparently even very young children are able to concentrate

for relatively long periods of time in situations where they find meaningful interaction.

Given the proper setting, a child can be absorbed

in a single activity for perhaps a half hour without interruption.

We

hasten to underscore that the span of attention is not only a function of
the child’s temperament and development, but also is related to the

manner in which the situation is presented and the modes of interaction
open to the child.

If, for example, the stimulus array is simplified,

ordered and uncluttered, attention will be facilitated.

Another belief which has received little support from empirical studies is the popular assumption that children become less dis-

tractable with age.

Hagen (1967) found that auditory distraction did

not negatively affect the performance of the younger children to any

greater extent than it did the older children.

In visual tasks, ir-

relevant information placed adjacent to relevant material caused interference, making performance at all ages inferior to performance under

conditions where no such distraction existed.

It is again worth noting

that the effect of extraneous stimuli is not always to cause distraction.

Whether or not is is attention-getting depends upon the needs and

adaptation level of the child.
To my knowledge, there does not exist a comprehensive theory

attention in
that deals directly with the growth and development of
children.

contribuHowever, a number of writers have made significant

sometimes directly
tions toward a fuller understanding of the process,
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or more often indirectly by way of some closely related issue.

One among this latter category is J. McV. Hunt.

In a monograph

published in 1965, Hunt attempted to point out how the traditionally dominant answers to the question of human motivation based upon homeostatic

principles of drive coupled with associationistic principles of learning were inadequate in explaining a large segment of human behavior.

He

argued that most of our actions are purposive in origin and cannot be

accounted for in terms of extrinsicly based drives such as tissue deficits, pain, sex, etc.

Specifically, Hunt noted that in very early in-

fancy, children showed signs of an intrinsic motivation toward ex-

periencing both novelty and order in their interactions with the environment.

This notion refers to basically the same phenomenon as R. White's

concept of competence motivation (White, 1959).

Although the basis for this

motivation is presumably innate, it can be either facilitated or extinguished depending upon the quality of the environment to which the
child is exposed.
The relevance of this issue to attention lies in the fact that
the sort of actions toward which this intrinsic motivation aims is the

perceptual, cognitive -affective enjoyment of actual and conceptual data
in one's environment.

The dynamic underlying this aim is the appetite

for novelty, incongruity and contrast within experience.

Inasmuch as

this entire process involves the purposive and selective operation of

consciousness, attention is an essential aspect of its function and

perhaps even its development.

It is upon this hypothesized inter

connection that we base the following speculation.
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Hunt

s

review of the literature suggests that the epigenesis

of intrinsic motivation involves three stages:
In the first stage, from birth to four or five months of age,

the infant's attention is captured by situations of change and
contrast.

As James succinctly put it, the child's attention is less

controlled by him than it is captured by the environment around him.
In Section 2.1.3, we put heavy emphasis on the idea that attention is

not the passive absorption of sensation but rather a continual process
of constructing the data of an occasion into a coherent immediate ex-

perience of consciousness.

We also argued that the organism's ability

to construct an object depends on a pre -perceptual schema or matrix

upon which the synthesis can be built.

This is not to say that in order

to perceive something we must already have an image of it somewhere

within our brain.

If this were true, we would be faced with explaining

how it is possible to attend to and perceive something one has never before seen, since presumably one would have had no means of building a

preperceptual image to match the data.

Rather the point is, as alluded

to earlier, that we bring to bear on any new (previously unencountered)

situation a matrix of references derived from previous experience which
serves both to differentiate the object from the field of data and to

establish in some way its orderly interconnection, similarities and
differences, with previous experience.

This is to say that the form or

reality of a percipient object is a function of its interrelation with
expressed
the total history of experiences as they are assimilated and
in the contemporary self or organism.
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In the case of an infant who has
not yet developed through

the differentiation and integration
of experience, such a matrix of

references or structure by which incoming
data is given intrinsic identity and meaning, attention is primarily
deteimined by the locus of
transformation, contrast

and change in the extensive environment.

This predisposition of attention towards
change and contrast appears
to be an innate tendency.

Soon the child begins to coordinate and

pattern these primitive encounters with the
environment.

The stored

and organized traces of these interactions
constitute the emergent pre-

perceptual structure or "sets" (immanence) which, when fused
with the
immediate sensation, creates the "object" of attention.

Because the

emergent structure is constantly evolving with each act of
experience,
his attentional capacities become more refined and differentiated
(this of course assumes rich and diverse interactions with the en-

vironment)

.

Moreover, the growth of these pre -perceptual sets with

their greater elasticity mean that the child to an increasing degree
is shaping the nature of his perceptual experiences.

Thus, attention

gradually shifts from being outwardly determined, to becoming selfdetermined.

The first expressions of this nascent self-determination of

attention appear in the second stage with the growing child's desire to

gain contact with recognizable objects, people or situations.

Here,

the rudimentary pre -perceptual structures are in the making and require

interaction with familiar circumstances to establish the order and

pattern in experience.
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The behavioral signs of this stage have been documented by

Piaget and Hunt.

Infants smile at, and will make efforts toward re-

peated encounters with an incident.

The child’s babbling consists

largely of incessant repetitions of a narrow repertoire of sounds and
he most readily responds to the parent if the parent utters sounds or

morphemes which are close imitations of those already in the child's
repertoire.

It is also worth noting that not until this stage does

the child show distress when left in an unfamiliar place or with a

strange person (separation anxiety)
In the third and final stage which commences around 9 months

after birth and continues throughout life, the child's interest begins
to shift from things which are familiar to things which are novel.

The strong attachment to familiars still exists as an anchoring stan-

dard or platform from which he ventures into new situations.

Hence, he

seeks to view a familiar object from new perspectives, exploring

through various modalities.

He begins experimenting endlessly upon his

environment and his experimentation is impelled by his thirst for novel
discovery.

Whereas in Stage Two, babbling is largely repetitious and

invariant, in this third stage the child is more interested in gen-

erating novel sounds.

He will attempt many variations on a single

vocalization and readily imitate adult phrases which he has never heard
or spoken previously.

There is some indication that these three roughly defined
stages are sensitive periods for the development of
terest, and attention.

curiousity

,

in-

For example, if the child is placed in a homo-

deprivation during
geneous environment and thus is subjected to sensory
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th® first stages, retardation and apathy will result.

A homogeneous

input deprives the child of an opportunity to build pre -perceptual sets

since the development of such sets depends upon interaction with a

changing and contrasting yet orderly environment.

Moreover, the ab-

sence of change leads to a waning of motivation and the onset of apathy,
the consequences of which is retardation.

Dennis (1960) conducted a

series of studies and observations in a Tehran orphanage and found that

children who were subjected to a bland and uneventful environment
suffered an impoverished social existence.

These children were grossly

retarded in their development of perceptual, motor, cognitive and lin-

guistic skills.

Sixty-five per cent of all children two years of age

were not able to sit up on their own, while 85 per cent of those who
had reached four years of age were still not walking.

In order for

attention to develop optimally during the first stage, the child
should be exposed to a rich, active environment so that he experiences
changes in receptor input.
During the second stage the child also needs to be in an
active environment but he should have the opportunity to make frequent

encounters with familiar objects, people, and circumstances.

After

9

months the child requires an even more diverse and responsive environment, yet the novelty should not be so disparate from previous occasions
as to disorient and overwhelm the child.

If there is excessive strange

be unable to
ness and little relation to his prior experiences, he will
further exintegrate the experience and may retreat in anxiety from

ploration.

of atThe guiding parameters for facilitating the growth

novelty and transition
tention in early childhood should be to provide
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within order and permanence.
On the basis of existing research data and the developmental
sequence outlined above, as well as a good deal of speculation, we have

abstracted three broad developedmental parameters which appear to
characterize the epigenesis of attention.

Because they are general hy-

potheses and summarize many ideas which have been implicit in the foregoing discussion, it seems appropriate to conclude on them.
The ontogenetic evolution of attention can be seen in terms

of three distinct but interrelated modes of progression.
1.

From outward to inward control.

According to Piaget, as

the child matures, what he assimilates in the course of experience be-

comes more and more the product of the operations which the youngster

enacts upon his environment.

Thus the nature of a child’s experience,

his respresentation of reality and his immediate perception of the

world around him become less a direct registration of sensory input and
more a function of his self-directed interactions and transformations

upon the world around him.

Inasmuch as consciousness and attention are

fundamentally the result of active self-determined process, it shifts
from being extrinsical ly (outwardly) determined to intrinsically determined.
2.

As the child advances further in age and experience, his

repertoire of operations expands, diversifies,
into complex structures.

arid

becomes integrated

This expansion creates new realms of poten-

tial, awareness, and perspectives.

Thus, the forms of attention pro-

gress from simple to more complex and novel situations.
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3.

Another major developmental trend involves the
progressive

internalization of perceptual and motor operations.

The child depends

less on overt physical manipulation of objects and is less
reliant on

concrete sensory-motor experiences to direct and control thought and
attention.

Instead, he can conceptually manipulate, project, and op-

erate upon data to produce ideas, concepts,. and abstractions which become in themselves a new and increasingly important source of data for
prehension.

This generation of novel, conceptual data through the var-

ious forms of psychological process --essentially the creation of new

potential- -is the primary means by which the human organism transcends
the boundaries of the actual world and advances into a new realm of

being, wherein the course of his growth and evolution becomes determined

by higher-order, spiritual, and ethical principles.
Thus, the third major trend in the epigenesis of attention is

a progression from a level in which the prehended data are actual and

concrete to one in which the data are conceptual and potential.

133

2.7

EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The following central objective is directly taken from
the

definition of attention advanced in Section 2.1.4.

Note that it is

stated in terms of a process which the learner would enact

To purposively select and structure the sensory and
conceptual data of the immediate present Into a unitary
focus and reject those data incompatible with or irrelevant to one's purpose.

It seems appropriate that the more specific objects be de-

rived from the developmental progressions outlined in the previous

chapter

1.

To bring the operation of attention more into the domain

of self-determined process so that the transformation and flow of in-

terrelation between subject and data (a requisite element in the com-

position of the attention process) become less dependent upon activity
in the environment and originate increasingly from the individual.

2.

To be able to subsume under focal attention, increasingly

complex and novel modes of process and structure.

This includes the

ability to focally attend to abstract and conceptual data.

3.

To turn one's attention toward the realm of potentiality,

i.e., to fantasize or imagine an unrealized future possibility.
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2.8

IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE AND
PROTOTYPICAL LEARNING EXPERIENCES

The purpose of the present section is to sketch out
certain

aspects of the educational environment which serve to
facilitate the de-

velopment of attention.

Many of these principles are implicit in the

previous discussions but at this time we wish to make these guidelines
explicit.
A.

In our treatment of some of the developmental issues sur-

rounding attention, we mentioned the critical role of early environment.
In accordance with the stages of development outlined earlier, we pro-

pose the following conclusions:
That the child's environment be rich and varied in stimulation.

However, the environment should not be cluttered- -it is important that

objects be thoughtfully separated so that there is clarity in the stimulus array.

Since the infant begins to respond differentially to pat-

terns within the first few days after birth, this exposure should com-

mence immediately.

Following the fifth or sixth week, it becomes in-

creasingly important for the child to begin to have not only a diversified
environment but also a responsive one.

There should be ample opportunity

for the infant to manipulate and experiment with the things around him.

This kind of active participation in the environment is a critical stage
in development of attention.

It is through such manipulation that the

child begins to acquire a schema of operations which form the basis of

internalized perceptual-cognitive processes.

Recall that these internal-

ized operations are what enable attention and perception to be internally

directed.

A popular example of this sort of provision

is the three
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dimensional mobile which is fastened to the
child's crib.
the infant causes the mobile to move.

m

strumental

His own actions then become in-

the perceptual experience.

tie a string or

yam

By moving,

A variant of this setup

is to

ribbon between the mobile and the child's hand.

Here again, the effect is the same, but in this
case the child can affect

motion by a more refined, differentiated movement, whereas
in the for-

mer case, gross bodily movement is necessary.

As a result, the infant

has more control over the kind of effects he can produce.

The experi-

ence can be further enriched by tying several ribbons or lengths of

yam, each of

a different color, to various sections of the mobile so

that by pulling a different ribbon he can produce a distinctly differ-

ent experience.
It is not enough that the inanimate environment be respon-

sive to the child's actions.

Even more important is that his inter-

personal contacts especially with respect to the parents or primary
adults be frequent, warm, nurtural and responsive.

Lack of such regu-

lar contact amounts to a form of emotional as well as perceptual -intel-

lectual deprivation.

Thus a parent's interaction with the child should

include little games wherein the parent shows recognition and actively

responds to the infant's sounds and bodily movements.

During the second stage (4-9 months), when the child's innate
interest tends toward recognitive familiarity, the format of parents'

interaction with the child should place heavy emphasis upon repeating

patterns of behavior and speech on subsequent occasions.

This, of course,

should not preclude introducing novel incidents into such occasions of
interchange
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After 9 months, when the child begins to show a curiosity for
the novel and unfamiliar, the substance of parent -child interaction

should shift toward a greater inclusion of new patterns and elements.
Thus, instead of merely repeating vocal or motor patterns, the parent

should produce novel variations in his responses to the child’s activity.

For example, if the child babbles "ma ma" the mother might respond

not just with "ma ma" but perhaps with "mi mi" or "moo moo" and encourage
her child to imitate.

Or if the parent and child have been clapping

hands together the parent might initiate a departure from the original
game by patting her hands on her head or cheeks.

Of course, the varia-

tions on such a theme are innumerable and need not be explicitly spelled
out here.

The main guidelines are all a parent or teacher requires to

generate her own individually tailored learning experience.
B)

The role of feedback - -It is fairly well known that if an

individual is provided with a knowledge of the results of his efforts,
his performance improves.

Moreover, the experimental results indicate

that the more complete such knowledge of results is, the greater the

improvement in performance.

An analysis of the research suggests that

knowledge of results influences attention in two ways.
As we mentioned earlier, a point of view taken by those inof
vestigators who equate attention with vigilance is that the effect

retarding
feedback is to help maintain the subject's alertness by
situation.
habituation to the otherwise monotonous or uneventful

How-

function of feedback
ever, arousal itself does not seem to be the main

occasions has been shown
because knowledge of results given on previous
in which no feedback was
to improve performance on subsequent tasks
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given.
In light of this, it would appear that the main value of

knowledge of results is to let the subject know when his attention is

wandering or lapsing and hence provide a corrective cue for him to refocus his energies upon the task.

Insofar as the individual is know-

ledgeable of his behavior and the subjective feeling with which this

behavior is associated, he has a measure of control over it.

This

principle might be implemented in a number of ways on a number of levels.

For example, students who are working together in a cooperative

task which requires constant attention towards the activity of each

other can incorporate a vigilance game within the main task in the

following way.
Suppose the main task involves a shadowing exercise, the object of which is to mirror the movements of one’s partner through one's

own movements.

The vigilance game could consist of an unanticipated sig-

nal given by the leading partner, which would signify that the following

partner should immediately reverse the direction of his movements so
that instead of mirroring the leader's movement he opposes them.

Thus,

if the leader were to extend his left arm, the follower who would be
of
facing the leader, would be required to raise his left arm instead

his right and therefore oppose the leader's pattern.

The signaling cue

movement;
could be any inconspicuous action or common word, a particular

should have
wrinkling one's nose, etc., but both leader and follower

agreed on what the signal will be ahead of time.

When the signal is re-

original mirroring expeated, this would indicate a reversion to the
ercise.
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In these circumstances, a lapse of attention would yield im-

mediate overt consequences enabling the leading child to give prompt
feedback to his partner.

Presumably, the follower would then have the

advantage of knowing when his attention wandered and would be able to

better identify the onset of lapses in future occasions and redirect
his energies and efforts to avoid them.

Another situation which would yield valuable feedback, onploys the type of selective listening task used by Broadbent and Treise-

man in their studies (see Chapter One).

The task requires a subject

to verbally shadow one message and ignore all others.

The exercise de-

mands high levels of concentration and any failure or shift in attention
results in an immediate breakdown of the subject's activity.
This design can be modified or complicated to provide various

levels of difficulty.

For instance, a younger child may be at first in-

capable of differentiating two sources of speech in which case simply
shadowing without this interference would be a sufficiently challenging
task.

More advanced students might be challenged by using three instead

of two simultaneously spoken messages.

In addition the physical intensity

the
or clarity of the shadowed message could be varied with respect to

intensity and clarity of the unwanted messages.

Blindfolds may or may

dispense
not be used depending upon whether the child requires or can

with visual cues in differentiating the messages.

Another variation

criss-crossing
would be to have the speaking voices constantly in motion,
cues more difficult and
one another in space, making the use of spatial

intriguing
and can be
These experiences require no special equipment
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implemented easily.

Students can work together in groups, each one

serving a vital role in the experiment.
C)

On a very fundamental level, the above experiences can be

viewed as exercises which require one to differentiate figure-ground
relations; since this is one way to characterize the process of attention,

we would like to suggest a couple of practical applications derived from
this conception.

The first instance involves the use of simple figures and
images embedded in a variety of increasingly complex backgrounds.

This

sort of exercise is commonly used as a device for assessing a child's

level of perceptual development and serves to determine whether or not
the child suffers from any psycho-neurological handicap.

There is no

reason why this technique could not be modified and developed into a
learning aid.
The second instance utilizes the same principle but in the

auditory mode.

In this case, music is the medium and the task becomes

one of identifying themes or motifs in various rhythmic and harmonic

contexts, within various keys, tempi, etc.

Again the level of difficulty

should be gauged according to the child's capacities, beginning with
simple exercises and gradually moving toward more complex tasks.
D)

Equally, if not more important than being able to focally

attend to selected sources of information in one's immediate environsome
ment is the ability to entertain as the object of one's attention,

imagination and fantasy.
ideal or unrealized possibility- -the capacity for
often teachers
Many children show a natural inclination for fantasy but
it has no practical
either ignore or suppress fantasy because they feel
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value.

This could be no further from the truth.

As was mentioned

earlier, fantasy is one of the primary means by which an individual trans-

cends the present and gains control of his destiny.

Specifically, fan-

tasy is extremely important in fonnulating goals, initiating and maintaining

goal -directed activity.

The teacher should thus be willing to entertain and encourage fantasy in her interchange with children, as well as among the chil-

dren themselves.

For example, the teacher might develop a game based

on the question, "What would you do if.

.

.?"

The game could be con-

ducted in various ways, depending upon the children's level of development and what other objectives are being served by the content of the
learning experience.

The following illustration merely suggests a di-

rection.

Each student writes (or if he cannot write, the teacher or
an older child can write for him) on a small piece of paper the question,

"What would you do if.

.

.?" and then adds on his conditions, such as,

"What would you do if you had 100 rolls of toilet paper?"

All the papers

are then scrambled up in a box, after which each child draws a question

and spends a few minutes fantasizing on what he would do under those

circumstances presented to him.

Once everyone had written down or re-

corded in some way, his particular fantasy, each would share his own

with the others.

A variation on this procedure would be to use actual materallowing the
ials such as blocks, paints, balls, sticks, dolls, etc.,

speculating and then
child to touch and see materials about which he is
to actually demonstrate his speculation.
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E)

Because the Thematic Apperception Test is designed pri-

marily for clinical diagnosis, its potential use as a learning tool remains largely unexplored.

This is unfortunate especially since one of

the functions of the test is to evoke fantasy.

The learning opportun-

ities which could be built around the test are virtually innumerable.

Such experiences need not be limited to non-directive situations in

which the child merely makes up a story.

The teacher may encourage the

child to carry out or dramatize his fantasy (if this is feasible)

,

to

project consequences and have the child self -evaluate the qualitative
aspects of his projection and generate other possibilities.
E)

To conclude, we would like to raise some general considera-

tions about the structure of the learning environment and the role of the

teacher in fostering the development of attention.
One point which consistently emerges above all others in our

description of attention is its nature as an active process of differentiating and integrating experience.

As such, we cannot expect a child

to attend for any length of time to something with which he cannot in-

teract- -to develop his capacity for attention without allowing him to

actively interrelate with the tings in his environment.

Although the

connature of this interaction may evolve to be highly internalized and

ceptual, it must

begin with overt concrete forms of process and then

progress to more covert and abstract levels.
transAttention depends upon the continual penetration and

consciousness intp
formation of the subjective world, the advance of

novel realms.

stalls
Research clearly demonstrates that if this process

subsides into stasis,
if the interaction between subject and data
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attention will disintegrate.

Thus, it is unrealistic to expect a child

to attend for any length of time to something with which he cannot interact; yet, we continue to subject children to passive, inert conditions,

reducing both their capacity to attend and the receptiveness to learning.

Many observers have noted that children in Montessori schools
generally display extraordinary attentional capacities.

One explanation

for this seems to be that Montessori children are allowed extensive

periods of uninterrupted time to explore and manipulate objects on their
own.

These sessions involve a minimal amount of passive taking-in and

are filled with activity which the child himself autonomously generates.

Another is that the child is provided by the teacher with a
"set” of operations to perform upon the object.

The teacher demonstrates

several, though not all the ways in which an object may be used, after

which the child attempts to replicate these operations on his own.

A

child who has acquired such a structure or "set” now has the means for
governing an ordered, integrated series of transformations in relation
to his environment.

The more knowledge a child has about a class of

events, the longer he can work at assimilating a new event and the more

prolonged his attention.

There is a close parallel between the autono-

intermous effectance of these operations in concrete action and the

nalized mental operations associated with focal attention.

In fact, as

believe that one
we have suggested previously, there is good reason to
is the developmental precursor to the other.
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2.9

EVALUATION

Since there is no possible way of reducing a higher -order

process such as attention to a strict group of behavioral elements, the

measurement of attention must be approached indirectly by way of inference from behavior.

The particular behavioral manifestations ac-

companying or resulting from the function of attention will vary ac-

cording to the characteristics of the occasion.

For example, the

behavior of a child who is concentrating on solving a jigsaw puzzle

might be very different from the behavior of a child who is wrapt
in fantasy about becoming an astronaut.

Fifferent from either of these

circumstances might be the actions of a child who is very attentive
to the antics of his neighbor.
If these examples of attention involve vastly diverse forms

of behavior, at what level do they have something in common?

Each of

these instances are similar to one another insofar as all involve a

selective interaction of the child's conscious awareness with some as-

pect of the subject's environment, integrated around a unitary object
or theme.

Arriving at this recognition requires the observer to go

beyond an analysis of the behavioral elements as final in themselves
and instead infer their joint meaning as indicators of an ongoing

higher-order mental process.

Thus, any evaluation of the degree of

success or failure in the foregoing educational objectives must be
inference.
based largely on the non-explicit, informal criteria of tacit

series
Of course, it is possible to present the child with a
test, note the
of mental exercises such as items from an intelligence
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amount of time until, and the frequency with which,
behavior apparently

irrelevant to the assigned task begins to appear.

In this design, one

might measure the elapsed time until first distraction and the
rate of
occurrence of subsequent unrelated activities as a behavioral measure
of attention.

At first glance, this may appear acceptable but a closer

look reveals some inadequacies.

First of all, this approach requires one to take for granted
a number of seriously questionable assumptions, one of which is that

the observer’s frame of reference is identical with that of the child.

For example, if the observer's aim is to assess the span or degree of

control a child has over his attention and he notices an apparent de-

viation in the child' efforts toward the task, he has no basis for
taking this behavior as evidence of the child's ability or inability
to voluntarily direct his attention, unless the child's purposes and

intention happen to correspond with the task assigned by the experimenter.

There is no easy solution to this problem and such difficulties certainly do not mean that current methods of measuring attention
are useless and dispensable.

It is, however, very important that one

be cognizant of the limitations and uncertainties encumbered in relying

upon them.

Having issued this "caveat" let us breifly list some measures

of assessment presently in use.

Kagan (1972) has recommended using the quality of short-term

memory, fixation time, eye tracking patterns, and quality of performance
on continuous vigilance tasks.

The quality of performance on continu-

ous vigilance tasks might be assessed in the following way.
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The child is asked to show by some response, verbal and non-

verbal, that he understands what is said by the examiner.

The examiner's

questions and directions are designed on four levels of age appropriateness:

18 months, 24 months, 30 months, and 36 months.

Examples of

items
a.

Ask child to point to objects and to objects in pictures.

b.

Using a single imperative with a variety of verbs; e.g.,

show/give me the ball; find it, etc.
c.

Ask child to pick out objects by size, shape.

d.

Ask child to respond to two or more parts of a series of

instructions.
e.

Show pictures of objects in pairs, ask child to point to

pictures; e.g., "Show me the boy and the dog; the dog playing with the
ball, etc."
f.

Ask child to respond to imperatives in which two parts are

simultaneously varied; e.g., "Give me the ball; give me the blocks, etc."

After showing pictures of a variety of situations, ask child to point to
the dog running, the boy sitting down, the girl playing ball, etc.

Finally, the quality of short-term memory can be assessed by

asking the child to repeat short sequences of numbers, letters and
words, e.g.,

1

2

-

3;

1

7

-

8; a

-

o

-

f; dog house; the cat

is red.

CHAPTER

THREE

GOAL SETTING
Goal-setting refers to the conception and structuring
of
unrealized possibility as a consequent expression
of one’s purpose
or subjective aim.. More specifically , it is the process
by which
an individual anticipates and organizes his future by
making a conscious decision about future events or conditions toward
which he
will strive.
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3.1

3.1.1

ELABORATE DESCRIPTION

GOAL- SETTING AS A MODE
OF PREHENSION

Discussing the differences between the organic or
living uni-

verse and the inorganic or lifeless universe, Whitehead
states that the

primary meaning of life is "The origination of conceptual
novelty- -novelty of appetition [Whitehead, 1938, p. 26)."

This statement can be

understood only when one keeps in clear perspective the fundamental
principles of the Philosophy of Organism, namely, that the nature of
any organism is not its substance or momentary state but its form in the

process of evolution, i.e., that process is reality.

In the particular

case of the living organism, this process exhibits two characteristics,
the first of which is creative activity.

Whitehead defines creativity as the process of "Eliciting into actual being factors in the universe which antecedently to that

process exist only in the mode of unrealized potentialities.

The

process of self-creation is the transformation of the potential into
the actual, and the fact of such transformation includes the immediacy

of self- enjoyment [Ibid., p. 23]."
Thus, an important distinction emerges between the already

actualized or existent data, inherited from the past and the immediate
present, on the one hand, and the non-actualized potentialities on the
other, which "Lie ready to promote their fusion of those data with

those potentialities."

This is the creative advance into novelty, the

means fulfilling one's being in the present by transcending the bounds
of the present and passing into the future.
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Yet, there is another aspect.

The creative advance into

novelty does not proceed in a random, unordered
fashion but embodies a
teleological, purposive dimension, i.e., subjective
aim, which gives

coherence and unity to the becoming process.

One way in which sub-

jective aim or purpose is directive of concrescence is
through an ex-

clusion of the boundless wealth of alternative potentialities
which
lie before the organism at any given juncture, selecting that
pos-

sibility which maintains the unity of organismic structure and the

continuity of progression from past to future.

To put it differently,

an important aspect of concrescence involves an act of decision about

what one is to become, how the ideality of one's purpose and aim will
be expressed in the actuality of one's immediate situation.

Recall

Whitehead's definition of concrescence as the name for the process in

which "The universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a
determinate relegation of each item of the 'many' to its subordination
in the constitution of the novel 'one'
1929, p. 321] ."

[emphasis added]

[Whitehead,

Concrescence is complete when the particular occasion

of the transformation of potentiality into actuality is fully realized.
Its culmination marks the "Evaporation of all indeterminacy; so that in

respect to its own feeling and to all entities in the universe, the
actual entity embodies a determinant attitude of yes or no [Ibid., p.
323] ."

This notion of "determinant relegation," or the "resolution of

all indeterminacy" in a particular situation implies a definite as-

sertion about one's relation to one's present and future environment.

Such an assertion necessarily involves a rejection of alternative

possibilities as well as the acceptance of the one presently
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selected.

Here again, the Whiteheadian category of
prehension can be
applied.

In this sense, prehension is synonymous with
decision.

will be recalled that prehension may be

1)

It

either positive or negative,

depending on whether the reaction is to incorporate or
reject the data
in question, and 2) it may be either physical or
conceptual; "physical"

if the data are actual, "conceptual" if the data are
unrealized or

potential.

A negative prehension was defined
considered but then rejected.
hension.

as one in which data are

There are two types of negative pre-

One involves a definite decision or act of exclusion, an

aesthetic judgement in which the organism dismisses, ignores, or re-

presses incompatible elements which would destroy or impair its development.

One example would be the case in which a student who

recognizes the incompatibility between his playing football and studying
for his exams decides to give up playing football.

The second type of negative prehension

which is particularly

significant in the choices of human beings is the conception of form
or ideal not realized in the data.

This process is a prime means of

transcendence- -through it an individual can advance in his develop-

ment by reacting not to the immediate situation as given, but rather
to some unrealized potentiality which lies beyond the present.

This

form of negative prehension underlies the creative advance into novelty
and operates through the channels of consciously held aspirations and
purpose.

An illustration offered is that of a child who aspires to

become a statesman.

Through his intentional fantasy he rises beyond
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his reality as a child and is entertaining
an idea which to an extent

replaces his immediate actuality.

He has turned his attention towards

an ideal; his prehension is conceptual.

Inasmuch as goal-setting

involves (1) the anticipation and

differentiation of future possibilities, and

(2)

a definite set of de-

cisions about these respective possibilities, it may be
regarded as a

form of conceptual prehension.

Thus, goal-setting is a crucial phase

in the creative advance of the human organism, standing
at the critical

juncture wherein one's sense of purpose or subjective aim is translated into the ongoing flow of immediate experience in terms of op-

erable plans and intentions.
3.1.2

A NOTE ON GOALS VERSUS DECISIONS
Although goal has been characterized as a decision, it is

important to clarify that all decisions are not necessarily goals.

A

goal is a decision which involves a pre-disposition to act with respect
to some potential unrealized occasion.

A goal can be an end, a result,

as well as a task or function to be performed.

dition one desires to achieve.

It describes a con-

It may be a standard of achievement, a

criterion of success, something tangible, measureable, and valuable to-

ward which one is motivated.
It

It is concrete, explicit, and definitive.

may be long-range or short-range: long-range goals help clarify short-

range goals; major goals determine minor goals, and the present is de-

termined by both the immanence of the past and the transcendent ideality
of the future.
3.1.3

GOAL SETTING AND THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATION

Generally speaking, theories of motivation are concerned with

151

what initiates and maintains human behavior.

In Chapter One, it was

shown how traditionally dominant answers to the
question of human mo-

tivation have followed the mechanistic objectivism
of Descartes.

Mechan-

ism has managed to claim a strong hold on
psychological thought up to the

present, despite many of its logical contradictions and
inadequacies.
In the field of experimental psychologies of motivation,
the drive theory

of Clark Hull and Skinnerian behaviorism represent two important
schools
in twentieth century American psychology that rely upon a
mechanistic

approach.

Although only a small percentage of psychologists would

claim strict adherence to these theories, a great majority of the
current research and speculation in the field of motivation is de-

rived from problems and issues posited by these two systems.
One instance of this is the large body of research as-

sociated with behavior modification.

The basic supposition under-

lying behavior modification is that patterns of human action can be

precisely correlated with a corresponding pattern of stimulus input.
The problem for the behavior technologist who wishes to elicit a

certain behavior then becomes one of simply providing the appropriate
stimulus condition.

Little if any consideration is given to the

subject's own intentions, which are by and large regarded as epiphenomenal.

As a result, behavior modification programs consist of

an elaborate system of incentives and rewards which are presumed to
be the critical agents for changing a subject's behavior.
In an effort to clarify the effect of incentives, as well as

other extrinsic causal agents upon behavior, Edwin Locke conducted a
series of studies which varied incentives and the goals of the
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subjects independently of each other.

Locke cites instruction

,

money,

knowledge of results, participation, time
limits, competition with one's

previous performance or with another's performance,
and praise and re-

proof as different kinds of incentives most
commonly used to increase
performance.

Contrary to the assumptions of behaviorism the author

found that these incentives are effective in increasing
output only to
the degree that they affect a person's goals or intentions.

He notes

that the effect of a well-run incentive system is to encourage
workers
to accept tasks and set goals that they would not accept or set
on

their own, i.e., for the intrinsic enjoyment of the work itself.

Thus

incentives can serve to commit subjects to tasks which they would not

otherwise undertake.
In a controlled series of experiments, Locke tested the

following hypotheses:
1.

That goals and intentions will be related to behavior

regardless of incentive condition; that is, goals and intentions

will be related to behavior, both within and across differences in
goals or intentions.
2.

When incentive differences do correlate with behavior

differences, these differences will be accompanied by corresponding

differences in goals or intentions.
3.

When goal or intention differences are controlled or

partialled out, there will be no relationship between incentive condition and behavior.
1966b, 1969)

(Locke, 1966, 1969; Locke and Bryan, 1966a,
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Although there are a number of methodological
difficulties

with Locke’s experiments, there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that
these hypotheses are correct.

Thus we would concur with Rayan’s analy-

sis that,

Tasks [intentions, goals, etc.]
are to be treated
as causal factors in behavior.
By this I mean that a
task is a necessary condition for most kinds of behavior.
(To find an account for the exceptions is an
empirical problem) ... I shall assert that a very
large proportion of behavior is initiated by tasks and
that a very large proportion of tasks lead to the behavior specified by the tasks (Ryan, 1970, p. 79).
.

.

.

To say that human behavior is predominately purposive

does not mean that an individual is aware of, or consciously intends

every single action or movement he makes.

Obviously, there is a mas-

sive amount of habitual action, performed subconsciously, which underlies consciously held aspirations.

For example, it is possible that

the effect of a task or intention may operate over such a time span

that it may produce an effect at a time when the individual is no

longer aware of the task as such.

Locke suggests four types of un-

intentional behavior:
1.

Behavior whose end is foreseen but in which movement

in a sequence is not consciously initiated.
2.

Behavior in which a different end occurs than is

intended due to error or lack of ability, i.e., accidental behavior.
3.

Behavior in which the end- as -is -foreseen logically en-

tails another end that is not foreseen as such.
4.

Behavior which is not and never was under direct con-

scious control, but may be indirectly controlled (e.g., muscle

contractions, neural activity and so on) (Locke, 1969).
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Type

I

could be termed sub- intentional (as opposed
to un-

intentional) since one may not be focally aware
of the behavior it is

subsidiary to- -some consciously held goal.

Of the others, 2, 3, and 4,

are the only categories that could properly
be called unintentional,
but they constitute a relatively insignificant
segment of our total

experience
3.1.4

PHASES OF THE GOAL SETTING PROCESS
Tentatively, the goal-setting process can be analyzed in terms

of the following elements:
(A)

The first step involves directing one's attention to-

ward the future expecially with reference to one' purpose or subjective aim.

At this stage, one's apprehension and consciousness of

the future is vague and indeterminant.
(B)

The second phase involves bringing into clear figure,

alternative courses of action, i.e., to articulate in clear terms the
set of possibilities which lie before one, i.e., Shall

the piano?

Study?
(C)

I

sleep?

Play

Etc.

Following this, the individual projects the consequences

which the various courses of action hold for his development, and eliminates those with negative consequences for his greater purpose or aim.

Of those which remain, he must consider and evaluate the feasibility.
In other words, one must be able to anticipate the prerequisites and

consequences connected with a particular possibility.
(D)

Establish priorities of the remaining feasible alter-

(E)

Integrate the alternatives into a coherent plan of

natives.
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action.

This process of integration first
requires the differentiation

of larger complex goals into their
component sub-plans.

For example,

the goal of becoming a medical doctor is
unapproachable in terms of a

single action; such a goal consists of a
large aggregate of smaller,
shorter- range goals such as taking various
courses in anatomy, physiology, organic chemistry, entering medical
school, completing training and internship and finally locating a job.

All of these sub-goals

must be integrated in such a way that they do not conflict
with one
another, fragmenting and dissipating the individual's energies,
ul-

timately preventing attainment of the goal.
(F)

The final step of goal -setting involves a commitment to

the formulated plan of action.

This act of decision and commitment is

most crucial --without it a person's intentions and plans are ineffectual.
It requires faith and confidence both in the correctness of the goal

and in one's ability to achieve it.

On another level, it means actively

refusing to entertain other plans until the goal is achieved or unforeseen consequences make it apparent that achievement is either impossible
or undesirable.
3.1.5

QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF
GOAL- SETTING
We have been describing in general terms the various operations

involved in the goal -setting process with little reference to the content
of actual goals set, as if content were irrelevant.

But this is not the

case.

Process is meaningless without content, as is content without pro-

cess.

Thus, there are several important qualitative aspects of goal-

setting we would like to address.

First, competent goal-setting should

lead the individual toward the release of his potentiality at an optimum
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rate.

This implies that one’s goals should
provide a degree of novelty

and challenge appropriate to one’s present
capacities.

And finally, one’s

goals should avoid leading to destructive
results for others as well
as oneself.

This implies that biological psychological
and spirtual

needs should be taken into consideration when
goals are set.

Maslow

postulates a hierarchy of needs beginning with basic
physical needs
such as food, shelter, warmth, etc., progressing
to the emotional needs
such as love, security, etc., and finally to higher order
needs of self-

actualization which concern the release of the highest level of human
potentiality- -creative activity expressed in service to one's fellowman.

Maslow holds that these higher order needs emerge only when the

lower needs have been satisfied.

Thus, goals dealing with needs

of self-actualization presuppose the satisfaction of needs of security
and physical well-being.

If Maslow' s hypothesis is correct, it may be

unreasonable to expect people to set goals on the levels of self-actualization when their more basic needs have not been satisfied.
Several studies have attempted to elucidate the ways in which

various types of empirically identified needs affect goal -setting.
Sicks and Nicholson (1966) found that females with low need for approval

among peers tended to be less restrictive, and less cautious in goal-

setting when among peers than when among females with a high need for
approval.

Franken and Morphy (1970) investigated the manner in which

the need for achievement would affect goal-setting under various con-

ditions of success and failure.

Results indicate that individuals with

a high need for achievement preferred goals of moderate risk, presenting
a moderate challenge to their abilities, in which the probability of
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success and failure is about equal.

On the other hand, individuals

"bo show a low need for achievement and a high
motivation to avoid
failure (i.e., test-anxious subjects),
generally prefer tasks which
are either extremely easy so that their
success is guaranteed or

tasks which are extremely difficult in which
case failure would not

cast a threatening reflection on their ability.

The reason that sub-

jects with a high need for achievement choose tasks of
moderate risk
is that if the goals are too easy to achieve, they
are not valued and

consequently there is no feeling of success when they are achieved.
In conjunction with these other factors, success on previous

tasks has a significant effect on an individual's goal-setting.

In a

series of three experiments conducted by Locke (1965) there was a

definite, positive relationship between success and measures of task-

liking and satisfaction.

The most difficult goals generally led to

the lowest degree of satisfaction with and liking for the task because

they were reached less often than easier goals.

Locke points out,

however, that there are three means of achieving the feeling of success

other than actually reaching the goal.
to one's goal;

(2)

They are:

(1)

getting close

improving over one's previous performance; and

being able to set goals that one considers desirable.

(3)

Thus, all of

these means of achieving a feeling of success would probably influence
task- liking and subsequent goal -setting.

3.1.6

GOAL-SETTING AND PERSONALITY PROFILE
Hughes (1965) has assembled a profile of characteristics des-

cribing the "goal -oriented individual" and contrasts this profile with
that of the "task-oriented individual."

In general, the goal-oriented
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individual seeks feedback and knowledge of
results and wants evaluation

of his own performance, while the task-oriented
individual avoids feed-

back and evaluation, seeking approval rather
than performance evaluation.

Whereas the goal-oriented individual seeks personal
responsibility

for work if goal achievement is possible, the
task-oriented individual

avoids personal responsibility regardless of
opportunities for success.
The goal-oriented individual performs best on jobs
that hold possibilities for improvement and he prefers opportunities for
creativity.

The

task-oriented individual, on the other hand, prefers routine nonimprovable jobs.

He obtains no satisfaction from creativity, whereas the goal-

oriented individual seeks goals with moderate risks and obtains achieve-

ment satisfaction from solving problems.

The task-oriented individual

seeks goals with either very low or very high risk, and obtains satis-

faction not from problem-solving so much as from finishing a task.

The

goal -oriented individual initiates action with a high level of psycho-

physical energy directed toward goals and adjusts his level of aspiration to the realities of success and failure.

In contrast, the task-

oriented person prefers to follow the directions of others and he may or

may not have a high-drive energy level directed toward the particular
goal.

In addition, he rigidly maintains either a high or low level of

aspiration regardless of success or failure.
It is interesting to observe that the profile of the goal-

oriented individual closely resembles patterns of behavior associated

with achievement motivation, whereas the task-oriented profile correlates
highly with indicators of test anxiety and the motivation to avoid failure.
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3.1.7

THE DYNAMICS OF GOAL- SETTING

During the process of goal-setting,
one must be able to
create, maintain, and clearly articulate
the incongruity between one's

present state and the future occasion towards
which one aspires.

Winter et al (1968) found that the tendency
to phrase personal goals in
a manner which implies dissonance or
incongruity between the goal and

present behavior was correlated with a high
ability for self-directed
change.

When subjects who exhibited a low tendency for self
-directed

change were asked to think of goals, they concentrated
heavily on

what the present condition was and appeared to be unable
to postulate
for themselves clearly different behaviors or feelings than
those that

they presently experienced.

The low-change subjects appeared closed-

minded to possibilities that did not exist at the present time.

This

inability to articulate differences between present behavior and future
goals reduces the possibility of experiencing incongruity or dissonance

between the two conditions.

If dissonance or incongruity can be regarded

as a motivating factor, then one would expect these subjects to show

little motivation to change their behavior.

Such a person. Winter postulates, would rate high on a scale

of identity diffusion tolerating internal ambiguity and contradiction

between present behavior and a valued goal, without experiencing dissonance, because he ordinarily conceives of himself in contradictory

terms anyway.

When one's identity is highly integrated around a sense

of purpose, dissonance between present self and valued goals is created
because of the premise, "I do what

I

value."

Thus, self-directed change

and goal consummation may be increased by creating conditions in which

160

one can clearly see and feel the
discrepancy between one's present

condition and the anticipated goal-state.

Until this incongruity is

differentiated, the goal will not have been
adequately conceptualized.
In fact, if goal-setting is conceived
as a process, then it can be de-

fined as a contemplated transition from one
set of conditions to

another set of conditions.

Until the processes that mediate this tran-

sition can be represented in operational terns, the
individual has no

definitive focus upon which to concentrate his energies
in effecting

self-determined change.

3.2

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION

The problem of explicating the role of goal -setting in the

release of human potential can be approached from two slightly different perspectives:

(1)

by defining its relation to learning com-

petence in terms of differentiation and integration; and

(2)

by focus-

ing on the crucial role that goal-setting plays in the translation of

potentiality into actuality.

Since there is much more empirical evi-

dence available with respect to this latter relation, we will deal with
this perspective first.

3.2.1

GOAL- SETTING:
OF POTENTIAL

THE ACTUALIZATION

The very phrase, "the actualization of potential," implies that
there is some transition, some behavior, some change in the state of the
organism.

The goal-setting process is a central element in the process

of self-actualization, perhaps because the establishment of a goal is
crucial in arousing motivation for the difficult struggle to achieve
change.

There is little dispute among psychologists that motivation,
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i.e., the initiation and maintenance
of behavior, is a complex phenom-

ena that includes various causal factors
emerging in the interplay between the organism and its environment.
What has not been resolved,
however, is the way in which these factors
should be conceptualized,

their relative importance in any given
occasion, and the way in which
they interrelate with one another in the
whole functioning personality.
For example, theorists in the behaviorist
tradition hold that

any human action or behavior is directly analyzable
to some extrinsic
stimulus condition, while cognitive psychologists
generally maintain
that any theory of human motivation must take into
account

intrinsic

psychological variables such as plans, intentions, etc., which
can be
quite autonomous of any physical stimuli.

For the behaviorists

,

plans

and intentions are merely epiphenomena--that is, they are not causal

agents, rather they are simply inert verbal labels which culture has

attached to the primary causal stimulus.

Inasmuch as one of our basic

premises is that human behavior is primarily purposive, i.e., purpose
is a predominant causal factor in human action, and since purpose is

an intrinsic non-physical element, it is very crucial that the causal

relation between intentions and behavior (goals or intentions being

differentiated expressions of purpose) be clearly demonstrated.
(i)

Intention and the Level of Achievement.

In an earlier section

of this chapter, mention was made of Locke's efforts to empirically
separate intentions and goals from extrinsic sources of motivation
such as incentives, and thus demonstrate that intentions directly

mediate action.

Since the present section is concerned with the ef-

fects of goal-setting upon achievement, it seems appropriate to re-

view at least one of his studies in detail.
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In this particular experiment
(1967) there were four dif-

ferent groups of subjects who were equally
distributed with respect to

ability and task interest.

Group

received knowledge of results.

I

was assigned difficult goals and

The experimenters set goals for this

group based on the best performance of each subject,
plus an increase

of ten per cent on subsequent trials.

The experimenter also told sub-

jects of their results at the end of each trial. Group
II was also

assigned difficult goals but received no knowledge of results.
iilwas not assigned specific goals to aim for.

Group

Rather, they were

told only to "do their best," but they were informed of the number of

problems they had correctly answered at the end of each trial
they received knowledge of results.

,

i.e

.

Group IV was given the same in-

structions as Group III but they received no knowledge of results.
By the fifth trial, Group

I

(hard goal--KR group) computed

approximately ninety-eight problems correctly per minute; while Group
II

(hard goal--NR group) correctly completed 90 problems.

Group III

(do best--KR group) scored 82, while the fourth group (do best-- NR

group) achieved a score of 78.

These results suggest that motivation-

al effects which previously had been attributed to differences in re-

inforcement or knowledge of results were actually

a

function of dif-

ferences in performance goals associated with the knowledge of results
and reinforcement conditions.

When differences in the goal-setting of

the "feedback" and "non- feedback" subjects was controlled, no overall

effect of the knowledge of results on performance was observed.

On

the basis of this and previous studies, Locke concluded that all types

of incentives (e.g., knowledge of results, money, instructions,
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participation, praise, verbal reinforcement, etc.)

,

are causalonly to

the degree that they affect a subject's
goals or intentions

(Locke,

1967 ).
In actual fact, however, knowledge of results
and goal-

setting tend to be interactive.

Feedback or knowledge of results pro-

vide an important basis upon which subsequent goals
are formulated.
Thus, realistic goal-setting depends upon the ability to
interpret and

utilize feedback in the goal-setting process.
Another important aspect of the relation between goal -setting
and achievement concerns the level of difficulty of the goals which an

individual sets for himself.

There seems to be a direct, postive cor-

relation between the difficulty of the goal which an individual sets
and his achievement with respect to that task.

Even in cases where

the goal is set an an unreasonably difficult and unattainable level,

achievement is superior to conditions in which specific goals are set
at more realistic and attainable levels.

Thus, high levels of pro-

ductivity and achievement can be elicited with difficult, challenging
goals.

However, if an individual consistently sets goals which exceed

his capacity to succeed, his sense of satisfaction with, and liking
for. the task is likely to diminish.

His disatisfaction or dislike is

liable to lead to apathy and to discouragement.

Therefore, some com-

promise with task difficulty must be made in order to optimize both
achievement and satisfaction.

On this basis, it is recommended that

individuals be educated to set goals of moderate risk and difficulty,
so that both the sense of advance into novelty and the experience of

satisfaction in this process can be maintained.
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(n)

The Specificity of Goal-Setting and Its
Effects upon Task In-

terest and Attitude.

In three different studies, Locke has
succeeded

in demonstrating that goals which are set
with respect to a certain

activity causally affect the level of interest or
involvement the subject will develop with respect to that task.

influence is exerted is somewhat complex.

The way in which this

However, the general trend

seems to indicate that specific performance goals enhance
interest in
the task much more effectively than instances wherein the
subject has

no specific goal.

Moreover, the effects of goals on interest seem to

grow with the length of the task and/or the length of the time period.
In one study (Bryan and Locke, 1967), two groups of subjects who were

initially different in the degree of motivation they brought to the

task were given different goal instructions.

The purpose of the study

was to investigate the effect of setting specific goals on the performance and attitudes of low motivation subjects as compared to the per-

formance and attitudes of high motivation subjects who were told only
to do their best.

Twelve subjects were selected after a pre-test.

Six of the

subjects had uniformly low performance slopes on the pre-test and low
scores on the attitudes scales.

"specific goal condition."

These subjects were placed in the

The other subjects had uniformly high

scores in both performance and attitudes on the pre-test and were

placed in the "do best" or "non-specific goal condition."

The task

was simple addition; one page of addition problems for each trial
period.

The trial periods were short at first, 15 seconds, but gradu-

ally they increased to 32 minutes in length.

There were 12 trials in
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in all.

Between each page of problems was a page
consisting of four

attitude scales:

(1)

interest -order; (2) degree of task focus,
i.e.,

percentage of time focused on the task;

(3)

intensity of task focus;

and (4) the degree of total effort exerted during
the trial.

The

subjects filled in these attitude scales following
each trial.
The subjects who initially scored low on the
pre-test for

motivation operating under the specific goal condition,
raised their
performance levels and developed more positive attitudes towards
the
task.

The group who scored high on the initial motivation pre-test

under the non-specific goal condition showed little performance increase and developed less favorable attitudes towards the task.

When

graphed, the scores for each of the measures of the two groups showed

convergence, i.e., the low motivation group "caught up" with the high

motivation group in performance and in task interest.
If this finding is valid, then inducing individuals to set

specific goals will be a more effective means of motivating them to-

wards actualization then if they articulate their intentions in merely

vague terms such as "I'll do what

I

can," or "I'll do my best."

In addition, setting goals can function as an antidote to

boredom.

This has implications for school and industrial situations.

It might be possible to turn to interest and enthusiasm in otherwise

useful but difficult to get involved in activities if the individual
resolves to set a determinant goal with respect to his involvement in
that activity.

Although Locke's work is beset by certain methodological difficulties such as inadequately accounting for and controlling experi-
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mental variables, his findings at the very
least present reasonable
speculations sufficiently sound to warrant
further research.

In ad-

dition, since they are not in contradiction
to the evidence of immediate experience, we tentatively accept them.

3.2.2

THE PROCESS OF GOAL-SETTING AND ITS
RELATION TO LEARNING COMPETENCE
The key dynamic underlying learning competence
depends upon

the reciprocal processes of differentiating and
integrating experience.

Goal -setting mediates and facilitates the differentiation
of experi-

ence in two ways:

(1)

It involves differentiating one's future by

bringing into clear figure the alternative possibilities with which
one is faced and formulating a determinant predisposition with respect
to these various possibilities;

(2)

Once a goal has been decided

upon, it now becomes possible to differentiate a complex mass of

immediate experience in terms of its particular relevance to the

adopted goal.
For example, one might distinguish a particular occasion of

experience in terns of whether or not it facilitates reaching a goal.
Thus, it introduces a dimension of importance into one's consideration

of data, providing a criterial basis for selective attention.

In fact,

it has been suggested that one important way in which setting specific

goals improves performance on a task is by aiding the subject to sel-

ectively direct his attention toward the relevant attributes or parameters in the problem situation (Ryan, 1970).
In addition, goal -setting also represents a mode of in-

tegrating or structuring experience around some purpose or intention.
Recall that one phase in the process of goal -setting requires the
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individual to integrate the feasible alternatives
stretching before

him into a coherent plan of action.

Moreover, once a person has con-

structed a goal, he can link and tie together
otherwise diverse or

disparate elements of experience in terms of their
interrelation to
the higher order purpose or intention.

Such patterns of interrelation

give these elements meaning.
The basic position taken here is that man is a purposive
being, and because goal -setting represents a primary means by which

his purpose is expressed

in concrete experience, intentions and goals

serve as both differentiating and integrating agents of psycho-motor,

perceptual, cognitive, and affective levels of experience.
tion,

In addi-

goal -setting is an important means by which these various po-

tentialities are differentiated and integrated with respect to the

various ontological levels of the organism's environment, i.e.,
physical, social, and unknown.
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3.3

3.3.1

DEVELOPMENTAL STRUCTURE

APPETITIONS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF GOALS
Insofar as human life can be regarded as a
process of con-

tinual unfoldment and transformation, any meaningful
description of the
goal- setting process must be based upon an adequate
grasp of its onto-

genetic evolution.

Such a developmental approach requires that one

trace from the beginnings of life, the very first manifestations
of

purposive

or intentional behavior.

two crucial questions:

(1)

At that point, we must confront

Since it is obvious that the mature form

of the goal-setting process, replete with elaborate symbolized plans
and objectives, is not manifest in infancy and early childhood, what

parameters do we take as the ontogenetic precursors to the fully de-

veloped process?

(2)

What is the nature of the transitions which in-

termediate the crude early forms of intentional activity and the mature
goal -setting process?

This is where the speculative value of an adequate meta-

physical foundation becomes very clear.

The function of philosophy

is to provide a coherent unified system of ideas through which we can

interpret the welter of our individual and collective experience.

One

of the aims of such a system is to generate speculation about the in-

terrelation and causal relations existing in the universe.

It then

remains for science to test and evaluate the adequacy of these speculations, and make them accountable to experience.

Thus, we turn to

the philosophical foundation upon which our conceptualization of the

goal-setting process is built, to derive the primary qualites which
characterize its genetic development.

In this particular case, the
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fundamental notion, derived from Whitehead's
philosophic scheme in our

formulation of goal-setting, is that of "appetition."
to

Appetition refers

the mental awareness of some unrealized goal
condition coupled

with an immediate physical feeling of the urge
towards realization
of the goal.

By means of appetition the organism directs its
cre-

ativity so as to procure in the future, the fulfillment
in actuality of some ideal or potent ialiety.
is hunger or thirst.

An example on the physical level

There is a physical feeling associated with an

urge towards a future realization of some fact or condition such as
drinking water or eating food, a change which will involve the absorption of new elements into the constitution of the organism.

Eisendrath (1971) points out how appetition may be exemplified by
aggression, a process which may be set in motion by an insult.

One of the factors of anger is a greater than
normal supply of adrenaline in the bloosdtream.
The idea, or insult, has here caused a somatic
change. An angry man may also strike out with
his fists. Such a motion changes the environment
supplying data for that man.
In this case, it
may put his fist in contact with another man’s
jaw
(Eisendrath, 1971, p. 104).
In brief, the developmental antecedents of goal -setting

reside in the basic or primary appetitions of the human infant.

These

appetitions are most commonly expressed through primitive assertions
of desire and assertions of aversion.
It has often been assumed that the first forms of appetition

that emerge in infancy are those connected with simple biological needs,

but the evidence is now somewhat at variance with this.

Very early

in life, almost immediately after birth, the child manifests need
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tendencies of sorts other than those associated
with biological survival.

A growing number of investigators

(White, 1959; Hunt, 1965;

Ryan, 1970; Buhler, 1968; Berlyne, 1960) have
argued that incongruity,

uncertainty, surprise, contrast- -are also primary needs
and therefore
are attractive rather than repulsive to infants.

As the child matures

through experience, these appetitions are modified, refined,
and extended with the development of perceptual -cognitive abilities.

Thus,

there is a trend of gradual evolution in which the biologically based

function takes on cognitive structuring as it interacts with the en-

vironment

.

The developmental progression of these primary appetitions
in infancy may be regarded in terms of three phases, each of which en-

tails the emergence of some new capability on the part of the organism.

Phase I:

This phase begins at birth or perhaps even before.

Here, the infant's appetitions are relatively undifferentiated and tend
to be concerned with the satisfaction of biological needs or appetites,
i.e.

,

sleep, air, warmth, food, etc.

themselves are unspecific.

This is not to say that the needs

Rather, the various expressions of activity

which the infant associates with these needs has not yet become selective.

This would suggest that the appetition, although it may fully

exist in terms of a physical feeling that indicates an incongruity

between the present and some unrealized condition necessary or desirable for survival has not yet acquired a conceptual dimension.
that part of appetition with which the child is

bom

Thus,

includes simply

the physical feeling or urge towards some fulfillment.

Gradually, a

conceptual component emerges which explicitly indicates the unrealized
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condition toward which the physical feeling
refers.

With the emergence

of this conceptual dimension, the focus
of consciousness becomes intentional, i.e.

,

the organism's awareness of the present
becomes par-

tially defined in teims of his awareness
of the unrealized conditions

toward which he aspires
Phase

2:

As the child approaches the age of six to ten

months after birth, many of his appetitions, along with
their respective modes of expressive assertion, have become differentiated.

Even

before this time, the child's crying and other vocalizations
show
regular variations according to the kinds of needs he feels.

For

example, every parent knows the difference between a cry indicating

distress and a cry which indicates crankiness, or a cry of fear or
a cry associated with rage.

Although these differentiations point to

the beginning of symbolic representation of appetitions, they remain

primarily on the level of simple expression.
Phase 3:

At approximately one year, not only do appetitions

and their associated expressions continue to become differentiated,

they also become symbolized in language.

The advent of this capacity

to symbolize appetitions is significant because it greatly extends the

child's power to determine his future and to bring this sense of future
to bear on his current development.

For example, since he is now

able to systematically manipulate and behave with respect to conditions which are not physically present, the child can weigh alter-

natives without having to experience them beforehand.

In additon,

symbolizing appetitions enables a child to formulate an intention, the
fulfillment of which will occur at a remote point in time and space.
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Moreover, the capacity to conceive of
possibilities is almost limitless.
For instance, he may express a desire for
something, the fulfillment of

which rests upon the prior fulfillment of another
unrealized condition.
There is yet another element which seems to emerge
parallel

with these phases; the emerging awareness of personal
causation- -the
child’s tendency to see himself as a causal agent in his
experience.
This awareness of causality accrues from the traces of a child's
first

interactions with his environment.

It depends not only upon mere

motor activity but also on "reafferent" stimulation or feedback, i.e.,
a perceptual experience which indicates the results effected by this

interaction.

This sense of personal causation is absolutely essential

if the fchild is to begin structuring his future in active self-deter-

mined terms.

Without it, he has no basis for developing the plans and

strategies necessary to fulfill his purposes.
3.3.2

SUMMARY
Current speculations on the developmental structure of goal-

setting trace its origins to very fundamental, perhaps innate, pri-

mary appetitions.

Such appetitions are the basis of novelty and

advance in the human organism.

As the individual's potentialities un-

fold through successive occasions of experience, these appetitions

undergo extension and transformation in three distinct but interrelated
directions; (1) they progress from simple to complex, i.e., highly dif-

ferentiated and integrated aims;
eral concerns;

(3)

more remote goals.

(2)

they advance from specific to gen-

they progress from very immediate to longer-range, and
The relatively restrictive tendency to respond only

to appetitions which are directly present is supplanted by an increasing propensity to symbolically represent appetitions and the capacity
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to respond as fully to the symbols as
to that which they originally

represent.

The functional qualities of symbolic
representation dra-

matically extend the individual’s capacity to
anticipate and control
his future.

3 4
.

EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The present statement of educational objectives is
derived

from both the expanded description of the various phases in
the sequence of the goal-setting process and the developmental progressions

outlined in the previous section.

Please keep in mind that these ob-

jectives are stated from the learner’s frame of reference.
a.

To develop the ability to turn one’s attention toward

the realm of unrealized possibilities in the future.
b.

To differentiate into clear figure the alternative

possibilities which lie before one, i.e., to articulate as clearly as

possible a set of possibilities with which one is faced.
c.

To project or fantasize the consequences which the

various possibilities hold for one’s development, and to eliminate
those whose negative consequences for one’s greater purpose or aim.
In other words, to assess and evaluate the feasibility of the various

courses of action.

This requires the learner to be able to anticipate

prerequisites and consequences connected with the particular possibility.
d.

To determine the priorities of the remaining feasible al-

ternatives with reference to one’s ultimate concerns or purpose.
e.

action.

To integrate these alternatives into a coherent plan of

This process requires differentiating the larger, complex

goals into component sub-goals, structuring these sub-goals so as to
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optimize attainment of one's purpose.
Hie three developmental progressions
which interrelate with
the above scheme of objectives are:
(1) Jo intensify or increase the degree of differentiation
and integration of the goals envisioned by
the learner
Not only does this refer to the ability to
formulate
and conceptualize long-range, elaborate life-goals,
but
also includes, (a) the abilities to discern and
articulate the differences which separate one's present
condition
from the goal being entertained, and (b) to determine
the sequence of actions that forms the process which
must transpire in order to actualize the goal or poH
tential.

To develop the capacity to adequately symbolize one's
(2)
goals and intentions. (Note: Language is not the only
mode of symbolization available to the child for this
purpose.)
3.5

3.5.1

IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE
AND PROTOTYPICAL LEARNING EXPERIENCES

GENERAL COMMENTS

An impressive volume of research summarized by both Hunt
(1965)

,

and White (1959) point out the crucial role of early environ-

ment in the development of intrinsic (purposive) motivation.

If there

is any clear directive that can be extracted from this research it is

that a neonate's environment should be rich in contrasts, complexity,
change, and order or regularity.

But these attributes in themselves

are not sufficient to foster the growth of intentional behavior.

The

child must also be able to actively interrelate with his environment,
to causally effect changes in his world and to receive re afferent feed-

back which reflects the consequences of his interaction.

The first

suggestion thus concerns the general quality and arrangement of the
learner's environment.
A.

The child should be provided, and encouraged to play, with
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plastic materials; materials which he
in some way.

beads, etc.

can mold, shape, build or change

Such materials include blocks, clay,
paints, typewriter,

Objects which are relatively impervious to
change or mo-

tion such as books, tables, pictures, etc.,
do not allow the child to

experiment with his causal, creative powers as
extensively.
3 . 5.2

LEARNING EXPERIENCE
Purpose:

I.

To assist the learner to turn his attention toward

the future and begin thinking in advance of his future
actions, i.e., to

begin differentiating and structuring his future.
Procedure:

Initially the child should be allowed to experi-

ment and familiarize himself with the materials, improvise on his own,
and begin to explore some of the possibilities and limitations for ef-

fecting change or creativity within his environment.

If the child is

having difficulty visualizing possibilities on his own, the teacher

may stimulate the child's speculation through leading questions, or, if
this does not work, the teacher herself may judiciously suggest some

possibilities.

At some point, when the child indicates that his explora-

tion has resulted in a number of discoveries, the teacher might begin

asking the child what he intends to do, or what he wants to do.

The

idea here is to get the child to express in however tentative or primi-

tive terms he might, some design relating to his future which goes be-

yond a merely random, impulsively-based activity.
Sometimes a child might find it difficult to generate such a
design.

In this case, the teacher should try to refrain from directly

suggesting a plan- -rather, the emphasis should be on helping the child
enact the process himself of seeking out ideas from his environment,
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and deciding from among those possibilities
he has assembled, which

one will be the basis of his goal.

With this im mind, the teacher may

take a magazine or book of pictures, sit down with
the child and page

through it, helping the child to think in terms of
possible subjects
or themes for a project; perhaps a dance, a painting or
sculpture.

The role of the teacher here is to stimulate the child's

consideration of the realm of possibilities (the potential environment)
and to extend his natural tendencies toward imagination beyond the
present, and to help him differentiate clearly what his possibilities
are.

3.5.2

LEARNING EXPERIENCE II
This experience presupposes the student has successfully

negotiated the process contained in Learning Experience
Purpose:

I.

To differentiate the stages and processes involved

in achieving one's goal.

Procedure:

Once a child has identified and chosen a defi-

nite goal (let us assume for the moment that his goal is to create a
collage)

,

the next step is to determine the materials or actions to

which he must attend in order to go about creating the collage.

The

teacher's intervention here might consist of encouraging or alerting
the child to actively consider the means necessary for the achievement

of his goal, i.e., paper, paste, paint, pictures, water, etc.

The

obvious way of doing this is, of course, for the teacher to begin

asking questions after the child has made a decision:

"What do we

need to do first?" or "Which things do we need in order to begin?"
Or, if the materials are on hand she might ask, "Do we have everything
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we need here?”

As the child responds, he should be
encouraged to list

the items or steps for his project on a
piece of paper.

write, then the teacher herself may

If he cannot

write down what he says.

Prefer-

ably the list would reflect the order of
priorities and sequence in

which the plan will actually be implemented.

Then, the child can

use the list as the basis for his subsequent activity,
checking each
item off as it is taken care of.
purpose,

a)

The list thus serves a two- fold

it serves as a helpful reminder of the child's plans,

and b) if the child discovers that his original plan is somehow
inadequate, he has a record which enables him to immediately pinpoint
the specific deficiency against the needs of the situation.

This sort

of feedback is a useful device for correcting and refining one's goal-

setting and planning skills.

Once the process of assembling or pre-

paring materials is finished and the project is completed, both the
teacher and the student should discuss how effective the planning

process was, e.g., was there enough time to do everything?

Was the

plan flexible enough to allow for un- anticipated ideas or occurrences?
Did we forget an important step or ingredient?

Following the dis-

cussion, the child should summarize the evaluation in his notebook, or
if the child cannot write, the teacher may write the summary from the

child's dictation.

Thus a permanent retord of the child's progress

is easily accessible to the teacher who seeks to evaluate the effective-

ness of learning experiences as they bear upon the child's performance.
3.5.5

LEARNING EXPERIENCE III
Purpose:

To conceive of the realm of alternative possibili-

ties in one's future, to differentiate and integrate these into a

178

coherent plan of action.
Procedure:

At the beginning of each day or class session,

the student begins by taking a few minutes to
write his goals and

plans for the coming day.

This list of goals then becomes the guiding

standard for the child's use of time and his scheduling
of activities.

At the end of the day, he compares his achievements against
his original
intentions in writing.

Besides fostering the habit of planning one's

future, this exercise also helps the child to learn to set realistic
goals.

The child has clear evidence as to how well he fulfills his

intentions, whether the goal is unreasonably high, or whether it was
too easy.

Students in the class can be trained by the teachers to give

each other valuable feedback.

The thrust of this feedback might be to

articulate any dissonance between what a child is doing and what his
stated goals and intentions are.

In addition, such discussions might

include ways in which goals or plans could have been improved.

At a later time, this experience might be extended to include
longer-range planning, such as scheduling a week, a month, or perhaps

even a semester.

Naturally, such complex goal -setting presupposes

that the student has been successful in planning smaller and simpler

units of time and activity.

However, the same principles of stating

and symbolizing goals, and utilizing feedback apply here as they do
in the simpler conditions.

As noted earlier, a number of studies have indicated a positive correlation between the level of performance attempted, i.e., the

difficulty of the goal, and one's level of performance on the task,
even in cases where the goal is beyond the possibility of achievement.
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In the latter situation, although
achievement will be maximized, the

child’s subjective experience is one of failure.

If such experiences

are both frequent and intense, the result
can be a loss of self-confi-

dence, a withdrawing from potentially challenging
situations and a general anxiety associated with facing the future.

Keeping in mind both

the need for success and the need for challenge, the
teacher should

encourage and stimulate the child to set goals which will extend
his

capabilities but will also avoid experiences of traumatic failure.

Occasional failure in small degree can, on the other hand, refine the
goal-setting process and cultivate individual stamina.
3.5.5

LEARNING EXPERIENCE IV
Purpose:

Procedure:

To express and symbolize one's goal.

The child writes a story, or paints a picture

portraying the intended or goal situation towards which he aspires.

When completed, the child shares this expression with the teacher and
other children in order to reinforce its meaning for him.

The painting

or story should then become relatively visiable and a permanent part of
the child's environment, serving both as an incentive and as a reminder

of the goal he has set and later on, after he has attained the goal, a

symbol of his achievement.
3.5.6

A NOTE ON MODELING.

The child begins very early in life to look

for a model to provide directives which he can follow.

From imitation

of sounds and movements, to the imitation of adult actions and makebelieve play, children are continually relating themselves to the adults
they observe.

Buhler and Kolberg, among others, have demonstrated that

modeling and identification are important sources of goals to the child
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as well as an important means by which
he acquires knowledge and skills

of the goal -setting process.

Thus it almost goes without saying that

the teacher herself must exemplify clearly
and consistently the prin-

ciples of competent goal-setting in her own
activities.
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4.1

4.1.1

WILL:

ELABORATE DESCRIPTION

A HISTORICAL DEFINITION

Despite the moratorium on the study of
inner experience which
has prevailed over American experimental
psychology for the past 40

years, the will has remained a topic of
discourse among many psycho-

analysts (Rank, Farber and Sullivan to
mention a few)

,

existentialists

(May), and the third- force psychologists
(Frankl and Maslow in particular)

.

These writers have kept alive and drawn heavily from
a rich

tradition in western thought that extends back to Plotinius.
Bourke

s

Vernon

classic survey (1964) identifies ten major conceptions of

will that have figured prominently in western philosophy from
ancient
times up to the present.

From among these various meanings, he attempts

a synthetic definition that embodies a core meaning for the idea
of will

Willing is that psychic activity of man whereby he
tends toward or away from certain objectives reflectively adopted, whereby he acts with some spontaneity or self- initiative and whereby he approves or
loves what he deems good and disapproves or hates
what he deems not good (Bourke, 1964, p. 235).
In addition, Bourke cites a common pattern running through

these historically diverse conceptions.
five steps or successive phases:

Step

initial feeling tendencies or impulses.

This pattern is expressed as
I

consists of certain unresolved
Step II involves the initiation

of personal effort to resolve these tendencies in terms of some reflec-

tively adopted purpose or value.

In Step III the resolving process

is terminated with the yield of a decision or choice, while Step IV is

the controlled execution of the decision in consciously directed activity.

Finally, Step V includes an evaluative relection upon the
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consequences of the entire process.

As can be seen, this descriptive

definition subsumes a very large category of
phenomena and indeed parallels much of the present theory.

However, the tern will, to be deveoped

in the following pages, refers to a specific
operation that could be

classified within Bourke's Step IV- -the expression of
an intention in
coherent activity.

Although this definition provides a starting point,

it furnishes no insight into the nature of
the process itself.

But

this is understandable since Bourke is a historian, not a
psychologist,

and his attempt is simply to give a descriptive summary of the
numerous

interpretations of will that have evolved through centuries of philosophical speculation.
4.1.2

THE WILL IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
(A)

William James.

The study of the will in

modem

psy-

chology received its most comprehensive expression in the work of

William James.
26)

His treatise on will in Principles (James, Vol. II, Ch.

remains a classic, yet to be equaled in more recent literature.

Although himself not heavily involved in laboratory experiments, James
was in constant touch with the results of such research.

both comprehensive and penetrating.

His survey is

Another important factor not to

be underestimated, is that James was one of the most gifted intro-

spectionists in the history of western thought- -a gift which enabled

him to articulate some of the most elusive aspects of direct experience.
Some of James’ ideas on the will were introduced in an

earlier chapter, but the emphasis here will be somewhat different.
However, some repetition may be unavoidable.
James begins his account with what he considers to be the
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most elementary instance of will, ideo-motor
action.

Whenever movement follows unhesitatingly and
immediately
the notion of it in the mind, we have ideo-motor
action.
We are aware of nothing between the conception
and the
execution ... We think the act and it is done; and
that
11 th
ntr ° SpeCti0n tells us of the matter (James,
1890
^ 22 ^
For James, ideo-motor action is far from an indicental,
isolated curiosity of experience; it is the fundamental process
"un-

disguised by complications" and as such is the key to understanding the
entire phenomena of volition.

Examples of ideo-motor action permeate

everyday life; walking, talking, driving, writing; it is rare that any
of these activities "demand a distinct impulse of will."

They most

often occur on the heels of the mere intention.
The determining condition of ideo-motor action, according
to James, is "The absence of any conflicting notion in the mind [Ibid.,
p.

523] ."

He points out that the experience of ideo-motor action is

frequently not self-evident because, "The mind entertains so many ideas

which do not result in action [ibid., p. 527]."
think many things but not do them.

That is, one can

This is so because other ideas co-

present with the original rob it of its impulsive power.

Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree
the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it
in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from doing
so by an antagonistic representation simultaneously in
(ibid., p. 526).
the mind
Through this transparent statement, one can glean a metaphysical kinship of James' psychology of will with the principles of
organismic philosophy.

Ideas are not inert elements forever marooned

in a vacuous world of abstraction, and denied intercourse with the
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body.

Consciousness is itself "impulsive," directional
and accompanied

by intensity.
We d° not have a sensation or a thought and
then have to
add something dynamic to get a movement.
Our sensations
ana thoughts are hut cross-sections as it were
,
of cur,
rents whose essential consequence is motion.
The popular notion that mere consciousness as such is
not essentially
a forerunner of activity, that the latter must
result from
some super-added will-force.
is not the norm
(Ibid.).
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

James points out that the popular notion that "mere
conscious-

ness as such is not essentially a forerunner

of activity, that the

latter must result from some super-added will-force," is misleading.

Such cases of "will with effort" he explains, are instances where the

main idea is nullified by antagonistic thoughts.

When the competing

tendency is removed "We feel as if an inward spring were let loose
and this is the additional impulse or fiat upon which the act effec-

tively succeeds [ibid.

,

p.

527]

."

The feeling of deliberation or effort

of willing associated with an act comes in when the neutralization of
the antagonistic and inhibiting idea is required.

The emphasis in the above quote is to draw attention to

another parallel with the organismic position developed in Chapter One;

not only are such ideas vectoral or impulsive, they are cross-sections
or abstractions of a process; "the mental experience of forms," poten-

tial given reality in the process of expression.

Thus, the integral

relationship between mind and body is asserted yet the dipolar nature

of experience (mental and physical) is also recognized.
Ideo-motor action is the kingpin of James' theory and accounts for how ideas function as causal agents in the world.

But in

order for this interpretation to be at all meaningful, it must say
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something about the nature of these efficacious
ideas; how they arise,

where they come from, and what determines their
intensity.
As a matter of fact, James delves rather
extensively into

this problem and forages through an impressive
amount of experimental

literature to make his point.

The "idea" from which action follows is

some "image" or representation (visual, auditory,
tactile) of the act
itself.

These representations are presumably traces left in the mem-

ory, synthesized from previous occasions of movement:

When we consciously will a certain act, a mental conception made up of mental images of these sensations defining
which special act it is, must be there
(Ibid., 492).
This answers the question of "what one wills."

movement presupposes consciousness of the action.

Voluntary

The ability to choose

to act one way instead of another first requires one to be able to dis-

criminate between the two modes of action before actually performing
the specific movements.

Thus, there must be some mental representation

analagous to each action which becomes the basis of discrimination and
the object of choice.

James argues that these representations involve,

among other things, kinesthetic schema,

My thesis is that in perfectly simple voluntary acts,
there is nothing else in the mind but the kinesthetic
idea, of what the act is to be (ibid. p. 493).
,

Elsewhere, he makes a distinction between two kinds of kin-

esthetic (by which he really means sensorial) impressions- -"remote"
ones generated by visual, auditory, distal tactile stimulation, and

"resident" ones, generated by reafferent kinesthetic and haptic cues

originating in muscles, joints, the vestibular system, etc.

Both resi-

dent and remote images can function as the impelling mental cue.
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However, there is a developmental trend.

In the initial

stages of learning a complex action, the
’’resident’' cues predominate

one’s awareness but as the sequence of movements
is practiced and mastered, these resident or proximal cues slip away
and the controlling

ideas become more remote (or distal)

which the movement is to attain.’’

;

”What interests us are the ends

An example of this progression can

be seen in learning to play a piece of music on the flute.

The inex-

perienced learner must focus his attention on producing the proper
fingering for each individual note.

Following this, he must concen-

trate on producing the correct breath pressure at the proper angle.
Later, individual scales must be articulated with smooth transition,

vibrato must be added, etc.

As the learner advances through each

successive step, he is less concerned and less preoccupied with the
immediate proximal requirements of performing and more concerned with
the remote ideal or image of style and interpretation.

In fact, if

attention is deliberately shifted to these particulars, they become
a tremendous encumberance to performance.

Here, a parallel will be recognized with Polanyi’s model

of tacit integration, presented in Chapter Two, Section
59.

2. 1.2. 3,

p.

Tacit integration was used to describe the hierarchical struc-

ture of conscious attention consisting of an intentional focal level

of awareness in turn supported by the coordination of a number of subsidiary levels of awareness.

In the present case, the same relation

is exhibited between resident versus remote images.

The remote image

corresponds to the focal idea or intentional level of awareness, while
the resident cues correspond with the subsidiary awareness of the
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particulars underlying a focal (remote) aim.

Consequently, the control-

ling representation, the sensorial image
which is efficacious in Jean-

Pierre Rampal when he picks up his flute and
begins playing a Faure "Berceuse," will be considerably more distal or remote
than resident. Whereas the focus of my attention (I'm not a flutist)
will be more taken by

the resident cues, the subsidiaries, of performing
the piece.

Although James regards ."attention to the idea" as the pri-

mary process of will, there is a second and distinct phenomenon
which
he describes as the "express consent to the reality of what is
attended
to."

It is difficult to go beyond this description with further
analy-

ses except to say, perhaps, that it refers to the intensity with which

an idea is felt.

Obviously, it is difficult to deny the reality of

something which one feels strongly, and one is also much more likely to
act on an intensely felt thought or impulse.

It is this dimension of

intensity which becomes particularly important in what James calls
"will with effort."

Earlier, it was pointed out that many ideas one

entertains never result in action because they are neutralized by com-

peting tendencies.

Yet consciousness is extremely complex, presenting

many motives simultaneously.

Human beings are faced daily with the

task of resolving conflicting tendencies or interests and acting in one

way versus another.
dominates.

This means that at some point one idea finally pre-

James accounts for this fact by saying that one may choose

to emphasize and nurture the idea by keeping one’s attention focused

on it and calling up the associated kinesthetic images.

As the idea

is intensified in this manner, it gradually comes to predominate the

conscious field and then ideo-motor action follows.
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The above also indicates another
important aspect of James’
theory; that the volitional process
lies entirely in mentality.

This

author can but yield in deference to James'
illustrious prose, "The

whole drama is a mental drama.

.

.

If

I

may use the word idea

will say that it is an idea to which our will
applies itself.

....
.

.

I

Consent

to the idea's undivided presence, this is
effort's sole achievement.
Its only function is to get this feeling of
consent into the mind

[Ibid., p. 568]."

Thus, volition is "primarily a relation not between

our Self and extra-mental matter [as a dualistic doctrine
would imply]
but between our Self and our own states of mind."

,

Thus, the psychology

of volition ends with the stabilization of the mind as the dominant
object of consciousness- -"The willing terminates with the prevalence of
the idea [ibid., p. 560]."
(B)

William McDougall.

Writing seme 18 years after James,

William McDougall was one of the last experimental psychologists to
hold a major interest in the problem of volition, at a time when psychology was being swept up on the behavior ist bandwagon.

McDougall re-

mained an outspoken critic until his death, against the behaviorists
attempt to explain human conduct entirely in terms of mechanistic
principles.

In its place, he offered an alternative; a full-fledged

experimental psychology, replete with methodology in which the dynamics
of purpose and will played a central role.

A comprehensive review and

critique of McDougall 's psychology falls beyond the scope of this effort
and must await another time.

Comments here will be restricted to his

theoretical statements on will and volition.

McDougall 's theory of volition can be seen as a natural
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extension of James' pioneering efforts on
this subject.

For one, he

accepted James' adaptation of the ideo-motor
theory as the baseline
case of willing and hence concurred that
the essential process of will
is maintaining the continuance of an idea
or feeling in the foreground

of consciousness.

Secondly, he corroborated James' account of "will

with effort" as a complex case of conation wherein
one or more conflicting tendencies must be overcome for the main idea
to predominate.

McDougall regarded volition as a special foim of complex
conation in

which the effort of the will somehow supports or reinforces the
weaker
motive, enabling it to prevail over an initially more impulsive
(but

ultimately less valued) goal.

(McDougall, 1908, p. 199).

It was in

explaining the higher levels of will that McDougall went beyond James.

Accepting that the effort of willing boils down to the effort
of attending to an elusive idea, McDougall asks how the attention holds
an idea at the focus of consciousness to the exclusion of rival ideas.
James says that it is achieved by "suppressing or inhibiting the rival
ideas that tend to exclude it [the original idea]

idea remains by virtue of its own intensity.

,"

while the favored

(Ibid.).

Hence, volition

is seen as a primarily negative function, an inhibition of irrelevant

and alien propositions.

McDougall takes issue with this interpretation.

One must yet explain how the inhibition is effected.

The view of voli-

tion as a fundamentally inhibitive operation, he feels, is misconceived.
That inhibition does occur, however, McDougall accepts as a plain fact.
His argument is that inhibition is a "secondary collateral result" of
the primary process, which is a reinforcement (not operant) of the idea

one chooses to will.

In support of this thesis McDougall points out
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that there are no physiological data
showing any evidence of inhibitory

impulses being sent out by the central
nervous system to the voluntary

muscles.

These same studies demonstrate instead
that control is achieved

either by innervating antagonistic muscles,
or by directing attention
elsewhere
By concentrating the energy of the mind and nervous
system
in one direction we withdraw it from, or prevent
its flowing in any other direction
(Ibid., p. 211).
Since the time of McDougall's writing, a great deal
more has

been discovered about the neuro -physiology of inhibition
and there is

now some evidence which suggests the direct inhibition of neural
activit y

be a fact.

(Altman, 1966).

However, it has also been shown

that such inhibition always occurs as a reciprocal effect of activity

elsewhere.

Thus, McDougall's basic hypothesis, that inhibition is a

secondary by-product, still stands.
This formulation has the advantage of parsimony because it
implies that the process underlying the self- initiation of activity also

underlies the self-restraint of action.

In the latter case, the in-

dividual inhibits an idea, not by brute repression, but by voluntarily
accentuating an alternate idea.

Such an interpretation is also con-

sistent with a large body of clinical evidence (Frankl, 1969; Farber,
1964; May, 1969), and clearly holds some very definite educational im-

plications.

(See sub-section

in this chapter.)

Another problem taken up in McDougall's analysis of volition,

which exceeds the work of James, is the relation between character and
will.

McDougall is adamant in pointing out that the mere presence of

ideals alone is insufficient to realize the ideal; especially when the
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intensity of an abstract ideal is often relatively
weak in comparison

with more immediate appetitions.

If the more concrete, but in the long

run, less valued desire (going to sleep) compels
one's attention, what

prevents it from completely smothering the weaker but
ultimately more

valued ideal?

How does the initially less intense goal

itial foothold in the conscious field to begin with, and

does it derive its finally over-riding intensity?

1)

get its in-

from where

2)

For example, Grinker

and Speigel (1945) cite numerous cases of soldiers going into battle

fearing for their own lives, experiencing anxiety and whose immediate

reaction is to remain in safety.

Yet, voluntarily these men move into

situations of great personal danger and knowingly risk their lives.
The impulse to avoid danger and the intense anxiety of battle is in-

itially overpowering, yet in the end, this tendency is over-ridden by

more abstract, remote ideals such as "serving one's country," and fulfilling a personal commitment in line with one's self-image.

McDougall would probably explain that such "Action taken
against the strongest desire" is made possible by the systematic or-

ganization of values and ideals within the personality structure.
writes,
The essential mark of volition- -that which distinguishes
it from simple desires, or simple conflict of desires-is that the personality as a whole, or central feature
.is
or nucleus of the personality, the man himself.
thrown upon the side of the weaker motive. ... In the
typical case of volition a man’s self, in some peculiarly intimate sense of the word self, is thrown
upon the side of the motive that is made to prevail.
The empirical self, the idea of his self that each
man entertains, plays an essential part in volition
(McDougall, 1908, pp. 206-207).
.

He
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This selection points to the crucial role
of self-image, in
the exercise of volition.

For McDougall, the structure of self-identity

consisted of a purposive hierarchy of emotion,
attitudes and values.
In another passage, he defines the "mind" of
any organism as "The sum

of the enduring conditions of its purposive activities
[In Boden, 1972,
p.

219]."

This led quite naturally to his remarkable observation that

what is called the self is "always an ideal rather than an
accomplished
fact," an ideal that is, in various degrees, approximated but never
attained.

(McDougall, 1908, p. 212).

The ideal of the self was called

by McDougall, "the sentiment of self-regard" and presumably functioned as
a central integrating element presiding over the individual's system of

sentiments.

The term sentiment was first used by A. F. Shand to describe

"emotional habits," but McDougall modified and expanded the usage considerably, defining it as,
.a system in which a cognitive disposition is linked
with one or more emotional or affective and conative
dispositions to form a structural unit that functions
as one whole system
(In Boden, 1972).
.

.

Whereas emotions and thoughts are passing phases, a sentiment

was seen to be a relatively enduring structure within the total personality.

This conception bears close resemblance to a recent

of "value."

(Jordan and Streets, 1972).

modem usage

In these terms, the sentiment

of self-regard corresponds to one's structural and functional sense
of personal identity, those values which involve the sense of self.

The

mas ter -sentiment derives its power because it is centered on the idea of
self, "An object perpetually present from which it is impossible to be

separated, one which is inevitably brought to mind in all situations,"
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especially all situations that call for choice of
goals and decisions
as regards means to the chosen goal

(McDougall, 1908, p. 214).

All this implies that a strong, effective will
requires a
strong, well- integrated sense of identity in which
the ideal of self is

durable and stable.

might read:

Thus, McDougall' s definition, slightly modified,

Volition is the supporting or reinforcing of an intention

hy the cooperation of an impulse excited within the system
of values

associated with the sense of self.
(iii)

Summary.

There are few points on which the theories

of James and McDougall are in disagreement.

It is one of those for-

tunate instances in the history of psychology where the work and efforts

of one great mind are complemented and extended by the labors of another.

McDougall 's extensions of James' fertile, but sometimes unsystematic
theory articulate clearly the crucial role of character in the develop-

ment and function of will.

Although their accounts of the process un-

derlying impulse- inhibition differ, this contrast should not be overemphasized.
It will be recalled, for example, how James argued that the

willed "idea" inhibits competing tendencies by gathering intensity and
building up associative connection.

This explanation is not too far

from McDougall 's thesis that inhibition is a collateral result of reinforcing an alternative impulse.

Although these theories are by no means the only ones ever
advanced, they are probably the most adequate, the most coherent, the

most complete, and the most important to date.

It is worth noting that

both James and McDougall published their theories well over 60 years
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ago (James in 1890, McDougall in 1908).

In view of this judgement,

it is imperative that the basic principles
suggested by these theories

be critically reviewed in the light of more
recent evidence.

Unfortunately, this is not a very simple task since
experi-

mental psychology has avoided any serious study of will
for the past
45 years.

But there are areas of empirical investigation that impinge

upon specific aspects of the willing process; sometimes directly,
as in
the case of the studies on perseverance; and sometimes indirectly,
as
in the case of studies on determining tendencies and preparatory
set.

4.1.3

DETERMININING TENDENCY AND PREPARATORY SET
(SELF- INITIATION)
(i)

Determining Tendency.

The concept of determining ten-

dency was first introduced by Ach and the Wurzburg psychologists in 1905.
In one of their experimental designs, subjects were instructed to add

two numbers which appeared on a screen or find a rhyme for a word which

appeared.

At the time of understanding the task and during the period

preceding the stimulus most subjects were very much aware of the task
and during the period preceding the stimulus most subjects were very

much aware of the task and their intention with respect to it.

However,

when the stimulus actually appeared, many subjects experienced no awareness of the task.

The response came automatically and the subject only

seemed to be aware that the response was correct.

perience of intending was not

Put briefly, the ex-

immediately responsible

for the action.

The term, "determining tendency" was introduced merely as a descriptive
label for this observed fact that intended behavior or activity may be

separated in time from the actual decision and intention.

There are

other examples of this separation in ordinary, everyday activity.

One
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may decide to catch the eight o'clock bus,
go to the bus stop and begin
to read a magazine while waiting.

Then, as the bus arrives, most often

one boards the bus with hardly a thought of
intending the act.
casion,

I

have been asked to take out the garbage while buried
in the

midst of writing a sentence.
that

I

On oc-

At the moment of the request,

will do it, but not just at that moment:

some time later, very suddenly

I

while during the entire operation

find that
I

I

I

may decide

Then during a pause

am taking out the garbage

may be thinking about something en-

tirely unrelated to the task itself.
The point here is that the experience of determining tendency, as something distinct from conscious intention, is an experi-

mentally established fact and it is this observation which, in part,
justifies the treatment of will as a process which can be conceptually

distinguished from goal- setting.

(The distinction must be counter-

balanced with the realization that the two processes are also conceptually
related, i.e.

,

an act of will presupposes at some point, if not immedi-

ately, a prior intention of the act.)
Later, Ach went on to develop a theoretical system and method-

ology for quantifying the strength of the determining tendency.

Although

Ach accepted the associationists' explanation that sequences of actions
and/or of ideas were determined by contiguity (i.e., one idea or act
suggested another if the two had frequently appeared together and the

strength of this tendency was proportional to the frequency of past
conjunctions)

,

he posited that determining tendency was an additional

kind of tendency produced by an "act of will" instead of by repetition
or contiguity.

The postulation of these two different tendencies provided
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Ach with a strategy for measuring the strength
of the determining tendency.

He contrived situations in which the intention
and its deteimined

activity came in conflict with tendencies attributable
to past associations.

The strength of the determining tendency was
measured by the

number of past repetitions of the conflicting activity
that were necessary to produce errors or interfere with the intended response.

To

achieve this condition, Ach would train subjects to respond to
a long
list of paired nonsense syllables of three kinds;

sequences of syllables;

2)

-

mig).

noimal with random

with inverted pairs in which each pair con-

sisted of a syllable and its reverse (tig
(tig

1)

-

git); and 3) rhymed pairs

Ryan summarizes Ach's method as follows:

1.
The subject read lists of paired nonsense syllables
of three kinds:
(a) "normal” with random sequences of
syllables, (b) inverted pairs in which each pair consisted of a syllable and its reverse (mun-num)
(c)
rhymed pairs (mun-tun)
The lists were read over and
over in trochaic meter, so that the pairs of syllables
were grouped, and the subject was instructed to learn
the pairs:
"You should try to hold the syllables in
memory, but without using aids. You should not use
mnemo-technic supports, just read the syllables and
try to retain them (aufzunehmen) ."
,

.

2.
After a certain number of repetitions under the
conditions above, the instructions were changed.
In
one series of repetitions, the subject would be instructed simply to "reproduce," i.e., give the first
word he thought of.
In another series he would be
instructed to invert all words, or to give a rhyme for
In the latter two cases, the determining
all words.
tendency would be in opposition to the associative
tendencies for some words, and in agreement for others.
For example, if the instruction was to rhyme, the subject
had only to give the same syllables he read before for
those pairs which were rhymed in the original practice
For the "normal" pairs, however, and for the intrial.
verted pairs, the subject had to give a new second member of the pair, different from the one originally
In addition to the practiced words, unpracticed.
practiced words were included in this test series.
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By varying the original number of repetitions used
in setting up the ’’associative tendencies,” Ach
found
that he could vary the number of errors and failures
to respond when the determining tendency conflicted
with the association. When a sufficient number of
repetitions had occurred, the subject would give the
originally associated syllable instead of the "intended”
syllable, so the determining tendency was weaker
than the associative tendency.
3.

Attempts to replicate this procedure yielded sporadic results and Kurt Lewin undertook further investigations of Ach's design.

He found that the fr

uency of associative contiguity was by itself

insufficient to induce interference.

Repeating some of Ach's origin-

nal experiments, Lewin' s subjects often experience no difficulty in

asserting the intended behavior over the associatively conditioned
behavior, even after 300 trials.

He then sought to determine the

kinds of conditions under which interference would occur and found
that the critical variable was to establish a trend toward responding
in terms of the original task while the new task is introduced.

Such

would be the case if the instruction were "to rhyme” and the first few
test trials consisted of syllables which had been in "rhyming pairs”

during the practice series.

These items would be followed by a syl-

lable which was formerly not rhymed but inverted in the practice trial.
In response to this syllable the subject is likely to give the old in-

verted associate instead of a rhyme.

Ryan concludes this is because

the order of the test series is such as to shift the nature of the task

from "rhyme” as assigned by the experimenter to "give the old sequence.
Lewin' s results call into question the validity of associa-

tionist principles to explain the interference effect.

His studies sug

stimuli
gest that it is less the specific association of contiguous
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than it is the ’’set” of intention to react to
the data in terms of some
rule or pattern which sets up a conflicting
response tendence.

The con-

flict is latent during the initial trials since the
responses predicated

by both intentions coincide.

The coincidence can subtly change the task

back to the overleamed practice task without any overt
consequences
until an item appears for which the responses diverge.

It is at this

point that the subject is aware of competing tendencies of intentions
toward the situation at hand.
Unfortunately, very little research has been carried out on
this problem of determining tendency during the 50 years intervening

between Lewin’s work and the present.

The only such efforts which

I

am aware of are several studies conducted by a group of Russian psy-

chologists and there is currently only one published in English.

Bzhalava (1963) devised an experiment in which his subjects

experienced great difficulty in voluntarily breaking one "task tendency”
or ’’set” in favor of another.

He assembled 45 subjects, each fluent in

both German and their native Russian, and provided them with lists of
nonsense words which could be pronounced in either German or Russian.
During the practice series, the subjects were trained to read the material with German pronunciation.

During the test sessions, the sub-

jects were told to continue reading in German but to read some words,

chosen in advance by the subject himself, in Russian.

Only

8

per cent

of the participants pronounced the critical word correctly on the first
attempt.

In the other 92 per cent, the pronunication was determined by

the trained predisposition to read German.

Nearly every individual re-

ported and exhibited great difficulty in reading the critical word

200

correctly.

Bzhalava’s own analysis provides little help in
explaining

these interesting results.

He merely says that, 1) the problem boils

down to the substitution of one "set" for another;

2)

this process is

not spontaneous, but must be consciously directed or willed;
and

3)

there is a wide range of individual differences observed in
partici-

pant’s ability to make such substitutions.

But as far as suggesting

how the substitution is accomplished, what the underlying processes
are, he offers no speculation.

Before venturing any speculation here, it seems appropriate to take account of the general findings accrued from the research

on determining tendency:

1)

In cases where a consciously (and earnest-

ly) adopted goal contravenes

a previously established trend, the inten-

tion will often not be spontaneously expressed in action.

2)

In such

circumstances, the individual may experience effort and difficulty in

asserting the intended action over the competing tendency.

On the surface, such evidence appears to contradict the James

McDougall theory of will which relies so centrally on the postulate of
ideo-motor action.

The studies of Ach, Lewin, and Bzhalava demonstrate

rather conclusively that a consciously introspected intention does not

necessarily and automatically lead to action.

Perhaps the "faculty"

psychologists were right after all in asserting "will power" to be a
separate discrete faculty (like vision or memory) existing on its own,
independent of other organismic processes.

But such a conclusion would

be to misread both the empirical facts and the theory.

To begin with, James' conception of ideas goes much deeper

and includes far more than conscious abstraction.

An idea encompasses
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a myriad of subsidiary sensations and
processes which lie beneath the

focal image at the surface of consciousness.

The articulated intention

is thus a somewhat superficial rendition
of the complex, purposive

hierarchy operating within the individual as he
acts toward some goal.

When an intention is actualized, all of these subsidiary
schema are
tacitly coordinated so that mental and physical, efficient
and final
cause are melded into a single unified expression of the
novel, un-

realized form.
In the studies of Ach, Lewin, and Bzhalava, the subjects

approached the altered task with the massive inertia of subsidiary
tendencies associated with the original intention immanent within the

purposive hierarchy.

This intentional predisposition, cumulative from

the past, emerges into the present, evoking anticipations at variance

with the novel and perhaps superficially felt intentional schema.

A

reorientation of each level of process must take place before, so that
any antagonistic ideas or tendencies interfering with the realization
of the new intention are removed.

This readjustment process initially

requires reafferent feedback for the brain to determine the extent
of discrepancy between the motor effects of immanent tendencies and
those effects newly intended.

Without any knowledge of this discrepancy

the extent of the organism's reorientation cannot be accurately anticipated.

An example which illustrates this more clearly is the novice

carpenter who, having hammered a nail with a two-pound hammer, suddenly
changes to a four-pound hammer.

His initial strikes will likely miss

the mark, not because of carelessness, but because the coordination of

subsidiary muscular tendencies have not yet been reoriented to the new
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task.

With repeated experience in making the transition
between harriers,

reafferent feedback becomes unnecessary since the adjustment
can be anti-

cipated before any movement actually occurs.
(ii)

Preparatory Set.

Hich the same interpretation can be

applied to the copious body of data generated by experiments on reaction time.

Measuring the speed with which an organism is able

to respond in some way to a signal was among the very first problems

studied quantitatively by Wundt in his original laboratory and it has
since remained a prominent topic of inquiry.

In the typical reaction-

time experiment, the subject is instructed verbally and prepared by

repetition of the response.

He anticipates only one kind of stimulus

to be presented and has only one kind of response to perform, e.g.,
to press a button when a buzzer sounds.
If the task involves responding quickly to the signals, the

general intention to push the button when the buzzer sounds is not sufficient.

Each time the signal is to come, he also must "get set" to

react, a process so widely observed that it has been given the name,

"preparatory set."

The preparatory set is something apart from the

goal which may pervade the whole situation.

It is almost as if the sub-

ject had to renew or intensify the specific determining tendency before
the stimulus is apprehended and the response made.

In most studies,

the subject is given a "ready signal" just prior to the stimulus, and
if this signal is omitted, the response is always slower even though

the general intention to respond to the signal is still in effect.

One controversial issue surrounding the interpretation of the

preparatory set has to do with the nature of the underlying physiological

203

mechanisms.

Some behavior ists believe the phenomena can
be explained

strictly in terms of muscular tension without assuming
any more complex

processes in the central nervous system.

There is some evidence to

suggest that muscular adjustment is at least partially
involved, but
there is other research which indicates an independent
factor of pre-

paredness in the brain.

Mowrer, Rayman and Bliss (1940) devised an

experiment in which the subject's task was to perform the same reaction for either of two stimuli, one auditory and one visual.

During

the trial, the subject was presented with a series of repeated visual

stimuli followed by a switch to a series of auditory stimuli and vice
versa.

The reaction to the first auditory signal, switching from the

series of visual signals, was markedly slower than either,
sponse to the preceding visual cue, and

auditory cues.

2)

1)

the re-

the response to succeeding

In other words, whenever a switch was made from one

signal to another, the initial reaction to the changed signal was found
to be slower.

Since the motor preparation is identical for both tasks,

Mowrer argues that the slowed reaction to the changed one must be due
to some central (as opposed to peripheral) process.

In an effort to

identify more specifically the conditions responsible for the retarded
reaction, the locus of the signal was changed without changing the sen-

sory modality.

It was found that when the task to respond remains in

a single mode, changing the locus of the stimulus produced no change in

reaction time.

However, when the alerting stimuli are disjunctive

(either visual or auditory)

,

whenever a change occurs

,

the reaction

time increases.

One possible interpretation of these results is that the dif-

ference between the tasks (i.e., responding to different sense
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modalities) is sufficiently large to require different
intentions and

determining tendencies for each reaction even though the
motor patterns
are the same.

On the other hand, when the signals change in location

but remain qualitatively similar and persist in the same
sensory mode,
the contrast is miniscule in comparison.

Thus, the intention and de-

termining tendency need little if any alteration when just the locus

of the signal is changed.

This speculation extends and emphasizes

another dimension of James' original notion of the "image" or repre-

sentation of the act in the mind.

It involves more than just the sub-

sidiary kinesthetic cues and the focal idea of the end-result (pressing the button, etc.).

These cues are only one aspect of the total

situation on which the intention rests.

prehension of the signal.

The other aspect is the ap-

The "idea" in ideo-motor includes the in-

tegration of afferent and efferent operations, the total occasion in

which the organism is functioning.

The idea that is willed

consists of the signal and action apprehended as an integral whole in

which each is defined in terms of the other.
This explanation amounts to a direct repudiation of the as-

sociationistic or stimulus-response paradigm because it means that the
stimulus and response are not independently constituted variables.
as perceived

The signal

is not just a sensation, but an act of seeing

in which both the sensation and the coordinated movement are "inside"

the act.

The motor pattern is not only stimulated, but controlled by

the seeing, so that the stimulus and response are part of a larger co-

ordination.

"Seeing the light" or "hearing the buzzer" is not one self-

contained experience and "effecting the movement" another; the two
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gradually becoming linked together through repeated
contiguity.

In-

stead, these aspects are agglutinated into a single
irreducible thought

or scheme.

No longer is the perception mere seeing; it is "seeingthe-

light- that-means-pushing- the-button." 5
(iii)

Summary and Comment.

The research on determining

tendency and preparatory set are concerned with the way in which intentions are actualized with very brief kinds of activity, e.g., pressing a button on the correct cue, giving the correct verbal response, etc.

This aspect of the literature sheds some light on that aspect of will

which involves the autonomous initiation of intentional, goal -directed
action.

The next area of investigation to be considered focuses on the

maintenance of goal-directed activity in situations where efforts must be
extended over a period of time.

These studies pertain directly to the

second phase of will, perseverance.
4.1.4

PERSEVERANCE

Perseverance has long been recognized in the literature as a

distinguishing characteristic of intentional behavior.

McDougall

(1908) cites it as one of the objective features of purposive

activity.

Tolman (1932) ranked "persistence -until -ends -are -attained" as a basic
criterion for molar purposive behavior, while Lewin frequently focused
on the endurance of tension between psychological regions of the in-

dividual, which he considered to be a causal factor in the sustenance

of goal-oriented action.

5

Even the behavioristic schools of experimental

The basic form of this explanation is based upon John Dewey's
classic critique of Thomas Meynert's attempt to explain learning in terms
of associative links.
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psychology

,

represented by Hull and Skinner, are concerned with
the

problem of continuous and persistent behavior, although
their conceptualization of the construct is based entirely upon extrinsic
environmental

variables and is devoid of any reference to internal organismic
factors.
The research upon which the various theoretical approaches
are based
falls into three distinct categories

(Feather, 1961).

The first category includes those studies which have treated

perseverance as a personality trait which is assumed to be relatively
stable in a variety of circumstances.

Typically, these studies have

attempted to determine whether there is a consistency manifested within
the perseverant behavior patterns of a person from one situation to
another.

Consistency, where it is manifested, is assumed to allow the

inference of a relatively invariant personality characteristic.

The

shortcoming of this approach is that the role of environmental factors
in behavior tends to be ignored since the emphasis is on personality

structures or traits which transcend the situation.
The second group of studies are comprised of those centering

upon the phenomenon of resistance to extinction.

Although this large

body of literature is not commonly classified under the topic of perseverance, some of the research is actually quite relevant since it in-

volves the study of persistence on a difficult task without reinforce-

ment (success) after having been trained on a particular type of reinforcement schedule.

The number of trials the subject performs before

extinction constitutes the measure of perseverance.

Since these studies

deal exclusively with the influence of situational variables, they gen-

erally ignore the possible effect of transnational (stable)
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personality differences.
The third category treats
perseverance as a motivational variable that emerges from an interaction between
stable personality traits,

on the one hand, and extrinsic environmental
factors on the other.
This approach has the advantage of being more complete
than either of
the above conceptions and is able to draw together
their specific con-

tribution into a larger explanatory context.
(i)

Perseverance as a Personality Trait.

Among those stud-

ies in which perseverance is conceived of as a trait underlying
behavior,
a factor analysis of an investigation by MacArthur
(1955) yielded

factors of ’’withstanding discomfort to achieve a goal,” "willingness and/
or ability to endure discomfort,” and "stability of character.”

Al-

though there is some evidence that perseverance is a unitary or homogeneous trait (Eysenck, 1953), it is important to note that several

investigators have not been able to confirm this.

For example, persever-

ance on a physical task (such as a handgrip exercise) does not always

correlate significantly with perseverance on a mental task (such as a
puzzle).

Likewise, persistence on a dull, repetitious task (such as

crossing out figures) does not necessarily intercorrelate with persistance in solving a mathematical problem.

It is this knowledge, that the

task parameters play an important role in determining whether or not an
individual will persevere, that draws attention to those studies con-

cerned with resistance to extinction.
(ii)

Perseverance and Resistance to Extinction.

The usual

design is one in which a subject learns that a certain action or response
in a situation produces a desired result of reinforcement.

Once he has
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learned the connection, the reinforcement
is terminated (without the
subject’s knowledge) and the number of times
he continues to execute the

response without the reward is taken as the
measure of his perseverance.

Different investigators have introduced changes
into various aspects of
this paradigm case in order to observe how
perseverance is affected by

altering the situation.

Briefly summarized, the findings are
(1) when

reinforcement is given intermittently (201-40% of the time),
there is

greater persistence than if
100% of the time)

-

t

(2)

it is administered very frequently (70% -

when reinforcement during the acquisition of re-

sponse is administered irregularly at varying time intervals, the
per-

son shows greater persistence than when reinforcement is administered

during regular intervals.

Thus, the greatest persistence is developed

by those subjects receiving variable and intermittent rewards.

Sub-

jects rewarded intermittently on a regular schedule exhibit less persistence,

and the least degree of persistence

who were trained on a fixed 100% schedule

is shown by subjects

(Deese and Hulse, 1967).

How are these findings to be interpreted?

Why should in-

frequent rewards elicit greater persistence than frequent rewards?
The most plausible explanation is that it is not clear to the subject

when training ends and when extinction begins, i.e., he does not know
exactly when to expect it under normal conditions.

This means that his

expectancy of being rewarded in any given occasion may be quite low and
is less likely to change after an unsuccessful trial than if the ex-

pectancy for a single instance were at a high level.

Thus, the ex-

pectancy or the degree to which a person believes his continued effort
will culminate in the intended result

remains higher after two or
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three unrewarded trials for the subject who is reinforced
infrequently
and irregularly and hence he is more apt to continue
responding in the
face of difficulty or obstacles to success.

Jenkins and Stanley (1950)

found that expectancy during extinction was inversely proportional
to
the percentage of reinforcements during acquisition.

Expectancy of

success in a particular situation, however, is only one of the factors

bearing upon perseverance.

Another important element is how much control the individual
believes he possesses over the situation, i.e., whether he feels he is

responsible for what happens.

If the person perceives the control of

the situation as external to himself, he will less readily persevere than
if he perceives himself to be somewhat in control of the rewards and con-

sequences of his actions.

James and Rotter (1958) observed two groups

of subjects perform under both 100% and partial reinforcement conditions.
One group was led to belive their reward schedule was dependent upon

chance while the other group believed skill was a determining factor in
their reward pattern.

Under both the 100% and partial reinforcement

schedules, the groups operating under the skill conditions persevered

longer than the "chance" group.

Another situational factor which affects perseverance is the
number of alternative response routes available to the subject.

Per-

severance is markedly greater towards goals where more than one course

of action is available following failure of the initial strategy than
in those instances where response is limited to a single activity.

However, the amount of time spent on any one course of action is an in-

verse function of the number of alternative and equally promising
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avenues which the individual knows are open to
him in his pursuit to-

ward the goal.

When he has but one means of tackling the problem,
his

perseverance in that one means is strikingly greater
than it is on the
first of two attacks.

When he has as many as seven alternatives, he

abandons the first very readily
(iii)

Lewin.

(Robinson, 1940)

Lewinian field theory has long recognized the

need to consider behavior in terms of interfacing personality and
situational parameters.

Lewin observed that "what is usually called persis-

tence is an expression of how quickly goals change when the individual

encounters obstacles.

He saw perseverance in terms of a frustration

situation in which a person in a state of tension is separated by some

psychological distance from a goal.

This barrier is the source of re-

straining forces which oppose the positive forces acting upon the person
in the direction of the goal.

Lewin was never explicit about the nature

of this psycholgoical barrier but presumably it could take many different
foims, e.g., physical distance, effort, or time.

The degree to which

this frustration barrier caused an individual to abandon his original in-

tention and turn toward other goals was postulated to be a function of
the individual's personal history of successes and failures in similar

past situations.

Lewin cites a series of studies on young children by

Fajan which serve to illumine this relationship.
summarized as follows:

1)

The findings may be

While past experiences of failure produced

a decrease in persistence at the task (persistence was taken as a func-

tion of the duration of effort exerted toward a goal)
experiences produced an increase in persistence.

2)

,

previous success

When praise and

encouragement accompanied previous success experiences, there was an
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even greater increase.

3)

Fajan found persistence to be inversely

proportional to the subject's distance from the goal,
i.e., persistence
became stronger with decreasing distance from the goal.
(iv)

Perseverance and Achievement Motivation

.

Additional

input to this interactive perspective is offered by several
studies in
the area of achievement motivation.

The theory of achievement motivation

was developed during the early 1950's by McClelland and Atkinson
as a

means of systematically interpreting the observed tendencies in some
individuals to value consistently striving for success at difficult
tasks.

The central construct of the theory, "the achievement motive,"

is defined as the tendency to consider activities as involving evalu-

ation of the outcome on some scale of excellence, and the tendency to
find success in this kind of performance as rewarding (McClelland and

Atkinson, 1953).

In such a situation successful performance at a dif-

ficult level is highly valued and is generally accompanied by a feeling

of pride and accomplishment while failure at an easy level is negatively

valued and is generally accompanied by a feeling of shame and embarassment.

This latter aspect is often called the "motive to avoid failure"

and correlates highly with test anxiety.

At least three studies (Winterbottom, 1958; Thomas, 1956;

French and Thomas, 1958), indicate a strong positive correlation between the need for achievement as measured by the Thematic Apperception Test and perseverance.
1)

The results of these studies suggest that,

the subjective probability or expectancy of success and the positive

(extrinsic) incentive value of success both show a positive correlation
to persistence, 2) the subjective probability or expectancy of failure,
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the negative incentive value of failure,
and the motive to avoid failure
(M af) all correlate negatively with
perseverance.

The theory predicts that if the other extrinsic
factors are

held constant when the motive to achieve success is
greater than the

motive to avoid failure, the resultant motivation is to
perform the task,
while on the other hand, if the motive to avoid failure
exceeds the motive to achieve success, the resultant motivation is to avoid
performing the task.

Likewise, perseverance, the tendency to continue moving

toward a goal in the face of frustration or failure, is manifested only

when the total motivation to perform the task is greater than the motivation to avoid the task or to do something else else.
(v)

Comment.

In this brief review of current theoretical

treatments of the phenomenon of perseverance, we have made an effort
not only to extract the useful data offered by each, but also to point
out some of the limitations inherent in each conceptual approach.

The

basic difficulty with the first approach is that perseverance takes the
form of "thingness” i.e., as a construct it is presumed to be a rather
fixed, static quality or faculty possessed by the individual which can

be activated to varying degrees according to the specific attributes of
the particular occasion.

The other equally unsatisfying position is to

frame the concept exclusively in terns of behavioral attributes manifested
as a function of environmental changes.

Either way, the resultant con-

struct is the result of high abstraction which tries to isolate the

property from context.

This methodology is presumptuous because it

purports to represent the immediate reality of experience when in fact
it can hardly be more remote from this reality.

Nor can a compromise
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of these two extremes (as in achievcmnet motivation) yield a
satisfactory solution because neither approach deals with the dimension of

evolutionary construction- -a dimension of crucial importance inasmuch
as we assume the most salient quality of the human organism to be its

participation in a continual process of creative transformation.

'Hie re

can be no separation or abstraction of a thing from its context of in-

terrelatedness with other things in the continual progression toward
novelty.

Perseverance as a process, then, is a natural phase in the
teleological aspiration of the organism toward the unfoldmcnt of po-

tentiality in the act of will.

Perseverance is the operation of main-

taining the actualization of purpose when this ongoing process encounters resistance.

Resistance may take the form of distractions (pro-

pensity to engage in activities extraneous to the immediate task)
time, obstacles (both physical and non-physical) waning energy level,
and insufficient knowledge.

Accordingly, perseverance may be seen as

the pressing force of purpose at the threshold of some novel consum-

mation.

Perseverance, as the maintaining phase of purpose, implies an

apprehension of personal efficacy upon one's future, i.e., a sense of

expectancy and control.

In addition, the intensity or magnitude of

perseverance depends upon the strength of the underlying intention,
level of aspiration, and the extent to which the organism is able to

attend or focus upon the circumscribed aspects

oi

the situation (ideal

as well as actual) relevant to the particular concrescence.
be
It is important that any definition of perseverance

process
firmly based upon the conception of its organic nature as a
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inextricably related to the total process of actualization.

To attempt

a description via abstracting and isolating the
concept from this con-

text is to completely lose sight of its meaning.

It should be clear at

this point that the concept of perseverance simply cannot
be reduced to

any characteristic behavioral pattern without resulting in
triviality.
For example, perseverance does not necessarily mean mere repetition
or

rote activity.

In some cases, it may involve giving up or yielding one

course of action in order to come back and try another approach to the
same problem.

activity.

Perseverance also does not invariably imply incessant

It may mean attempting something intermittently, perhaps

even stopping altogether to await the appropriate time to resume action.
4.1.5

EFFECTING CLOSURE
Almost all the research relevant to this aspect of will comes

from experiments carried out by Lewin's students on Lewin's concept of
task-tension.

This metaphor is derivative of Lewin’s field theory

model of motivation.

The effect of a task or intention is compared

to some kind of system under tension such as a spring operating against

counter- forces, or the pressure of gas inside a container.

Lewin

held that task-tension was more than an analogical expression, but
was a real force operating in the psychological field.

Ryan (1970) has

pointed out, however, that the concept of task- tension adds little explanatory weight to the phenomenon it describes, i.e., the tendency of
individuals to follow through adopted tasks to their completion.

Since

the construct was never framed in terms of a set of principles which go

beneath the observed facts, it is really nothing more than a convenient
label or synonym.

Nevertheless, the idea of task-tension generated a

large body of research on the effects of task interruption upon the
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tendency to recall and/or resume activity on the
interrupted task.

Ovsiankina (1928) devised experiments in which she
could interrupt activity in various ways and observe subsequent behavior
to determine

how frequently subjects would resume the uncompleted task.

In the vast

majority of cases, even where the activity was relatively
uninteresting,
subjects went back at the first opportunity to the unfinished exercise.
However, the tendency to resume the interrupted activity was signifi-

cantly lower when the interruption consisted of starting a new task, al-

though the resumption rate even in this case was still 79%.
of more recent follow-up studies have replicated Ovsiankina'

A number
s

findings,

but more research is needed to ascertain the role of individual per-

sonality differences.
The well-known studies of another of Lewin's students,

Zeigamik, are also worthy of note.

Zeigamik

(1927) found that when

students were presented with a series of comparable tasks, some of which

were interrupted, they were more likely to remember the uncompleted
rather than the completed tasks when tested.

The fact that recalling

the task and the spontaneous tendency to complete it are so concurrent,

suggests a relation between the "idea" or representation of the task and
its actualization.

Once again, this empirical relation corroborates

James’ basic thesis that the cause of voluntary action resides with the

direction of one's attention toward the "idea" of what the act is to be.
At the moment, there is painfully little empirical evidence
on specific developmental changes in the "Zeigamik effect" or the ten-

dency to spontaneously resume unfinished tasks.

Consequently, it is

difficult to draw any direct inferences from the literature about the
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nature of the process underlying the observed phenomenon.

As it stands

now, the facts merely indicate that people in general show
a propensity
to consummate unfinished tasks.

However, there is one connection which

offers a basis of speculation.

The fact that recalling the interrupted

task and the spontaneous tendency to complete it are concurrent

sug-

gests a relation between the presence of the idea or representation of

the task and its actualization.

Once again, this could be seen as an

exemplification of James’ thesis that the cause of voluntary action resides with the direction of one’s attention toward the ’’idea" of what
the act is to be.

4.1.6

SUMMARY:

TOWARD A COHERENT DEFINITION OF WILL

Nearly the entire corpus of research that relates to intentional behavior- -the studies on determining tendency, preparatory set,

resistance to extinction, perseverance, task tension- -can be plausibly

explained in terms of the basic theoretical scheme of will put forth
over half a century ago by James and McDougall.

The results of this

research, however, provide added detail and coherence to their basic

conceptual scheme and it seems appropriate to summarize briefly, in
context with the original scheme, the specific contributions afforded

by these studies:
1)

The actualization of a purpose follows spontaneously

from unencumbered attention toward the unrealized possibility.

The felt

image of the possibility in one's consciousness merges into, and be-

comes the bodily expression.

As the intended idea gains prominence in

exthe phenomenal field, it accordingly evokes an analogous ideo-motor

pression.

"Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree

the actual movement which is its object."
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2)

vary

(a)

The extent to which the idea is realized in
action will

as a function of the intensity of feeling
associated with the

idea itself

and (b) according to the relative predominance of
the idea

over other conflicting tendencies.
3)

The structural properties of the willed idea can be
seen

as an ascending-descending hierarchy of organismic processes
which are

tacitly

coordinated by the central presiding purpose.

The articulated

focal intention itself is merely the tip of the iceberg beneath with

the myriad of contemporary, kinesthetic, haptic, and sensorial opera-

tions are integrated.

In fact, the structure of the willing process is

identical to the structure of attention (described in Section 2.1.4).
The willing of the conscious intention is sustained by a massive number

of subsidiary schema spanning all the way from molecular operations to
the abstract purpose entertained in consciousness.

Without the cor-

roboration of the subsidiary processes, the will is impeded.
4)

The act of willing involves an integrated coordination

of both afferent and efferent processes which subtends both the ap-

prehension of the relevant data in the external world and the motor
patterns that are finally enacted.
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4.2

4.2.1

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION

OVERVIEW: WILL AND THE ACTUALIZATION
OF POTENTIALITY
As one might expect, the research that has dealt directly

with the relation of will to learning is scant indeed.
least one study worthy of mention.

Yet there is at

Morgan (1941) studied the relation

between level of achievement and perseverance.

Two groups of children

equated for IQ and age were given a problem for which there was no final
solution.

One group had completed several training sessions in a per-

sistence maze (an exercise supposedly designed to develop perseverance)
This? group worked longer as a whole and generated more superior so-

lutions than did the control group.

These results are hardly surprising

--it would seem inevitable that all other things being equal, a person

who further extends his efforts toward a task is likely to emerge with
a higher quality solution.

Though left without an arsenal of research

data to establish the role of "will" in various aspects of human development, there is yet recourse to the sentience of informal knowledge
and direct experience.
If one accepts the proposition argued in Chapter One, that

man is a purposive being, i.e.

that the purposes he comes to know and

feel do indeed mold and pattern the fabric of his interactions with the

external world, then the pivotal importance of will, the process by which
intentions are actualized becomes self-evident.

However, the relation is

the interest
so central as to deserve a more explicit statement, both in

of clarity and coherence.

In Chapter One, a fundamental reorientation of

of an organism
first principles was advocated in which the final reality
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was defined as a process--a process in which data, potential
and actual,
are integrated into a unified novel expression of the organism's
sub-

jective aim.

In the case of a human being, will is implicated in the

highest level of concrescence.

world of potentiality- -one
the world of actuality.

'

s

For in the process of willing, the

ideals and aims--becomes integrated with

Through the infusion of these elements which

lie beyond the concrete immediacy of the world as given, the human

organism is capable of enormous creativity.
Without will, these two vital aspects of the self (ideal and
actual), which mutually require one another, become dissociated; the
aims and ideals do not participate in the construction of reality and

eventually they lose their meaning.

Devoid of these higher integrating

principles, the individual's actions may be reduced to mere reaction
towards a situation on the basis of superficial impulses.

Such pat-

terns of behavior preclude genuinely creative levels of expression be-

cause they tend to lack consistency, coherence and vision.
The implications of will as a factor in the integration of

personality have also been discussed by Rank (1921)
Farber,

(1965).

,

Frankl (1969)

,

and

These writers provide clinical testimony that the dis-

sociation of ideality from actuality can lead to a disintegration of
the personality structure which, if extreme, may result in various

forms of mental pathology.

(See R. D. Lang's The Divided Self.)

There is another implication which can be derived from the

organismic framework.

In each occasion of concrescence, potentiality is

the
suffused with the actual data and something novel is created, i.e.,

by the
whole introduces a new element into the situation unpredicted
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component data as separate entities.

The resultant concrescence re-

introduces diversity into the system and in turn creates
the potential
for a new unity to succeed it.

Transposing this model to the human con-

dition we see that when an intention is willed into actuality, the
immanent basis of the self (the data) has been altered and new possibilities are within reach.

The student who labors through exercises in

counterpoint will be able to envision potential compositions which a
student without such practice would be unable to imagine.

Thus, will

contributes ultimately to the creative advance by generating poten-

tiality as a result of the actualization process.

The potentiality for

space technology rests on the achievement of a highly complex system of

mathematics and the potentiality for calculus and analytic geometry in
turn relies on the attainment, the actuality , of basic number relations,
etc.

Turning to a less abstract analysis of the relation between

will and creativity, Whitehead notes that creative process involves
two very different kinds of activity.

The first is a free, unrestricted

flow of though and fancy, a ’'romance” of the imagination in which ideas
are

bom.

The second aspect involves disciplining the mind to begin

elaborating, developing, consolidating and refining the nascent idea to
a mature realization.

In this vein, it is interesting that Beethoven

allegedly produced no less than 20 versions of the first movement of
his Fifth Symphony before he came up with what he considered to be an ac-

ceptable result.
4.2.2

WILL AND PERCEPTUAL -MOTOR COMPETENCE
deThe mastery of a complex learned psychomotor skill often

pends upon a great deal of practice.

When a child is learning to co-
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ordinate

the many muscle movements required for walking, many
repeated

efforts are required or else the child would never learn.

Similarly, a

virtuoso pianist must practice persistently in order to achieve consummate mastery.
4.2.3

Such practice requires a tenacious perseverance.

WILL AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT
The aim of moral competence is to develop patterns of relating

to others in ways that foster the mutual release of human potential.

Will is an extremely vital process in developing and maintaining such
constructive principles in one's interactions in a social context.

Willing requires the individual to apprehend and respond to whatever
situation he finds himself, in concordance with the ideals he holds,

even in situations where the immediate circumstances are aversive.
Incidently, this "moral will" is not to be confused with "moral rigidity"

wherein certain patterns of behavior are invar iantly enacted.

The ex-

pression of a moral ideal will be determined not only by the ideal but
also by the specific circumstances in question.

The actualization must

be relevant both to the ideal and to the data.

4.3

DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

At this point it should be clear that the development of will
is inextricably linked with the development of the organism's other ca-

pacities.

Thus, it is very difficult to separate conceptually the on-

togenesis of will from the emergence of psycho-motor, perceptual, affective and cognitive function.

But this is as it should be, since the

terms of
approach taken in organic analysis is to define a process in

function of interits relation with other processes, i.e., meaning is a

relatedness.

Admitting this position, however, theoretically commits
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the present author to a task the magnitude of which falls
far beyond
the bounds of a dissertation.

With full acknowledgement of this fact,

the following remarks must necessarily remain incomplete and restricted
to very general statements.

Since will is conceptualized as a specialized extension of
the more general operations of intending and attending, the develop-

mental trends and periods of these processes apply also to the epigenesis of will.

Since these trends have been outlined in previous

chapters, they need not be repeated here.

However, there are some

additional comments and further data which need to be considered.
In comtemplating the issue at hand, my mind is drawn back

to the statement of James that volition is primarily a relation be-

tween "our self and our own states of mind"' that, in willing an act,
there is nothing else in the mind but the kinesthetic idea of what
the act is to be.

It will be remembered that the Jamesian notion of

idea is remarkably analogous to the more contemporary concept of set.
In Chapter Two, it was seen how "preperceptual" sets function in the

operation of attention.

Through continual interactions with the

environment, the organism develops a structure or schema which is

brought to bear upon incoming afferent stimulation.

A preperceptual

set is the cumulative product of previous differentiations and in-

tegrations and when conjoined with incoming sense data the organism

can select, assimilate, and interpret new data almost instantaneously.

Similar sets are developed for the various multitude of routine motor
activities such as walking, writing, driving, etc.
tute an essential aspect of the core idea.

These sets consti

Obviously, without the

tacit knowledge of the set, the idea cannot be willed.

A child who
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has never sat on a bicycle seat will be unable to ride the
bicycle on

his first attempt no matter how hard he tries.

The problem then arises

of explaining how these sets are acquired and what is the characteristic

pattern of their evolution.
According to James, one can have no a priori idea of move-

ment which one has not already performed.

’’Before the idea can be gen-

erated, the movement must have occurred in a blind unexpected way, and
left its idea behind."

This basic thesis has some validity insofar as

it recognizes the prerequisite, "tacit” knowledge of the content of

the action before it can be executed.

However, it is untenable to the

extent that it disallows for the real possibility of deliberately novel
action.

Certainly, massive inheritance lies behind every increment of

creative activity, but the element of novelty, however slight, is irrefutable and cannot be dismissed.

Otherwise, one is led to the absurd

conclusion that imaginative and intelligent thought exert no influence
on behavior.

Or, one must conclude with equal absurdity that all kin-

esthetic sets are pre-existent (a proposition which James disavowed at
the outset).

Thus in the formation of intentional sets, there is not

merely the distilled accumulation Of past experience but also the active
transformation of personal history in terms of possibilities yet unrealized.

Some of Piaget’s observations provide a documentary of the

ontogenesis of these intentional sets in infancy and early childhood.
(Piaget, 1954).

Although Piaget's interest in making these observations

as it
was not so much to study the development of intentional behavior

was to trace the antecedents of logical thought in children,
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nevertheless, the data are relevant.

Between two and four months of age, the child’s activity
is

characterized by "primary circular reactions”.

During this stage, the

infant s behavior shows nascent signs of purposive
initiation.

The

ends toward which movement is effected are immediate and
very limited,
e.g., watching intently and smiling at an adult, giggling at
the sound

of a rattle, systematic thumb sucking.

The significant limitation of

this stage is that the intentional reaction can be aroused only if the

eliciting stimulus is actually present.
The "secondary circular reaction" appears during the ages of

four to eight months and is distinguished from the primary circular re-

action in two respects.
complex.

1)

The unit of intentional action is more

In the previous stage, "seeing the stimulus" and "effecting

the action" are undifferentiated and global, i.e., the appearance of "A"
and the motion "B" exist as a contemporary whole.

In the "secondary

circular reaction," "A" and VB" are differentiated and perceived separately as two things, yet are integrated into a causal relation.
set "A
2)

The

B" is constructed through mutation and exhaustive repetition.

The intentional set is capable of preceding the eliciting stimulus.

This element of field independence signifies a step toward increased in-

ward control of action
The ability to intend situations and actions

absent from the

perceptual field is increased between eight and 12 months.

The child is

able to voluntarily apply old patterns or sets in new situations.
The "tertiary circular reaction" develops during twelve to

eighteen months and is marked by the tendency to explore novel variations
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of old behavior patterns.

Hunt (1965) has also documented a dramatic

shift in the child's interest towards novel
situations.

For instance,

in babbling, the child will deliberately vary his
vocalizations, or, he

will explore many different ways of interacting with
a familiar toy.
IXiring

this time he shows an extraordinary ability to develop
new

patterns of activity never before performed.

In healthy individuals,

the quest for novelty remains predominant throughout the remainder
of
life, even into old age.

On the basis of the data reviewed in this and earlier chapters, the following speculations on the developmental progression of

will are offered.

Note the resemblance of these genetic dimensions to

those of attention and goal -setting.
The "intentional sets" or "schema" (the original impulse on

which will is totally dependent) exhibit in the wake of increasing maturation,
1)

greater degrees of "field independence" --that is, an act

may be willed in the absence of the goal object and initiated and sustained in an environment adverse to the attainment of the goal;
2)

an advance toward greater novelty, transcending the

boundaries of habit and the familiar.

The ground of possibilities plays

an ever more important role in the formation of intentional action;
3)

the focus of will (the focus of attention), in James'

words, gradually shifts from "resident" to "remote" cues.
In other words, through experience, the "subsidiary" levels

of a willed act recede from consciousness, thus allowing the individual
to entertain more complex (more distal) actions.
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Two other trends are noteworthy.
The tenacity of a child*

A.

s

capacity to will

increases as

a function of his level of knowledge connected with the act.

The the-

oretical basis underlying this assertion is that a child who is more

competent has more alternative courses of action available to him when
facing an impasse, and hence he will be less apt to give in than would

someone with fewer alternatives (See 4.1.4).
The child's capacity to will is most intense at that

B.

time when he is maximally engaged in the learning process, especially

when experiencing a sense of progress which is leading to the threshold
of mastery.

There is some support for this hypothesis in White's no-

tion of competence motivation (1959), and J. McV. Hunt's concept of

"motivation inherent in information processing (1965)."

Both stress

the importance of an environment rich in contrasts and incongruity

during the early years.

This provides the child with opportunities to

be purposively engaged in a process of discovery and mastery and to be

continually transcending the bounds of his limitations.

4.4

EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES

To develop the capacity to actualize a reflectively chosen

goal or intention.
1.

To initiate, autonomously, action leading to the ful-

fillment of a goal.
2.

To persevere- -to sustain appropriate efforts toward the

and
realization of a goal or intention when encountering difficulties

lengths of
to repeat actions decided upon regularly and for extended
time.
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3.

To consummate the achievement of a goal.

4.

To actualize an intention judged to be highly congruent

with one's overall purposes and long-term goal when less congruent conflicting impulses are present.

The specific expression of this ob-

jective will be determined by the context.
(a)

overcoming procrastinating tendencies;

Two such expressions are:
(b)

self-restraint of non-

constructive or destructive impulses, e.g., inappropriate aggressive
behavior.

4.5

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

In the broadest sense, instruction can be seen as the process

of arranging learning environments and guiding the learner's interaction

with them in such ways as to maximize the development of his latent
potentialities.

Before proceeding to specific learning experiences, it

seems appropriate to mention some general implications afforded by the

literature for fostering the development of will.
A.

The structure of most school scheduling systematically

deprives the child of the opportunity to consummate sequences of goal-

directed activity.

A specific example of this suppressive dimension can

be seen in the way the school day is chopped up into time blocks which

are incapable of yielding to the child's attempt to fulfill his own

goals and intentions.

More often than not a child is apt to be in-

terrupted by the tardy bell while in the midst of some task with the
result that he will be unable to follow through on intentions he may
have set for himself.

If such arbitrary interruptions become the rule,

valued by the
the child is likely to feel his goals and aims are not
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institutional community.

This will surely influence the way in which

the child himself views his own aspirations.

When the continuity of his

efforts to persevere and effect closure are often thwarted, he will find
little reason to continue striving.
However, interruptions, if handled properly, can facilitate

perseverance.

Students can be assisted to plan their time and budget

their efforts over long periods, but this requires the teacher to help

preserve the continuity and integrity of each child’s chosen task.
B.

The above remarks concerning the management of inter-

ruptions have important implications for fostering a sense of personal
efficacy.

To see and feel oneself as efficacious, in control of one's

situation, is a prime requisite in the capacity to will an intention into actuality.

This involves much more than a vague sense of self-esteem

--it consists of a unified sense of personal identity at the core of

which is the ideal of self-determination.
McDougall was referring to such a sense of personal causation

when he wrote that the "idea of his self which each man entertains plays
an essential part in volition."

Empirical verification of the relation

between the sense of efficacy and the actural degree of striving is
provided by numerous studies on achievement motivation

(Section 4.1.4).

These studies also indicate that the sense of self-efficacy and the degree of striving is,

1)

facilitated by previous success experiences,

attenuated by repeated experiences of failure,
encouragement.

3)

)

increased by praise and

All of these variables influence the subjective proba

bility of achieving success.
One practical

2

application of these findings would be to
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allow the child as much independence as he can handle in directing
his
learning activities.

If he feels the outcome of his efforts are beyond

his control, he will probably abort the task when he encounters difficulty.

However, if he presides over the situation with a sense of

personal control, and knows consequences are not externally determined,
he his more apt to persevere at a task even if the result is failure.

On the other hand, caution must be exercised so as not to over-extend
the child’s abilities to manage a situation alone.

Unrealistic ex-

pectations can set the child up for guaranteed failure and seriously
erode his sense of self-determination.

He begins to anticipate fail-

ure regardless of his efforts and therefore sees no reason to continue
trying.

A constructive approach would therefore be to grant indepen-

dence gradually, keeping pace with the child’s expanding capabilities
so that his successes outnumber his failures.

Failure in small amounts,

however, can be beneficial because it nurtures the tenacity of will
(and ingenuity in searching for alternate means)

.

This fact is well

documented in the research on ’’resistance to extinction.”

A child who

has never met with failure will never learn how to persevere in the
face of obstacles.

With this in mind, the teacher should occasionally give the
student tasks which are slightly beyond his present range of accomplishnot
ment and if he fails or meets with difficulties, the teacher would

step in and complete the task for the child.

It is of much greater

remediate
value to encourage the youngster to pinpoint the problem,

and make another attempt.

it,

If the child is failing because a different

child's perspecapproach is called for, the teacher might reorient the

problem may be solved.
tive asking questions as to what other ways the
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the teacher could suggest specific strategies or provide clues to
a
solution.

The point is for the teacher to be as parsimonious (but not

miserly) as possible in administering assistance, giving the child no

more help than he really needs to achieve his goal.
C.

A general principle which seems to be emerging out of

these specific considerations is that the dimension of identity as-

sociated with self-determination is cultivated and strengthened by a

personal history of having successfully actualized one's goals and
intentions.

This principle in part lends some justification to the

popular and often scoffed at "exercises for strengthening one's willpower."

James, however, took the value of such exercise seriously,

Keep alive in yourself the faculty of making efforts by
means of little useless exercises every day, that is to
say, be systematically heroic every day in little unnecessary things; do something every other day, for the
sole and simple reason that it is difficult and you
would prefer not to do it, so that when the cruel hour
of danger strikes, you will not be unnerved or unprepared. A self-dicipline of this kind is similar to the
insurance that one pays on one's house and on one's possessions. To pay the premium is not pleasant and possibly may never serve us, but should it happen that our
house were burnt, the payment will save us from ruin.
Similarly, the man who has accustomed himself steadily,
day after day, to concentrating his attention, to will
with energy, for instance, not to spend money on unnecessary things, will be well rewarded by his effort.
When disasters occur, he will stand firm as a rock,
even though faced on all sides by ruin, while his companions in distress will be swept aside as the chaff
(James, 1900).
from the sieve

The Psychosynthesis Research Foundation (1972) has suggested
setting
several exercises based on this principle most of which involve

such as
small specific tasks to which one diligently attends each day,

activity
beginning an activity at a certain precise time and terminating
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at another predetermined time.

The tasks are not difficult and there

is no special intrinsic value in the acts themselves.

The benefit seems

to derive from the process of intending the act and then executing
it

completely and excellently.

This might be done in the case of the common,

daily routines such as getting dressed in the morning.

If the various

movements are executed with care and attention, efficiently but not
hurriedly, the experience of having satisfactorily and deliberately

controlled a series of events contributes to an immanent sense of personal efficacy which is brought to bear upon subsequent experiences.
D.

The technique described here is a tentative speculation.

The following learning experience is intended to facilitate instances

Of complex will.

Complex will was described in Section 4.1.2 as oc-

curring when the chosen course of action is contravened by powerful
tendencies antagonistic to the goal.

Experimentally, such instances

have been studied under the rubric of "approach- avoidance conflicts."
James spoke of such a condition as involving "will with effort" while

McDougall labelled it "volition."

In any case, having to engage in

some less than pleasant task, judged necessary, or acting in spite of
fear, anger, anxiety, despair, or fatigue, is a familiar experience

to almost every human being.

It is this sort of situation which the

lay person associates with the term "volition."

Depending upon the

circumstances, the behavioral attributes of this process may mean

either initiating action toward a valued end or autonomously discon-

tinuing or restraining impulsive action detrimental to the realization

of valued ends.

For the purpose of continuity, we will use James'

piototypical
episode of getting out of bed on a freezing morning as a
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example (the full account of which appears in Section 2.2.2).

It will

be recalled how he traces his inability to get up to the paralyzing
am-

bivalence of two conflicting tendencies, "the warmth of the bed and the

cold outside."

The crucial turning point which released him from this

ambivalence occurred when the focus of his attention shifted to a

fantasy connected with the coming day’s events.

Because fantasy is

a mode of attention and because attention is both unitary and selec-

tive, the tendencies generated in response to the immediate percep-

tual data are displaced from consciousness by the conceptual prehen-

sion of unrealized possibilities.

conflict issuing

The imagination transcends the

from the organism's attention to the immediate

actuality of warmth versus cold, and releases energies for the spontaneous expression of the imagined possibilities.

The transcendant

quality of the fantasy is particularly important in resolving the
conflict between the competing propensities, the reason being that
fantasy extends beyond the realm of the immediate present; the sphere
in which the conflict is operative.

Once again, the hierarchical

structure of the intentional scheme allows further insight into the

dynamics underlying the resultant action.

The fantasized possibility

represents, to use James’ expression, a "remote" (versus resident)
image- -the focus of attention dwells almost entirely in the contem-

plated end-result rather than within the intervening perceptual -motor
processes.

James discovered his getting out of bed occurred within

tacit, suba lapse of consciousness because the act transpired as a

sidiary expression of his focal attention toward the "distal

fantasy.

as part of a
In this case, the sequence of "getting up" functioned
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larger coordination of activity.
Thus, the parameters of the technique involve two basic

elements:

1)

The first step is to discintinue all ongoing activity

temporarily and induce relaxation.

Any means of relaxation available

to the individual may be utilized, closing the eyes and breathing

deeply and slowly.

2)

Once the pace of physical and mental activity

is quiescent, the individual should begin imagining the intended

situation.

The construction of the image (visual, auditory, kines-

thetic) can accrue gradually but systematically- -every few seconds a

new aspect of the potential situation should be introduced.

It is

particularly important that the content of one’s contemplated activity
along with the associated feelings and emotional ambient of the situ-

ation be imaged.

At some point, fantasies of actions relevant to the

situation will be generated spontaneously.

As these fantasies unfold,

they should be voluntarily nurtured and followed through.

Once the im-

agination gains momentum and the impulse to act is felt, movement should
be allowed to follow and no restraints imposed.
In cases where the aim is to inhibit or restrain a strong,

spurious impulse, such as anger and agression, McDougall's insights inimplications.
to the fundamental process behind inhibition have important

suppression
Inhibition, it will be recalled, is effected not by a direct
of an alternate
of negative impulse, but by focusing on the facilitation

tendency.

for the conSuch a technique appears to be a promising means

trol of emotional behavior.

For example, if one is angered and frustra-

slowness or error, the anger
ted with the behavior of another because of
some aspect of the other
may be slowed by focusing one's attention on
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person’s behavior which evokes opposite feelings of affection and
empathy.
Such aspects include, if nothing else, that other person’s latent potentiality, his ideals, aspirations, his reality as a fellow human-being in

search of meaning and fulfillment, struggling with the stresses and
tests of life as best as he can.
In view of what little developmental data exist on attention,

goal-setting, etc., it might

seem somewhatunrealistic to expect very

young children to be capable of reacting in tenns of such abstract
propositions.

But the capacity for empathy and appreciation does not

rest primarily on the capacity for conceptual abstraction, as anyone

who has worked with mental retardates can affirm.
E.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the exercises

prescribed for attention are presupposed and directly transferable
as learning experiences for the development of will.

4.6

EVALUATION

At present there are no standardized tests for the quantitative measurement of will.

It is true that the "French Test of In-

sight" and the TAT have been used as measures of perseverance.

How-

ever, their use is justified on the basis of their supposed correla-

tion with the need for achievement.

Ryan (1970) has given sufficient

reason to question seriously the validity of these applications.

Con-

sidering this state of affairs, naturalistic observation probably reany
mains the most valid and the most reliable means for assessing

changes

and
in the development of self- initiation, perseverance,

effecting closure.
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One difficulty standing in the way of standardized measures
is that there are no strict and stable behavioral criteria associated

with these processes.

Many intentions, such as thought and concen-

tration, involve inner activities not directly observable.

However,

the presence of such acts may be inferred from an indeterminate set

of cues.

This is why the objectives of Section 4.4 were deliberately

framed in general terns.

This difficulty does not mean that accurate

assessment, under limited conditions, is impossible.

put can be extremely valuable.

In fact, such in-

Such conditions, in which the process

is accessible to observation, include cases where the child's goals and

intentions involve motor activity, i.e., tasks with tangible results

such as building, painting, etc.

The child's verbal or pictorial pre-

presentations of his goals, and his performance with respect to those
goals in terms of level of difficulty, frequency of attainment, and

degree of persistence, can be used as a baseline criterion for each child.
Changes expressed in terms of the criterion can provide a rough longitudinal assessment, at least of the directional properties of the child's

development
There is one final problem pertinent to evaluation which is in
is
need of research: that is, whether or not the level of the criterion

task specific or task independent.

If it is task- specific, then the use

of the criterion measure would be invalid.

Such results would also call

Psychosynthesis Research
into question the rationale put forth by the
for the value of "will exercises."

The assumption is that the strength-

on one particular task will
ening of the capacity to actualize intentions

realize intentions in a
yield a generalized effect on the ability to
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completely different task.

CXir

own explanation for the anticipated

beneficial effect of such exercises rests on a much different theoretical basis and has nothing to do with the conception of will as a dis-

crete unitary "faculty” which, like a muscle tissue is presumably

strengthened through exercise (See Section 4.5, "C")

5.

A

FINAL NOTE

The role of subjective purpose in determining the construction

of reality is so fundamental that it has often been overlooked in the
scientific study of human behavior.

Within the scope of current method-

ology, psychologists and biologists tend to be attracted to clear-cut and

highly specific sorts of problems.

But the problem of purpose is both

pervasive and incredibly polymorphous.

For though efficacious in the

physical world, purposes cannot be defined strictly in terms of stable
behavioral variables.

Since science in general, and psychology in par-

ticular, have operated upon a metaphysics of materialism, any recogni-

tion of purposive causes as such has traditionally been seen as scien-

tifically unproductive.

Chapter One stands as an effort to demonstrate

the untenability of such a position and offers.amore adequate meta-

physical framework within which the concept of purpose might be understood.

Upon this foundation, the theory of volition seeks to describe

directs, and
in a coherent fashion the way in which purpose organizes,

impels the process of human becoming.

Conceptually, volition encompasses

operation,
three successively more specialized levels of purposive

at-

tention,” ’’goal -setting,” and ’’will.”
Chinese boxes, each
The visual analogy was suggested of three

box contained within a larger box.

The outermost box represents at ten-

purpose.
tion, the most basic expression of

Contained within the larger

attention--goal-setting.
box is a more specialized version of

And with-

The
the process of will is generated.
in the boundaries of goal-setting
and
specialized processes depend upon
analogy illustrates how the more
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presuppose the more general processes, yet at the same time contribute
an additional dimension of definiteness and actuality,

Thus, will pre-

supposes an intention or goal, while goal-setting presupposes attention

toward the realm of unrealized possibilities.

Despite the dearth of direct research on goal-setting and
will, there is a considerable amount of empirical study on topics di-

rectly relevant to these processes and this evidence, along with the
speculative insights of many creative minds, provide enough data to

construct a first approximation of a comprehensive theory of volition.
Because attention is the most fundamental process upon which
the others are based, it is given the most extended treatment.

In brief,

attention is defined as the process by which the individual pruposively
selects (differentiates) and structures (integrates) feelings, as well
as the sensory and conceptual data of the immediate present into a unity

of conscious experience.

As a process, it is sustained through a con-

with the
tinual transformation of the data which the organism prehends,
novel realms.
result that conscious experience is always penetrating into

transition
Research demonstrates that if this condition of flux and

subsides into stasis,
stalls, if the interaction between subject and data

attention and consciousness will disintegrate.

This holds some far-reach

content of educational experiing implications for the organization and
ences.

attention, many forms
There is substantial evidence that without

else proceed very inefficiently.
of learning either cannot take place or
the
in Section 2.3 suggests that
The developmental progression outlined

depends heavily on concrete
growth of attention in early childhood
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sensori-motor manipulation of objects in the environment.

Yet, young

children are often subjected to inert infoimation and restricted to
passive instructional roles, reducing both their capacity to attend and

their will to learn.

Educational experiences should be geared to foster

the type of interaction between the child and his environment which leads
to the experience of penetration and adventure (See section 2.5 for

learning experiences)
Goal -set ting --anticipating and selecting future possibilities

toward which one will strive- -requires the individual to bring into clear
figure, alternative courses of action by which the desired goal may be

realized, to project the consequences which the various possibilities

hold for development, to determine the priorities of the possible
alternatives, and to integrate the final decision into a coherent plan
for action.

Finally, the individual must develop some degree of com-

mitment to the decision.

This is most important since commitment

protects nascent plans and intentions from fragmentation.

Drawing from

the developmental hypotheses offered in Section 3.4, educational efforts

should provide experiences which will increase the degree of differen-

tiation and integration of the goals envisioned by the learner, i.e., to
help articulate with increasing specificity,
2)

1)

the goal state itself,

being enthe discrepancy between one's present condition and the goal

in order
tertained, and 3) the sequence of actions which must transpire

to actualize the goal.

In addition, learning experiences should nurture

reference to more abstract
the capacity to develop long-range goals with

ends (such as higher-order values and ideals).
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Will, the process of bringing a goal into fruition or realizing an intention in action, follows spontaneously from unencumbered

attention toward the unrealized goal.

It is ideo -motor --as the inten-

ded idea gains prominence in the conscious field, the mental feeling
of the possibility merges into and becomes the bodily expression.

The

effectiveness of the process depends on the intensity with which the
idea is experienced and the relative predominance of the idea over other

conflicting tendencies.

According to this theoretical account, fantasy

plays a key role in the process of will.

We have repeatedly asserted

that attention is at the heart of every volitional process and the

function of fantasy is a case in point:

Fantasy is merely a mode of

attention in which the data are potential rather than actual.

Being able

to fantasize or project oneself into the intended situation energizes and

motivates one to action.

James once pointed out, if an exciting idea is

brought before the mind, action will immediately follow.
In summary, because volition is an indispensable process

underlying the release of human potential it therefore must become a
central concern within any educational enterprise that takes seriously
the task of fostering the creative growth of the full range of capaci-

ties folded within every human being.

As Huxley observed, man cannot

relegate the evolution of his individual and collective existence simply
to the external conditions impinging upon him.

He is a purposive being

him to
and his sense of purpose is the primary element which enables

shape his future.

Evolutionary advancement rests on the organism's

ability to transcend the present.

Purpose and volition, the basis of

the present by going
transcendence, represent at once the fulfillment of
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beyond it.
In parting,

I

wish to re-emphasize the speculative nature of

this dissertation and the need for a systematic program of follow-up
re~
search.

Until more empirical evidence is available the conceptual frame-

work must be regarded as tentative.

Another very important task which

awaits future talent is to generate new practical techniques and methods

from the basic theoretical scheme developed here.
As Whitehead points out, producing a speculative scheme in-

volves imagination far outrunning direct observation, but- -and he writes

with the weight of historical evidence in hand,
The secret of progress is the speculative interest in
abstract schemes of morphology.
Except for the
rarest accidents of chance thought precedes observation.
It may not decide the details, but it suggests the type.
Nobody would count whose mind was vacant of the idea of
number. Nobody directs attention when there is nothing
he expects to see. The novel observation which comes
by chance is a rare accident, and is usually wasted.
For if there be no scheme to fit it into, its sig(Whitehead, 1929a, p. 72).
nificance is lost
.

.

.
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